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Preamble
The choice of this particular subject area for research had its gen
esis in the desire
to produce work that could possibly be of som
e immediate as well as hopefully
lasting practical utility and relevance.
This desire was itself fuelled by two main factors
:
1. The absence to the writer’s knowledge, of any
substantial publication or other available work on
Jamaican
Maritime Law perse; and
2. the writer’s own experiences in the private p
ractice of
law in Jamaica and his consequent perceptions r
egarding the
research needs in the maritime law sphere.
The actual span of the thesis is to some extent a
reflection of the writer’s striving
towards fulfillment of the above mentioned desire
.
Thus, admittedly from the standpoint of theoreti
cal analysis, the writer could
have been kept busy and happy enough in looking
only at one of the major sub
areas spanned by the thesis.
However, it was felt that from a practical standpoint, while paying cognizance to
other relevant considerations, it would be more useful to take a broader perspective
along the lines adopted in the dissertation.
This work is therefore a modest attempt to make an initial contribution to the
virgin area of Jamaican Maritime Jurisprudence.
In so doing an attempt has been made to, inter alia, put Jamaica’s Admiralty
Jurisdiction and its Maritime Law generally in a proper historical, institutional,
policy, and jurisprudential setting.
This, at least, it is hoped might be of some future value. If, in addition, the pith
of the study should ring well and find itself translated into some practical use, then
the writer would consider his efforts very much rewarded.
Finally, on a somewhat flippant note, throughout the thesis, the writer has used
the masculine gender “he” rather than “he or she”, in say, referring to any given
maritime claimant.
In this time of environment conservation sensitivity, the writer contents himself
with the knowledge that by avoiding the two extra words on each of the several
occasions that they could have been used, some paper have been saved.
While the precise quantitative impact on the tree population is uncertain, some
clear support for the approach adopted may be gleaned from the law itself.
Section 4 of the Interpretation Act, 1968, apparently unashamedly prov
ides that:
uwords importing the masculine gender include females..
Of course, “she “ could (or perhaps should) have been similarly used instead.
But then, may next time.
No doubt, by the foregoing discussion any fears of “semantic chauvin
ism” and
the like that maybe have been prompted by this approach of conven
ience have now
been dispelled.
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ABSTRACT
Chapter 1 introduces the thesis including its aim,
scope, raison d’ etre, conceptual framework, premises,
terminology, perspective of analysis, and research
methodology.
Chapter 2 outlines the broad legal setting within
which maritime law exists and functions in Jamaica
and in which the maritime claimant seeks to enforce
his claim.
Chapter 3 traces the development of Admiralty
Jurisdiction in Jamaica towards establishing the legal
foundations upon which the present Jamaican
Admiralty jurisdiction rests. In so doing, the present
scope of Jamaican Admiralty Jurisdiction is delineated.
Thus, it is shown what sort of claims the maritime
claimant can have entertained in the Jamaican
Admiralty Court.
Also, the international dimension to the present
admiralty jurisdiction is highlighted and its relevance
to the local judicial process noted.
Chapter 4 looks at the various aspects of the
matter of Arrest of Ships. The Law governing ship
arrest in Jamaica is examined. Relevant international
stipulations are considered especially as these may
have implications for Jamaica and its laws pertaining
to ship arrest. The Mareva Injunction is considered
particularly to the extent that it may, at times, be
viewed as offering an alternative to ship arrest.
Chapter 5 attempts to look at the question of the
exercise of jurisdiction from the perspectives of
Private International Law and to a lesser extent that of
Public International Law. In effect, it emphasizes the
international dimension to Jurisdiction issues in
Jamaica.
An attempt is made to identify and examine
stipulations in International Convention Provisions
which may ultimately have implications for
Jamaican maritime law and the maritime claimant as
regards the exercise of Jurisdiction and Choice of Law.
This is done against the background of the relevant
applicable Jamaican municipal law principles which
are first examined.
Particular jurisprudential problems pertaining to
Jurisdiction clauses and maritime torts committed
beyond the territorial seas of but affecting Jamaica
are discussed.
Chapter 6 looks at the question of Time Bars as
they relate to and operate in respect of maritime
claims in Jamaica.
International Convention provisions with time bar
stipulations are examined and their relevance to and
possible consequences for or relevance to Jamaican
Maritime Law and Maritime Claimants in Jamaica
highlighted. Particular problems pertaining to ‘Time
and Bar’ Arbitration Clauses and Time Bars in
Jamaican Conflict of Laws are discussed.
Chapter 7 concludes. The main inferences to be
drawn from the study are highlighted. Suggested
changes and future challenges are summarily noted.
ABBREVIATIONS
C.M.I. Comité Maiitime International
I.L.C. International Law Commission
I.L.O. International Labour Organization
I.M.O. International Maritime Organization
U.K. United Kingdom
U.N. United Nations
U.N.C.T.A.D. United Nations Conference on Trade and
Development
U.N.C .I.T.R.A.L United Noations Commission of International
Trade Law
Y.B.I.L.C. Yearbook of the International LAw Commission
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Chapter 1
Introduction
A: The raison d etre general
A right without a remedy is practically not much of a right. Graveson observes
that: ‘It is not enough to be that a legal right exists: to be perfect it must be capable
of
enforcement in a Court of Law”
It is hardly any consolation to a maritime claimant that he would have succeeded
on his claim, if only he was given an opportunity of having it heard on its merits. The
fact
is such a claimant is normally interested in and satisfied only by actual settlement o
f his
claim.
Likewise, a favourable court judgement in hand is of little comfort if there is
nothing on which it can bite. In short, where ones claim is not provisionally secured
before a court trial on the merits, “victory obtained against, say, a foreign shipowner
where none of his assets are within the courts jurisdiction (or are otherwise accessible)
hardly warrents any celebration.
This points to the fact that there are preliminary legal issues of much practical
importance that need to be focused on as regards enforcement of any maritime claim.
1 Graveson, R.H.O Conflict of Laws - Private International Law, 7th Edn., Sweet & Maxwell,
London, 1974, p. 590.
3
B: The Aim
The purpose of this study is to examine certain preliminary legal issues pertaini
ng to
the enforcement of maritime claims in Jamaica.
In so doing, an attempt is being made to take particular cognizance of
relevant
provisions of international maritime conventions as these relate to such issues.
These Conventions it is felt, help to provide an illuminating backdrop against
which
the relevant Jamaican Law may be viewed.
Thus, an underlying theme of the study is that there is often an international
legal
dimension worth bearing in mind when looking at these particular prelim
inary issues
which appear in the Jamaican Municipal Law context, clothed only in local p
rocedural
garb.
C: The Preliminary Legal Issues
The study is concerned with preliminary issues such as pertain to: How much
time the
claimant is allowed before he mist commence legal proceedings so as to preserve
his fight
and/or remedy?; Whether the claim in question is among the set of claims
that the
Admiralty Court can entertain?;
Wether the Court has jurisdiction to hear and determine the particular claim brought
before it:
If the Court does have jurisdiction as regards the claim before it, whether it will
exercise such jurisdiction:
4
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What are the considerations as regards obtaining provi
sional security for one’s
maritime claim, in particular, by way of ship arrest?
Mainly the issues are procedural 2 in character and or
in some aspects embrace the
field of Private International Law (Conflict of Laws).3
The study does not concern itself except incidentally wi
th certain civil procedural
details such as pertains to pleadings which may arise in c
onnection with some of these
preliminary matters.
D: Terminology and Scope
“Preliminary Legal Issues” are limited to the extent indicat
ed, and generally to those
basic issues which arise prior to and independent of any
hearing (or previous hearing) on
the merits of the claim.
They in effect relate to the first set of legal hurdles the ma
ritime claimant is faced with
in his pursuit of legal redress.
Accordingly, matters such as the enforcement of foreign
judgements and arbitration
awards which arise after a previous hearing, fall outside t
he scope of the study. So too are
all issues as regards the merits standing or status of a clai
m of which may arise in respect
2 Lush, L.J., notes in Poyser v. Minors (1881) 7 Q.B.D. 329 at 333
that “procedure” is “the mode of
preceeding by which a legal right is enforced, as disting
uished fro the law which gives or defines the
right, and which by means of the proceeding the court is to
administer; the machinery as distinguished
from the product.”
3 Cheshire and North Private International Law, 11
th Edn., Butterworths, London, 1987, p. 4 states
that: “Private International Law.. .is that part of law whi
ch comes into play when the issue before the
court affects some fact, event, or transaction that is so close
ly connected with a foreign system of law
so as to necessitate recourse to that system.”
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interrogatories, proof of foreign law, other evidentiary questions and the like.
The word “claim’ is used simply in the sense of a demand for one’s due or assertion
of ones right.IMaritimeu is used to mean: related to the sea.
The term “ Maritime claim” is used with more forensic significance. It refers to a claim
within the Admiralty Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of Jamaica. 4
The expression “Maritime related claim” is used generically to encompass all claims
that have some connection to the sea. From this it is clear that “Maritime claims” constitute
a subset, (albeit a very large one), within “Maritime related claims”.
The phrase: “Enforcement of maritime claims” is in this thesis used in the sense of
prosecution of such claims.
This entails instituting legal proceedings towards obtaining legal redress,. Unless the
context indicates otherwise,”legal proceedings” refer to proceedings in the Admiralty
Division of the Jamaican Supreme Court.
Jackson5in the major work: “Enforcement of Maritime claims”, notes that:
“There are three aspects of Maritime Claims:
(i) The extent to which security may be obtained by a maritime claimant so as to
ensure that there will be assets available to turn a judgement into a material gain
(the provisional remedy aspect):
(ii) The rules governing the bringing of an action to enforce a maritime claim (the
jurisdictional aspect):
4 See: Chapter 3.
5 Jackson, D.C.: Enforcement of Maritime Claims, Lloyds of London, 1985.
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security aspect)6
This study is more concerned with the first two aspects. The third is dealt with
sparingly and only to the extent that it relates to the first two aspects.
It is the writer’s view that despite the importance of “the security aspect”, the subject
of liens around which this third aspect is centered, while meriting some attention in the
context of a discussion of maritime claims, is analytically, quite a distinct subject in its
own right..
This, it is respectfully submitted to be even more the case, in the light of the
conceptual framework so far delineated.
The writer takes some comfort as regards the approach adopted upon noting the title
adopted by Tetley7,in another major work of relevance to the subject area of this thesis.
The title is: “Maritime Liens and Claims”. Such a title and the distinction it emphasises
are both apposite and instructive in the present context.
Moreover, under Jamaican Law (following the English Common Law position), only
a small minority of maritime claims have attached to them maritime lien status.
6 Thid,. p. lvii.
7 TeLley, William: Maritime Liens and Claims, Business Law Communications Ltd, London, 1985.
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E: The raison cI’etre
Specifically, as regards Jamaica, the study is prompted by a number of
considerations.
There is a definite need for Jamaica to modernize its maritime laws in general.
Typically, when thought is being given in Jamaica to the updating of such laws,
attention is focused only on substantive law matters. Thus, at present, efforts are directed
at finalizing a draft comprehensive maritime code which deals with a variety of
substantive law issues.
No attention is specifically paid to the preliminary legal issues such as those under
focus in this thesis.
Indeed, there has been virtually no change in the relevant Rules of Court provisions
relating to Admiralty procedure and practice in Jamaica since their promulgation almost a
century ago.8
Yet the substantive law rules dealing with various rights and liabilities or duties and
obligations can only be efficacious to the extent that they are facilitated and come to life
through appropriate procedural and, or conflict of law rules.
For example, it is obvious that any large oil spill within or near Jamaican territorial
waters is potentially catastrophic for the fragile local economy, whose foreign exchange
mainstay is at present, Tourism.
8 Vide: Chapter 4.
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which would probably be a major victim in any such oil spill scenario.
Yet, although the substantive law rules would normally9recognize su
ch an oil spill,
as giving rise to an action in tort, as the jurisdictional rules now stand, they could
significantly fetter and frustrate effective civil action being taken ag
ainst a delinquent
shipowner. This is clearly against the national interest.
Also, typically, Jamaican parties to maritime contracts, for exam
ple, shippers,
seafarers and the assured under marine insurance contracts are faced w
ith adhesion type
contracts which they enter with foreigners containing Foreign Jurisdictio
n and Choice of
Law Clauses.
These stipulations normally have both a prorogatory effect in that
they refer the
parties, and disputes between them to the law and adjudication of a specified country, and
partly a derogatory effect, in that by their wording, they preclude
suits in all other
jurisdictions.
One question might therefore be: Should a Jamaican Court in a particula
r case uphold
such stipulations so as to effectively deny its citizens the right to bring th
eir cases before
the courts of their homeland?
In other words, should such “private ordering” by the parties be sufficie
nt for a
Jamaican Court to consider itself not suitable to hear and determine the disp
ute?
These, it is submitted, raise important jurisprudential and policy questions which are
worth examining.
9 Assuming, for instance, that there was negligence.
9
Similar questions arise regarding the so called ‘Time and Bar” Arbitration clauses10
which purport to terminate, absolutely, a party’s right to take action for breach of a
charterparty after elapse of a contractually stipulated time period, without arbitration
proceedings being instituted.
These questions ultimately have implications for Jamaica’s national interest.
Further, Jamaica aims to strengthen its position as a major maritime centre in the
Caribbean. Generally it desires acceleration of its maritime development.
Undoubtedly, several factors enhance these prospects.
Jamaica has in the Port of Kingston, one of the finest container/transhipment terminals
in the Western Hemisphere alongside modern breakbulk roll on /roll off facilities.
The Port of Kingston stands unrivaled among Caribbean ports and is built on
Kingston Harbour which is the seventh largest natural harbour in the world and almost
landlocked.
Geographically, it lies in a very strategic position. It is positioned mid-way between
North and South America and lies on the direct route from Europe to the Orient via the
Panama Canal.
This makes it a most convenient port for trading vessels and it remains today a major
transhipment port.
In addition, Jamaica is one of the major cruise shipping destinations of the world.
In the sphere of legal services it has a Bar and Bench of a very high standard.
10 Vide: Chapter 6.
10
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large measure to their efforts, Jamaica has been selected as the site of the International
Seabed Authority under the new Montigo Bay Law of the Sea Convention.
This should help to focus attention on Jamaica as a significant maritime centre.
Various Private Sector and Governmental organizations operating within the shipping
sector also enhance the maritime development prospects of Jamaica. Other factors also
augur well for such development.
However Jamaica can only fully realize its maritime development capabilities and
optimize benefits from any such development if there is in place up to date legal services
infrastructure including modem maritime procedural, and Conflict of Laws rules.
For instance: a common concern of maritime claimants and their lawyers in any given
case, is where is the best country to have an offending vessel arrested.
Thus Hill12 has commented:
the 64,000 dollarquestion which your hypothetical bonafide maritime claimant
will likely pose is “where, how and when can I most advantageously arrest a ship in
pursuit of my particular claim?”3
Of much importance here are not only the national substantive law stipulations as these
pertain to the claim in issue, but also the requirements, efficiency and efficacy of the
Arrest procedure in a given country.
In this respect, Jamaica needs to be able to compete in the regional and international
11 Vide:Chapter2.
12 Hill, Christopher et al: Arrest of Ships, Lloyds of London Press Ltd., 1985.
13 Ibid., p.v.
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market place to attract utilization of its legal services, by way of upholding nign
standards. The fact is “Forum Shopping” is very much a part of international shipping
reality today. As Hill observes: “Forum Shopping” is an activity (cynics would call it a
sport) which has been commonly practiced by maritime claimants the world over”.14
This also helps to point to the matter of the international dimension.
F: The international dimension
Jamaica exists in an international maritime community in which international
Convention provisions are more and more providing a setting for the operation of or are
otherwise influencing the functioning and development of municipal law.
Tetley15 sees the main purpose of international conventions as embodying three
principles:
“(1) Uniformity of law
(2) Cerrtainty of law, and
(3) Justice, or a just solution to the problems requiring solution.”16
This suggests that when Jamaica becomes a party to an international convention, such
as say, The Hague Rules17,it ought to ensure that its Conflict of laws stipulations do not
frustrate its international commitments.
14 Ibid., p. vi.
15 Tetley, William: The State of Maritime Law; Canada, U.S., U.K. and France, Meridith Memorial
Lectures, 1986, Faculty of Law, Mcgill University, pp 309-404.
16 Ibid., p. 390.
17 Vide: Infra.
12
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conventions, bearing in mind these three principles.
Where a Convention is silent on a point or allows some latitude for particular national
construction as in the case of the Hague Rules in respect of Jurisdiction Clauses, then it is
being contended that in addition to bearing in mind these three principles, due regard
should be had to Jamaica’s national interest.
Also, even where Jamaica is not a party to a maritime Convention, it can help in the
realization of the objectives implicit in these three “principles” when applying or seeking
to develop its maritime municipal law.
This, it can do for instance by taking due cognizance of relevant international maritime
convention provisions as these relate to particular preliminary legal issues.
This, it is submitted, is particularly relevant to the maritime law sphere which by
nature operates in an international setting.
However, it is to be emphasized that in suggesting that note should be taken of the
international legal dimension as regards the preliminary issue, no derogation from the
normal role of local legal sources is being advocated.
All that is being contended is that the international legal dimension should also be
borne in mind. The case for such an approach is further strengthened in Jamaica’s
particular situation by the dearth of local court decisions and legal weitings as well as the
existence of lacunae in maritime legislation on matters relating to maritime procedural and
private international law.
13
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mind:
. Private international law differs from most other branches of law . .in the fact tha
t
there is comparatively little legislation or case law in this field”19
Related to this fact and compounding matters, is the fact that it appears, this field of
the law is not one in which judges are in general at their happiest and competent best.
Here it may be borne in mind the words of the American Judge Cardozo, J, when he
stated:
“The average judge, when confronted by a problem in the Conflict of Laws, feels
almost completely lost, and like a drowning man, will grasp at a straw.”2°
In Jamaica, following the general trend in most countries, Conflict of Laws cases are
few and far between.There appears to be no reported Maritime law case dealing wit
h
Conflict of Laws questions.
Overall, there is a pancity of Jamaican cases infringing on the specific area of focus of
this thesis.
This makes it most likely that judicial clutching to the nearest and seemingly safest
straw will take place.
In practice this often means a virtual mechanical resort to English Authorities.
These authorities, although generally of sound and high quality, do not always
18 Morgenstern, Felice: International Conflicts of Labour Law, ho, 1986.
19 Ibid., p. 5.
20 Cited in Morris, J.H.C.: “The Conflict of Laws, 2nd Edn., 1980 at p. 9 as quoted by Bradshaw,
David: The imputed proper law of the contract: Conflicts in the Common Law, W.LL:J:, Vol. 7, No.
2, October 1983, 327, 329.
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always free from deficiencies.
They may at times reflect vested economic interests which are diametri
cally opposite to
those of Jamaica.
Braekhus21 has for instance described how in effect vested nation
al economic
interests gave rise to opposite approaches being taken by English and Am
erican Courts in
the period preceding The Harter Act, 1893 U.S. on the question of Choic
e of Law and
Jurisdiction clauses in Bills of Lading. Involved then was the conten
ding interests of
British Shipowner and American Cargo interests.22
Such overt expression of national interests are more readily discernible
in Protectionist
national legislation dealing with Substantive law questions. Howeve
r, it appears these
interests may also find covert expression in other areas of the law in
cluding that under
focus in this thesis, perhaps at times by the device of “judicial interpretation”
While neither judicial insularity nor chauvanistic legislation is being promoted, it
seems that in a world where perceived national interests may form a co
vert backdrop to
not only legislative but also judicial activity, to would be less than prudent not to bear this
in mind in striving to develop one s own jurisprudence.
Such an awareness should prompt a search for different perspectives so
as to have a
broader informed basis for making the relevant decisions.
These different perspectives may be those of other common law jurisdictions as well
21 Braekhus, Sjur: Choice of Law problems in International Shipping (Recent Developments), Printed
for private circulation only. Extract from the Recuel des cours, volume 1
64, Sijthoff & Noordhoff,
The Netherlands (undated).
22 Ibid. chapter 3.
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as in appropriate cases civil law junscilcuons.
This study is not a comparative law study. Such an approach would exten
d the width
and volume of this thesis beyond its proper dimensions. Neverthe
less, as deemed
necessary, references are made to the law of various countries.
At the minimum however, it is felt that international dimensions shou
ld be taken into
account by the relevant decision makers.
In so doing, this should not lead only to a look at relevant internati
onal convention
provisions. Importantly, regard should be had for the recorded
deliberations of
international maritime bodies such as UNCTADs Shipping Commit
tee, I.M.O, I.L.O,
and the C.M.I. as well as those of the U.N., where relevant.
In these for a a variety of legal opinions are canvassed by interna
tional maritime
experts representing different interests and schools of thought.
It seems to the writer that this is one additional potentially fertile sour
ce that a country
with an embryonic maritime jurisprudence can meaningfully tap.
Hence, the writer is in this thesis adopting an approach which expressl
y incorporates
an international dimension in striving to look at what ate in effec
t local maritime
preliminary legal issues.
0: The preliminary issues and law practice.
These preliminary issues also take on a special significance in the ac
tual practice of
law in Jamaica.
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In many instances, local practitioners have been limited to just addressing preliminary
matters in maritime cases.
This may be as a result of a Jurisdiction Clause which results in the semi/processed
case being shipped to say, London for final determination.23
Even where the matter can be heard in Jamaica, the parties especially where they are
all foreigners, may choose to have the matter dealt with in London (or some other
international maritime and financial centre). In this case their legal representatives in
London (or elsewhere) may only seek advice of local legal counsel on preliminary issues
involving Jamaica.24
Otherwise, it may simply be a case where after, say, a vessel is arrested and security
put in place for its release, negotiations between the parties result in adequate
arrangements being made to avoid litigation.
Also from the standpoint of practice, these preliminary issues are not only of interest
in the context of legal proceedings. There is always the old adage that prevention is better
than the cure.
Thus, local counsel may try to avoid future bottlenecks by careful contract formulation
and drafting, advice to clients and in negotiations with foreign parties as pertain to such
issues. However, in light of the thesis topic, this aspect is not developed, but is to be
nevertheless borne in mind.
23 Vide: Hyman, Hugh and Barnett, Courteny: The Admiralty Courts and prospects for Caribbean
Maritime Developáment, Caribbean Shipping Journal, November 1985, p. 30.
see: Appendix 20
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H: The practical Objectives
The thesis thus aims to achieve the following practical objectives:
1: To analyse, discuss and make suggestions towards having particular areas of the
relevant law updated and improved.
2: To make a contribution towards clarifying what the law is by stating what the law
appears to be at present.
3: To make a contribution towards the development of an analytical framework for a
Jamaican maritime jurisprudence.
4: To highlight the international dimension and to a lesser extent the policy
considerations which the relevant preliminary issues might entail.
I: Some Premises
Discussion as regards Jamaica’s public policy interests proceeds on the basis of a
number of extra-legal considerations and assumptions.
These include the following:
1: Jamaica is a “cargo interests” rather than a “maritime carrier” country and its
interests are best served at the present time by taking (so-called) pro
cargo-interests positions.
2: Jamaica has a strong vested interest in promoting the economic welfare of its
seafarers.
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3: Jamaica’s beaches (and other physical marine resources) constitute a vital
economic resource, damage to which, by say, a large oil spill or other pollution to
the marine environment would be extremely harmful to the island’s economy
which today has tourism as its main foreign exchange earner.
4: Jamaica needs to develop as an important part of its basic maritime intrastructure,
its laws both substantive and procedural as well as its adjudicatory machinery.
5: Jamaica needs to set the stage where it can become a significant provider of legal
services and an appealing forum for maritime litigation.
J: The perspective of analysis.
The subject matter of this study may be viewed with different lenses.
One standpoint may be that of a private legal practitioner in Jamaica having to contend
with these preliminary questions.
Another might be that of an adjudicator dealing with the issues ex post facto after they
have been “organized”, researched and presented by appearing legal counsel.
Thirdly, the perspective may be that of the policy maker involved in basic questions as
to what rules are in the national interests.
The study although inclined towards that of the first perspective, also attempts to take
into account those of the second and third perspectives.
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The study is essentially a legal one. It basically entails an analysis of specified aspects
of the law by the utilization of legal reasoning.
Here, an attempt is made to heed the caution of Bos25, who in his book, “A
methodolgy of International Law”, stated:
“No reasoning can purport to be a ‘legal’ one unless it is borne out by one or more
among the rules contained in one or more of these <recognized manifestations >of
law” 26
For Bos, such “recognized manifestations of law” are “...the phenomena which in a
given legal order one is allowed to invoke in order to legitimize a reasoning alledged to be
a legal one”.27
In the context of Jamaican as well as International Law these manifestations may be
referred to as “legal sources”.28 An attempt is therefore made to buttress the contentions
advanced or arguments employed in this study by utilization of these sources.
Despite the basic nature of the study, it is recognized that the law does not operate in a
vacuum nor is it to be viewed as self-serving. Accordingly, extra-legal considerations,
such as already indicated ultimately provide a practical context for the legal discussions.
Analysis of the law essentially takes place against the background of:
1. the need to develop the content and efficacy of the law;
25 Bos, Maarten: A Methodology of International Law, North-Holland, 1984.
26 Ibid., p. 49.
27 Ibid., p. 56.
28 Vide: Chapter 2.
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2. perceived national interests; and
3. the provisions of international conventions.
L: The Research and its Methodology29
The research was carried out mainly by way of consulting and analysing various legal
publications and other written materials. The writer also had discussions with a number of
maritime law experts and other persons in the shipping and legal fields as regards
different issues examined.
A wide variety of legal materials was consulted.
These included the following: legislation; reported cases; unpublished court
judgments; academic law treatisies; law practioner’s texts; article; seminar papers;
periodicals; pamphlets; publications of international conventions; conference and working
comniitte reports; Governmental and private sector documents and other writings.
Also consulted were historical, shipping and other materials relating to the area of
study.
Court files of Admiralty cases were perused at the Jamaican Supreme Court. Also
perused in Jamaica for the purposes of the thesis were files that the writer had worked on.
While at two different International Law Firms (in Canada and Norway, respectively)
which specialise in Maritime Law, and at a leading International P & I Club (in Norway),
further exposure was had to how some of the issues discussed developed and were
resolved in practice.
29 See also, supra: “Acknowledgements”.
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Here again, the writer was, inter alia, involved in the perusal of various files for the
purposes of the thesis.
Discussion of some of the issues involved with maritime lawyers in these
organizations as well as the preparation of opinions on some of the matters in the said
files aided the gathering of relevant information for the thesis.
At the Jamaican Supreme Court, records were consulted as regards the frequency of
Admiralty Cases and related matters.
Much of the legal-historical data in the thesis particularly that contained in Chapter 3
were obtained by the writer consulting old English and Canadian Maritime law
publications, various published historical accounts of Jamaica (and other former British
colonies), as well as importantly, Jamaican or other West Indian authored legal-historical
materials.
Searches were also carried out in respect of Chapter 3 at the Public Records Office,
London.
Overall, written materials for the thesis were collected in Jamaica, Canada, England,
Sweden and Norway and to a lesser extent in Holland.
The research was conducted also by way of mainly informal interviews with a number
of maritime jurists, on aspects of the thesis subject area.
Other persons consulted by way of informal interviews were in general from the
shipping and law fields in the countries already named.
22
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was to gain both theoretical and practical insight on matters pertaining to the thesis
subject.
At times there were difficulties getting particular detailed information which were sent
for from Jamaica, but on the whole, the necessary information was obtained.
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Chapter 2
Jamaican Law, Legal System and Maritime L
aw
A. General Background
Jamaica1 is an independent unitary2 state with
in the Commonwealth of Nations.3 The
island was an English colony from 1655 until it ga
ined independence on August 6, 1962. It is a
parliamentary democracy with a separation of po
wers of the Executive, Legislative and Judicial
arms of government. The form of government i
s that of a constitutional monarchy.4
The island’s law and legal system had their gene
sis in and today remain strongly influenced
by those of the English.
There has been some controversy about the rec
eption of English Law into Jamaica.5
However, it is now well established that English Com
mon law6 was received in 1661.
1 See Appendices 1 & 2 for basic data on Jamaica.
2 As distinguished from Federal States such as the U.S.A. and Ca
nada.
3 Association of the United Kingdom and self-governing nations
whose territories originally formed part of the
British Empire.
4 The British Queen is legally Head of State but plans are afoot to make
Jamaica into a Republic: vide: eg.
Daily Gleaner, August 20, 1989, p. 8A. Jamaica is still toda
y, in English legal parlance referrable to as one
of “her majesty’s dominions”: vide: Haisbury’s Laws of England, 4th Edn.,
Vol 6.4
5 See generally: Patchett, K.W.: Reception of Law in the West
Indies, 1972 J.LJ. 7 and Morrison, C. Dennis:
The Reception of English Law in Jamaica: W 1 L.J., Octo
ber 1979, 43; Grant, V.B.: Jamaican Land Law,
chapter 2.
6 As distinguished from statute law.
7 See eg. Patchett, 1972 J.L.J. 7, at p. 22; Fraser, H Aubrey: L
egal Developments and Law Reform in the
West Indies 1972 J.L.J. 67, at p. 70; Gordon, Dorothy Claire
: Jamaica: International Encyclopedia for
Labour Law. Kiuwer Law and Taxation Publishers; The Netherl
ands, 1984.
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In 1728 statutory confirmation8was given of the cont
inued operation in the island of
English enactments which were up to then
“... at any time esteemed, introduced, used, accepted
or received as laws... “ of Jamaica.9
Thus, in order to determine whether an English Act passed
prior to 1728 was or is part of
Jamaican law it is necessary to ascertain whether such an
Act was at any time “used” in the
island before then.1° Satisfying such a criterion is
fraught with enormous evidentiary
difficulties.11
This ultimately can have adverse implications for ascertain
ing the law on aspects of any
given subject such as that under consideration. Overall, the question of the recepti
on of English
Statutes is of particular relevance to any consideration of Jama
ican Maritime Law, a significant
component of which is comprised of Imperial United Kingdom Sta
tutory Provisions.12
Patchett 13 notes that:
“English statute law has been incorporated into the law of t
he various West Indian
territories in four major ways:
1 Express extension by the United Kingdom Parliament of partic
ular statutes, either
8 1 Geo. 2, C. 2. section 22.
9 Ibid.
10 Morrison, op Cit., 45 st.ates that: “The effect of the 1728 Act however, was to ma
ke user the criterion for
reception of English Law”.
11 See generally: Morrison, op cit.; Grant, ibid.
12 eg. Merchant Shipping Act, 1894 (U.K.); Maritime Conventions Act, 1911 (U.K.).
13 SeeF.N.5
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generally to all dependent territories or only to named colonies. Such extensions are
usually made by the statutes themselves.
2 Adoption through incorporation by reference to colonial legislation. Again this may
take two forms — by express incorporation of named statutes or by general
incorporation clauses which do not specify indivicual Acts.
3 Adoption by repetition of the provisions of the English Acts.
4 Reception under the common law rules relating to statutes of general application in
force in England before a specified date usually that of settlement or conquest.”14
It is to be noted that soon after the English settlement, Jamaica was granted a legislature with
power to repeal and alter the statute and common law of England and generally to make new
law. Jamaican legislation actually dates back to at least 1681.15
By the Colonial Laws Validity Act, 1865, (U.K.), English statute Law was not to be
deemed applicable to any colony unless it had been extended thereto either expressly or by
necessary implication.
Accordingly, no English Statute relating to maritime (or any other matter) enacted since 1655
applies to Jamaica unless it has been incorporated in accordnace with the foregoing. 16
14 Ibid., p. 55.
15 See Vol 19, Laws of Jamaica.
16 See Grant, ibid, p. 5.
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Most importantly, from the date of Jamaica’s independence , the United Kingdom los
t its
legislative power over the island. Hence, The Jamaican Independence Act, 1962, (U.K.),
section 1(2), provides that as of that date (August 6, 1962), no Act of the United Kingdom
“shall extend or be deemed to extend to Jamaica as part of the law thereof.”
However, the pre-existing law continued in force upon Jamaica’s independence
. Thus
section 4(1) of The second schedule to The Jamaica Constitution Order in Council 196
217
provides that:
“All laws in force in Jamaica immediately before the appointed day shall
(subject to amendment or repeal by the authority having power to amend or
repeal any such law) continue in force on and after that day...”
In turn, section 4(1) of The Jamaican Constitution Oder in Council, provides that “subject
to the provisions of this constitution, Parliament may make laws for the peace, order and good
government of Jamiaca”.
17 The Jamaican Constitution is the supreme law of the island, and provides (per section 2) that if any other law
is inconsistent with it such “other law shall, to the extent of the consistency, be void.” Thus, Carnegie notes
in reference to the English doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty that: “In the Commonwealth Caribean
Constitutions, the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty is ousted by the superior doctrine of the supremacy
of the constitution: Carnegie, A. Ralph: The Law of the sea in the Commonwealth Caribbean: The
Domestic Law context, Lecture notes on Coastal and Estuarine studies 27, A new Law of the sea for the
Caribbean, Gold, Edgar (ed.), Springer-Verlag, N.Y. 1988, 83 at p. 87.
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Where an English statute is in force in Jamiaca under 1 Geo2, cap 1, section 2218, its
repeal in England does not affect its operation in Jamaica.19 Similarly where an English
Common Law rule has been recognissed in Jamaica its abolotion in England does not render it
inoperative in Jamaica.2°
B. Sources ofJamaican Law (Legal and Literary
1 Legal Sources 21
a. General
The primary legal sources are (1) Legislation and (2) Case Law or Judicial Precedent.
Other sources include custom and learned legal writings.
b. Jamaican Maritime Law Legal Sources
(i) Legislation
Old and often outdzted statutory provisions inherited from England constitute the majority of
existing maritime legislation in Jamaica. Mainly these are local pre-independece local enactments
18 See, supra and F.N. 8.
19 Sutton v Thomas etal, Stephen’s R 810; Bernal v Feuriado 1927 Clark’s R, 238 cited by Grant,
ibid, pp. 5-6.
20 Gray v Referee if Titles, 1 JL.R. 97, cited by Grant, ibid., p. 6.
21 The means by which the law comes into existence.
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which adapted and apadted as necessary U.K. statutory provisions.
Also, as intimated, a very significant part of Jamaican Maritime Law is comprised of
Imperial U.K. Statutory provisions which were extended to Jamaica.
This process of extension at times creates particular difficulties in ascertaining the law on a
given maritime matter, This is as regards both physically finding the relevant law in the first
place as well as generally determining the law on the subject.
Section 9(1) of The Maritime Conventions Act, 1911 (U.K.) provides that: “This Act shall
extend throughout His Majesty’s dominions and to any territories under his protection. . .“
Similarly, section 91 of The Merchant Shipping Act, 1894 (U:K) in reference to Part 1 of
that Act, provides that : “This Part of this Act shall apply to the whole of Her Majesty’s
dominions, and to all places where Her Majesty has jurisdiction.”
Where there is such express extension in the “parent” U.K. Act itself as just quoted, then
there is relatively little difficulty in ascertaining whether particular U.K. statutory provisions
form part of Jamaican Maritime Law.
However, it appears that since the enactment of The Maritime Conventions Act, 1911,
(U.K.), this practice was discontinued. Instead, the practice has been typically to reserve
power in the British Crown to apply the relevant provisions to British possessions.
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For instance, Section 6(1) of The Merchant Shipping (International Labour Conventions)
Act 1925, (U.K.) provides that:
“His Majesty, may by Order in Council, direct that the provisions of this Act shall subject to
such modifications and adaptations, to be specified in the Order, as appear to His
Majesty
necessary or expedient in the circumstances of the case apply to ships registered in any B
ritish
possession...”
Similarly section 36(1) of the Merchant Shipping (Safety and Load Line Conventions) Act,
1932, (U.K.) provides in reference to Part 1 of that Act, that “His Majesty may by Order in
Council direct that the provisions of this Part of this Act and ... the provisions of any other Act
relating to Merchant Shipping, including any enactments for the time being in force amending or
substituted for the provisions of this Part of this Act or any other such Act, shall extend, with
such exceptions, adaptations or modifications (if any) as may be specified in the Order, to
any colony.”
An initial problem is of course that of locating the relevant Order in Council (if any). The
problem in practice is exacerbated by the fact that extended U.K. statutory provisions are not
Contained in any official local publication as is the case with the readily accessible locally
enacted legislation which are contained in printed offical volumes of Laws of Jamaca.
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Other problems may arise as regards whether particular U.K. maritime statutory provsions
are to be deemed as extended by necessary implication.
To further compound matters , it appears that various U.K. statutory provisions have been
borrowed and used as if such provisions were was in fact extended to Jamaica. This apparently
has been the case even in respect of certain U.K. legislation passed after Jamaica’s
independence.22
After a period of reliance on such legislation, persons using them may unwittingly regard
them as part of the maritime statutory law to which Jamaica is subject. This ultimately abets
uncertainty as regards maritime legislation in Jamaica.
Moreover, most of the maritime statutory provisions have never been adjudicated upon or
otherwise subject to local judicial consideration. Accordingly, issues as to such provisions’
status and applicability seldom benefit from local judicial detemination.
Since independence, the main areas of legislative activity in maritime matters have been
those pertaining to (1) Port Maritime Administration and to a lesser extent (2) Economic
Regulation of Shipping. Overall, the maritime area has received scant attention from local
legislators.
22this appears to be so as regards use by, for example Government Authorities concerned with ship registration
and related matters of Merchant Shipping Acts., enacting in the U.K. after Jamaica’s independence. This has
happened because of traditional reliance on U.K. shipping Forme and Rules in this area based on the continued
application of an 1 of the Merchant Shipping Act, 1894 (U.K.) to Jamaica. Thus where the Law and
Concomitantly subsidiry rules and forms have changed in the U.K. since independence it appears the new rules and
fprms and in the final analysis the new laws, have been resorted to.
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However, there is at present a number of draft bills, including a comprehensive Modern
Merchant Shipping Bill 23, due to replace The Merchant Shipping Act, 1894 (UK) still
presently relied on. Unfortunately, such bills have tended in the past to remain so
indefinitely 24
The area of Jamaican Maritime Adjectival Law remains essentially untouched by post-
independence legislation. The same is true for Jamaican Private International Law. In effect, the
area under study has not had any particular legislative indigenous input.
Appendix 3 provides a list of Jamaican Maritime Legislation.
(ii) Case Law
There is a dearth of Jamaican or other West Indian judicial decisions on Maritime
matters. Reported cases are scarce.
In practice, reliance is normally placed on English decisions. Often, there is no Jamaican or
West Indian case on point.25 This contrasts sharply with other areas of Jamaican Law such as
Criminal, Labour, or Landlord and Tenant Law where a fledgling Jamaican or West Indian
flavoured Jurisprudence may be said to be emerging and where there is a relative abundance of
local case law.
23 The Jamaica Shipping Bill, 1989
24 Vide: Hyman, Hugh C. The status of the law in Jamaica relating to Dangerous goods and their carriage by
sea: (IMO) J/3699, Annex 22, pp 8 - 9.25 However, Newton has observed that “...although in some areas of the law a number of important West
Indian cases are summarised in the West Indian Reports, yet legal practicioners seem to prefer citing English
cases in the courts.’ : Newton, Velma. Historical Perspective of Law-Reporting in the English-Speaking
Caribbean, W.I.LJ., October 1978, 37 at p. 38; see also infra re literary sources.
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(iii) Other Sources
There is at present hardly any Jamaican or West Indian le
gal writings in the maritime law
field. Most Writings that impinge on the field have to do
with the broader public international
law issues pertaining to the Law of the Sea. Thus in the
unlikely event of a Jamaican Court
feeling the need to seek the aid of indigenous “learned legal w
ritings” in the field, it would be
accordingly constrained. As regards custom, it appears that its r
oles as a legal source has so far
been at most, negligible.
2. Literary Sources 26
The primary literary sources encompass legislation and law reports. Trea
tises are considered
as secondary source material. “In Jamaica, legislation represents the greater
part of published
legal material followed by law reports and treaties.” 2
7
As noted above, applicable Imperial U.K. Statutory provisions are not in
cluded in the
official published volumes of statute law in Jamaica. This at times creates problem
s in locating
the law especially in the maritime field. The problem in its most acute form mig
ht render it
necessary to carry out searches in English archives.
Problems may also arise in respect of international law sources as these pertain to
Jamaica.
Where the law is to be found.
27 Lawrence, Yvonne T: The Literature of the Law: Statutes and Subsidiary Legislation, The Caribbean
Law
Librarian, Vol,. 2 No. 2, July 1985, p. 23.
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Here, Carneigie laments that “. . .not even Jamaica has an official and comprehensive
serial publication of the treaties entered into by the state. ..“
Although this is so, information regarding Jamaica’s treaty undertakings can (albeit, at times
belatedly) be obtained from the relevant Government Authorities and international bodies
concerned. Undoubtedly however, such an official publication is needed.
As regards Law Reports, reliance is mainly placed on English Reports. However, there are
Jamaican and West Indian Law Reports. Also unreported judgments of the Supreme Court and
Court of Appeal are available. In keeping with the small number of locally decided maritime
court cases, relatively few of them are to be found in these Reports.
Also as noted above, there is a paucity of research work 29 pertaining to the field of
maritime law. These deficiencies as regards our literary sources raise more than simple
problems of information documentation, accessibility and retrieval. They ultimately affect a
maritime claimant in his quest to enforce his claim in Jamaica.
These deficiencies also ultimately make a mockery of the maxim: Ignorantia jurus non
excusat. It is also clear that not only is the claimant fettered but so too are those concerned with
advocating or adjudicating his claim.
28 Carneige, A. Ralph: The Law of the Sea in the Commonwealth Caribbean: The Domestic Law Context: A
new Law of the Sea for the Caribbean, Gold, Edgar (Ed.) Springer - Verlag, New York, 1988; See also:
Buergenthal, Thomas; Maier, Harold G: Public International Law in a Nutshell, West PubI., 1985, p. 235
for a comprehensive list of international law literary sources and F.N. 50 and quotation referred to.
This also reflects a broader problem. As Fenty observes: “Publishing as an industry inthe Commonwealth
Caribbean is not a vibrant enterprise. This can be attributed to several factors including the lack of organised
publishing houses especially in the area of law. Other reasons are an apparent lack of interest in writing by
both the academic and practitioners in their areas of expertise, and the absence of a large market for sales in
the region.”; Fenty, Leslie P.; The Literature of the Law: Law Reports and Treatises, The Caribbean
Librarian, Vol, 2, No. 2, July 1985, 30 at p. 32.
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C: Jamaica’s Court System30
The hierarchy of the Jamaican Courts are in descending order: The Court of Appeal, the
Supreme Court (so called, but which is not supreme), the Resident Magistrates Court and the
Petty Sessions Court. There are also speciaiised courts: the Revenue Court, the Family Court,
the Traffic Court and the Coroners Court, the Gun Court and the Juvenile Court.
The Jamaican Constitution 31 provides for appeals to be made from the Court of Appeal to
the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in England. This conduit, in part serves to
perpetuate the umbilical nexus between Jamaican and English Law and legal systems.
In reality therefore, at present the apex of the Jamaican Court System is in England.
However, it appears plans are afoot to set up a Caribben Court of Appeal and abolish local
appeals to the English Privy Council. 32
30 See infra, diagram of the Jamaica Court System: Fig. 2.1.
31rer section 110
32 See eg: The Weekly Gleaner, Tuesday, July 18, 1989, p. 15.
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D: Stare Decisis Doctrine applied in Jamaica
The fundamental doctrine of binding precedent or stare decisis states that courts are bound
to follow the ratio decidendi of previous decisions of courts higher in the hierarchy in cases
similar to those previously decided by those higher courts. 33
This doctrine is applied in Jamaica in keeping with the hierarchy of the Jamaican Court
system outlined above. Thus, decisions of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in
England on appeal cases emanating from Jamaica have the most force in local courts.
Decisions of Jamaica’s past (pre-independence) Court of Appeal are treated as not binding
but of high persuasive authority.34 Decisions of other present West Indian Courts of Appeal
are regarded as persuasive only.35
In practice, English decisions are most resorted to and often treated as if they are binding.
Although these decisions ought not to be treated as more than highly persuasive. 36
On occasions when a point of law was not covered directly by the Privy Council, English or
West Indian authority, Jamaican courts have looked at decisions from other jurisdictions,
treating them as persuasive authority. 37
Harris, Phil: An introduction to Law, 3rd Edn., Wiedenfield and Nicolson, London, 1988, at pp. 182 - 183;
Stott, Vanessa: English Legal System, Anderson Keenan Publishing, London, 1981, Chapter 3.
Burgess, A.D. : Judicial Precedent in the West Indies, W.I:L:J:, May, 1978, p. 27 at p. 29.
Ibid.
Ibid, p. 33.
Ibid, p. 35.
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It is submitted that more attention needs to be paid to such decisions and underlying
jurisprudence, in the shaping of Jamaican jurisprudence.
As Burgess 38< notes “. . .those decisions may on occasions provide more guidance for the
development of law than the English equivalents.” 39
E: Maritime Claims Adjudication
(1) General
Most maritime disputes are settled in Jamaica without resort to legal proceedings. Overall,
the amount of maritime claims adjudicated are relatively few. 40
(2) Adjudication by the Courts
Generally, maritime claims are dealt with by the Admiralty Division of the Supreme Court.
However, occasionally particular maritime related claims are filed and heard in the “Common
Law “division of that court. Maritime related claims of limited amounts 41 may also be heard
in the Resident Magistrates Court.
Of the small number of cases filed42 in the Admiralty Division of the Supreme Court only a
miniscule amount 43 ever reach the stage of final judgment. Understandably, there is no special
mid., p. 35
40Vide: F.N.42 & F.N.43
41 Generally up to J.$1O,000: The Judicature (Resident Magistrates) (Amendment) Act, 1987.
Normally not exceeding 20 cases annually on average (This estimate is based on inspection of the Supreme
Court Records by the writer.).
No more than two cases on average.
41
court dealing exclusively with Admiralty matters as such a court would be in practice very much
underemployed.
However, in principle such a specialized court would be desirable. As is noted in Guidelines
for Maritime Legislation: 44 There are a number of reasons which favour the establishment of
specialized courts for the adjudication of maritime disputes such as the specialized character of
maritime law, its international nature, the frequent involvement of technical problems and the
need for quick disposal of maritime disputes. The negative aspect may be the greater cost of
administration of justice, but this disadvantage is outweighed by the advantages previously
mentioned.’ 5
In Jamaica’s particular situation, it seems to the writer that a commercial court46 should be
set up, and included among its purview should be admiralty matters. Such a Court dealing with a
wide range of commercial matters would certainly have more than enough to deal with while
benefiting from specialisation. Importantly, it would facilitate greater efficacy and efficiency in
dealing with particular features and requirements of maritime related and commercial matters in
general. Specialist judicial expertise could be better harnessed and honed. Jamalca’s Revenue
Court dealing with taxation matters has already manifested the benefits of such specialisation.
However, such a Commercial court would be most effective if certain other changes are
Guide-lines for Maritime Legislation, 2nd Edn. U.N., ST/ESCAP/380.
Ibid., pop 250 - 251.
See: Scrutton on Charter parties, 18th edn. Sweet & Maxwell, 1974, section 23, on the Commercial Court(of England).
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implemented.
At present, Appeal Court and Supreme Court Judges become such by progressing through
the ranks of the Judicial Department of the Civil Service.
Typically, most of their initial experience and grooming is in the criminal law sphere.
Whereas this has potentially unsatisfactory consequences for the administration of justice in the
civil law area in general, such potential consequences appear to loom larger in Admiralty
matters. This is so because of the lack of opportunity in practice to delve in such matters.
Moreover, the judge(s) concerned might have had limited academic 7 exposure as well to this
area of the law which in many respects is quite different from other areas of the civil law.
It is submitted that this is so despite the acknowledged very high standards maintained by
the Jamaican Judiciary in general. Hence, it is clear that for development of the process of
maritime adjudication, far reaching changes may be needed not only in terms of restructuring the
Supreme Court and setting up a new specialised court, but also as regards the preparation and
staffing of such a court’s complement.
3. Maritime Arbitration
This takes place rather infrequently, and usually involves the relatively smaller claims. There
are no specially designated Rules for Maritime Arbitration. Like other private Arbitration in
or instance, in the law faculty of the regional university, The University of the West Indies, Admiralty Law
15 not part of the curriculum.
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Jamaica, it is governed by the Arbitration Act, 1900.
Typically, the relevant Arbitration clause stipulates London or some other International
Commercial Arbitration centre as the venue for arbitration hearings. However, where the scale,
cost-benefit analysis or other special circumstances of the claim concerned would render it
inadvisable to deal with the matter outside Jamaica, then resort will normally be had to maritime
arbitration locally.
Overall in Jamaica, it appears there is not sufficient sensitivity to the benefits of arbitration.
This also contributes to the lack of use of this method of maritime adjudication.
F: Jamaica anti International Law
1. General
Jamaica is party to a number of international maritime and other conventions. Appendix 4
provides a list of the conventions to which Jamaica is a party. In the umbrella maritime sphere
of the Law of the Sea, Jamaica it has had a particularly high profile contributing significantly to
the new Montigo Bay 48 Law of the Sea Convention.
Jamaica was chosen as the seat of the proposed International Seabed Authority. Thus article
156 (4) of the new (3rd) United Nations Convention of the Law of the Sea (U.N.C.L.O.S.)
states that: “the seat of the Authority shall be Jamaica”.
TheConvenon Was signed in Mondgo Bay, Jamaica on December 10, 1982.
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In general, it seems that Jamaica’s level of successful activity in this broader area of the
public international maritime law-making process, has generally not been matched by a
commensurate level of effort as regards (1) timely updating or enactment of domestic maritime
rules as required or contemplated by undertaken treaty obligations, or (2) becoming party to
narrower focused related maritime conventions dealing with, for instance, civil liability and
procedural issues. The particular area of focus of this thesis it appears, is very much a victim of
this incongruity.
2. International Law and its applicability in Jamaican Municipal Law
(a) Customary International Law
The applicable principle is enunciated in R,v, Director of Public Prosecutions and another ex
pane Dafney Schwartz (1976), 15 J.L.R. 33
There, Melville, J. stated that: “Customary rules of international law are deemed to be part
of our municipal law, subject, of course to two important qualifications. Lord Atkoin stated it
thus in Chung Chi Cheuy v. R (1939) A.C. atp. 168:
“The courts acknowledge the existence of a body of rules which nations accept among
themselves. On any judicial issue they seek to ascertain what the relevant rule is, and
having found it, they will treat it as incorporated into the domestic law, so far as it is not
inconsistent with rules enacted by statutes, or finally declared by their tribunals’...”
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Importantly, the Jamaican Court will have to be convinced that what is asserted to be
customary international law is in fact so.
In paying cognizance to this requirement, Melville, J. adopted the statement of Lord
McMillan when the latter stated:
“Now it is a recognised prerequisite of the adoption in our municipal law of a doctrine of
public international law that it shall have attained the position of general acceptance by
civilized nations as a rule of international conduct, evidenced by international treaties and
conventions, authoritative text books, practice and judicial decisions. It is manifestly of
the highest importance that the courts of this country before they give the force of law
within this realm to any doctrine of international law should be satisfied that it has the
hallmarks of general assent and reciprocity.” 50
(b) Treaties
A treaty does not become a part of Jamaican law unless it is specifically incorporated as
such by a legislative measure, an enabling Act of Parliament. 51
Ibid., p. 3550 Compania Naviera Vascongado v. SS Christina (1938) A.C., 497
See:Barnett, Lloyd G. : The Constitutional Law of Jamaica, Oxford University Press, 1977, at p. 287; Ott,
David H.: Public International Law in the modeern world, Pitman, London, 1987, at pp 38 - 39; Brownlie,
Ian: Principles of Public International Law, 3rd. Edn., Clarendon Press, Oxford, at pp. 49 - 50; Wallace,
Rebecca, M.M.: International Law, A Student Introduction, London, Sweet & Maxwell, 1986, at p. 38.
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Jamaica’s approach is in keeping with the statement of the Judicial Committee of the Privy
Council in England in the appeal case from Canada: Attorney-Generalfor Canada v. Attorney
Generalfor Ontario, 1937, A.C. 326:
“Within the British Empire there is a well established rule that the making of a treaty is an
executive act, while the performance of its obligations, if they entail alteration of the
existing domestic law, requires legislative action. Unlike some countries, the stipulations
of a treaty duly ratified do not within the Empire, by virtue of the treaty alone, have the
force of law.”
3. Succession to pre-independence Treaties by Jamaica.
In Jhirad v. Ferrandina (1937) 355 F. Supp. 1155, it was stated that:
“As with much of International Law, the question of treaty succession is muddled. Yet it
seems generally agreed that some rights and duties do devolve upon the new country,
particularly those rights and duties locally connected to the area gaining independence.
Particularly in reference to emerging nations the weight of authority supports the view
that new nations inherit the treaty obligation of the former colonies.”
This American case thus applied the principle of continuity. However, shortly after, by
1974, in the discussions of the International Law Commission (I.L.C.) it became clear that in
fact the majority view favoured the “clean slate” approach leaving the successor with a free
Choice: Draft Articles, Y.BJ.L.C., 1974, Vol. 2, pp 222, 214, 23i5, Articles. 15, 16, 23.
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Thus in their commentary on Article 15, the I.L.C. stated that:
“The majority of writers take the view supported by State practice, that a newly
independent State begins its life with a clean slate, except in regard to ‘local’ or ‘real
obligations. The clean slate is generally recognized to be the ‘traditional’ view on the
matter. It has been applied to earlier cases of newly independent States emerging either
from former colonies. . .or from a process of secession or dismemberment.”
However, in the case R. v. Director of Public Prosecutions and Another, ex parte Dafney
Schwartz, 52 the Full Court of the Jamaican Supreme Court, after considering the relevant
ILC statements, held that: “It is . . . a moot point as to whether the clean slate theory has
hardened into a ‘customary rule’ of international law. If it has not, then it ought not to be
adopted in our law.” 53
The matter of Jamaica’s succession to pre-independence treaties was dealt with in the
Exchange of Letters between the newly independent state of Jamaica and the United Kingdom:
(The Jamaica Gazette, April25, 1963).
Overall, the position appears to be that Jamaica succeeded at independence to the pre
independence treaties entered into on behalf of pre-independent Jamaica by the United
Kingdom, subject to its right to denounce or otherwise take such actions in respect of such
52 Op.cit.
53.iutd., per Melville, J. at p. 35.
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treaties as it may deem appropriate.
Also, provisions of international conventions have fo
und their way into Jamaican law
without Jamaica becoming a party to these conventio
ns. This happens where, as in the case of
the International Convention For the Unification
of Certain Rules Relating to the Arrest of
Seagoing Ships, 1952, the United Kingdom becomes a party
to a Convention without at the
time of so doing or subsequently making the then colon
y of Jamaica a party as well.
Subsequently the U.K. would enact concomitant enabling l
egislation 5 provisions of
which are later extended to or adopted in Jamaica without Ja
maica becoming a party to the
Convention.
In the case of the 1952 Arrest Convention, the enabling legislation was The Administration
of Justice Act,
1956 (U.K.)
Per Order in Council No. 631 of 1962. (re F.N.48) and see Hyman, Hugh; Barnett, Courtenay FR.: The
Jamaican Admiralty Jurisdiction: With References to Territorially and the new Law of the Sea C
onvention, and
views on maritime developments in Jamaica, W.I.L.J., Vol 8, No. 2, October 1984, 175 at pp. 180
-
181.
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G. Concluding Remarks
It has been shown that there are some deficiencies in respect of Jamaican Law and Legal
System, especially in the Maritime Law sphere, which have potentially adverse consequences
for a maritime claimant.
Some of these deficiencies are legacies of a recent colonial past. Others reflect a lack of
adequate material means to address certain problems.
Still others yet result from a basic lack of attention or sensitivity to the requirements of the
maritime law area.
The fact that, for instance, Admiralty cases constitute a rather miniscule part of the work of
the Jamaican legal profession (both bench and bar), means that in the profession itself there is
less sensitivity to and advocacy for needed changes as would normally be the case.
Development of Jamaican Maritime jurisprudence is accordingly hampered. There is also the
related problem of lack of expertise, itself related to the perceived need or demand for such
expertise.
Governmental and other authorities concerned with allocating scarce resources between
competing ends may myopically look askance at the maritime law field when choosing priority
areas of focus. However, it appears to the writer that from the standpoint of long term national
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maritime development and the potential contribu
tion of legal and related services to the national
economy, even a cursory cost-benefit analysis
should readily vindicate the need for the
suggested changes. There are strengths in the system t
o be built on such as the acknowledged
generally high level of competence of the local judiciary and bar.
However, if a maritime claimant is to have his claim effective
ly and efficiently enforced,
then it is respecifully submitted that the needed improveme
nts identified ought to be considered
and hopefully implemented sooner than later.
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Chapter 3
The Jamaican Admiralty1 Jurisdiction
A: Introduction
“Jurisdiction” is a multifaceted legal term.2 In the con
text of this chapter, the term
essentially relates to the various types of subject-matters over whic
h a court has competence.
The expression “Jamaican Admiralty Jurisdiction” is
herein used to encompass the entire range
of claims and issues that may be entertained by the Ad
miralty Division of the Supreme Court of
Jamaica.
For, the Maritime claimant, it is crucial whether his cl
aim is among those which may be
dealt with in the “Admiralty Court” — that is those within T
he Jamaican Admiralty Jurisdiction.
This is so, since, he could in a particular case find himself tu
rned away from that court on the
basis of that “there was no jurisdiction on the court in Jamaica” to determine h
is specific claim
as happened in the case: De Osca v The Lady D., 1961, 3 W.I.R. 5
15, 516. Most importantly,
1 The term “Admiral” appears to have been first used in England aroun
d the end of the thirteenth century.
Originally the admirals only had jusrisdiction over their fleets in relation to disc
iplinary matters. With
the growth of piracy in the mid fourteenth century there developed a need f
or a court to administer justice. In
time, jurisdiction to administer such a Court in relation to piracy or spoil was ext
ended to the Admiral.
Later such a jurisdiction grew to encompass other maritime related issues and became
known as the
admiralty jurisdiction:’ See generally: Holdswoth, W.S.: A History of English Law, Vol. 1,
544 - 559;
Curzon, L. B.: English Legal History, 191 - 194; Robers, David N.: The Act
ion in Rem: Is Provincial
Adoption Viable and/or Desirable? (Unpublished) , Canada; Marsden, R.G.: Select
Pleas of the Court of
Admu-ality, Vol 1, pp. xiii - xiv.
2 See: Alcehurst, Michael: A Modern Introduction to International Law,
4th Edn, p. 102; Foukes, David:
Administrative Law, 6th Edn, 1986, for use of the term in the Admi
nistrative Law context; Hyman, Hugh
and Barnett, Courteny;: The Jamaican Admiralty Jurisdiction: With refe
rences to territoriality and the New
Law of the Sea Convention, and views on Maritime Developments in Jam
aica, W.I.L.J. Vol. 8, No. 2,
October 1984, 175; and see infra, Chapter 5.
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onlY a claimant whose claim is within the Admiralty Jurisdictio
n can properly institute or have
instituted on his behalf civil proceedings directly against an offending ship3 and have it
arrested.4
The Jamaican Admiralty Jurisdiction is derived from imperial U.K. legislation.5Its
present scope can best be appreciated by an examination of its origins and development to date.
3Thatis, “in rem” proceedings, see, infra, chapter 4.
4 See, infra, chapter 4.
5 See: Co1ojal Courts of Admiralty Act, 1890 (U.K.), and infra.
55
B: Origins and Development6
Admiralty Jurisdiction in Jamaica was originally exercised by a Vice-Admiralty Court7
whose existence in the island date to 16657.8 These courts were natural offshoots” of the then
High Court of Admiralty of England.9
The jurisdiction of the Vice-Admiralty courts was much influenced and at times constrained
by that exercised by the High Court of Admiralty, which for a long time heard appeals from
these courts.’°
___
___
___
___
___
___
___
___
___
_
p
6 To date, there appears to be no published or available account of the historical development in Jamaica of its
Admiralty Jurisdiction. In certain studies dealing with the History of the Courts inJamaica (eg. Chambers,
Hugh V.T.: Essays on the Jamaican Legal System and.. .A concise History of the Courts in Jamaica From
1660 to the present time, 1974), no reference is made whatsoever to an Admiralty Court, yet alone its
jurisdiction. This is paradoxical as in the early days of British Colonialism in Jamaica and for a long time
after it appears that the Jamaican Vice-Admiralty Court (see F.N.7) was Jamaica’s most active court or at
least one of its most active and important courts. The dearth of published accounts and the accompanying
paradox is reflected in Craton’s observation that American scholars have in their writing ignored
CaribbeanVice-Admiralty Courts, yet they were “more numerous and far busier than those of the mainland
territories” and “when in fact in the Caribbean Courts Prize Cases seem to have outnumbered all others by
ten to one, and the volume of business in Jamaica alone probably outran that of all the mainland Courts
added together.” “. . .Between 1763 arid 1815, the Jamaican Vice-Admiralty Court handled 3, 700 cases of
which some 3, 400 were Prize Cases... “: Craton, Michael: The role of Caribbean Vice Admiralty Courts in
British Imperialism, Caribbean Studies Vol. 11 July 1971, No. 2, 5.
‘
“Courts having Admiralty jurisdiction in British possessions overseas. They acted under commissions from
the Crown Authorising governors of colonies to exercise such powers as in England appertained to the Lord
High Admiral”: Osborns Concise Law Dictionary, 7th Edn., pp 339 - 340.
8 See: Crump, Helen J.: Colonial Admiralty Jurisdiction in the seventh century, Longman, London, 1973 at
p. 101 where she observes that in Jamaica: “There was an admiralty Court working between 1657 and 1660,
but it was not established by the sdmirahy commissioners. ..The court rested simply on the authority of the
governor...”; Also see: Doty, Joseph D: The British Admiralty Board as a factor in Colonial Administration
1689-1763, Philidelphia, 1930, p.20 where he notes that: “The earliest Vice-Admiralty Court in the
dcolonies appears to have been in existance in Jamaica by 1658”
9 See: Roscoe, Edmund: Roscoe’s Admiralty Practice, 5th Edn., 1931, p. 5.
10 Ibid., p. 15., See also Wiswall, jr. Fran: The Development of Admiralty Jurisdiction and Practice since
1800, 1970, p. 98; Note: In 1833 by the Act of 3 & 4 Will 4, C. 41, 5.2 - The Judicial Commtte Act
(U.K.), appeals from Vice-Admiralty Courts to the High Court of Admiralty was discontinued and
subsequently made to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in England. Also see generally:
Hollander, Barnett: Colonial Justice, london, 1961.
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Wiswall notes that the High Court of Admiralty heard “appeals from Colonial Vice
AdmiraltY courts” although “these courts actually exercised a wider instance
jurisdiction than the
High Court of Admiralty.”12
The English Admiralty Court itself had earlier received Maritime Law from other
countries.’3Thus, as has been noted:
“Maritime law is not the product of a single legal system, instead, it is the result of an
evolution of codes, customs, and usages of seafarers and seafaring nations since time
inimemorial”14
Accordingly, it may likewise be emphasised that although Admiralty Jurisdiction reached
Jamaica through England, this jurisdiction’s ultimate roots are international and of great
antiquity. Indeed, the present list of enumerated claims specified to be within the Jamaican
Admiralty Jurisdiction has its more immediate genesis in the provisions of an International
Maritime Convention.15
For the present purposes, it is however only necessary to consider briefly the history of the
English Admiralty Jurisdiction to comprehend the development of Jamaica’s own Admiralty
Jurisdiction and its present ambit.
11 See: F.N, 10.
12 Op.cit., p. 98.
13 See generally, Roscoe, op.cit., chap. 1., Marsden, R.G., Vol. 1, Gold, Edgar: Maxitime Transport, 1981;
Schoenbaum, Thomas 3.: Admiralty and Maritime Law, 1987, p. 1 e. seq.
14 Intemtionaj Maritime Law Principles (ICOD) Maritime Law Course, World Maritime University May 23 -
27, 1988, Malmö, Sweden, p. 15.
15 The International Convention for the Unilicationof Certain Rules Relating to the Arrest of Seagoing Ships,
1952, and see infra, part D of this Chapter.
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The earliest distinct reference to a Court of Admiralty in England appears to be in 1357.16
The earliest statute relating to the English High Court of Admiralty Jurisdiction entitled “An Act
0ncemng what things the Admiral and his deputy shall meddle” was enacted in 1389.17
From the early part of the fifteenth century there was one Lord Admiral and one High Court
of Admiralty in lieu of the several courts which previously existed. Since then the English Court
of Admiralty had been under two main divisions of Ordinary and Prize Jurisdiction.18
This Ordinary (or “Instance19)Jurisdiction comprised three categories: (1) Civil
Jurisdiction, (2) Criminal Jurisdiction and (3) Admiralty Droits.2°
In the Civil Jurisdiction, the law administered was English Maritime Law, which is basically
the law administered today except that it has lost much of its former international character and
has generally otherwise undergone much development.
As regards the criminal jurisdiction, until 1536, the Court of Admiralty had an exclusive
jurisdiction over crimes committed on the High Seas.21 By a number of enactments22this
jurisdiction was transferred from the ambit of the Ordinary Jurisdiction or otherwise whittled
away.
l6See Marsden, R. G., op. cit., vol. 1, XXXV, XXXVI; Holdsworth, W.S. op. cit., p. 545. Fitzgerald,
Richard: Admiralty and Prize Jurisdiction in the British Commonwealth of Nations, 1948,60 Juridical
Review, 106.
17 See Roscoe, op. cit. p. 5.
18 See Fitzgerald, op.cit., p. 106.
19 Roscoe, op. cit. notes at p. 3, that ‘the word “Instance” seems to be used to describe a civil court one of
Suits and processes as distinguished from a Prize Court which is not in fact one in which ordinary litigation
takes place.”
20 See, infra and Wiswall, op. cit., p. 8 and Fitzgeral, op.cit., p. 107.
21 Fitzgeral op. cit., p. 108.
22 Eg. 28 Henry VIII, C. 15; 39 Geo III, C. 37; 4 & 5 William IV, C. 36.
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Admiralty Droits were rights to property found at sea or stranded upon the shore.23 These
have been put (in so far as they have not been abolished) under direct Governmental
Administraflve Control.24
“Prize’ is property of a belligerent captured at sea by a vessel acting under governmental
authority. Thus, in times of war a special commission is issued to the Admiralty Court giving it
jurisdiction to adjudicate upon captures made at sea and to condemn the captured property as
prize if lawfully subject to that sentence.
Accordingly, in more recent times, the Prize jurisdiction normally lies dormant until
ressurected and invoked by the dictates of war. It appears the last such invocation was in
respect of the second World War.25
The High Court of Admiralty itself underwent a prolonged period of dormancy from around
the mid seventeenth century when it operated with a contracted jurisdiction to around the mid
nineteenth century.26Then it was resuscitated and its civil jurisdiction enlarged by a number of
enactments.27
For the dormant period prior to the revival, that is going as far back as around the mid
seventeenth centwy, the court’s civil jurisdiction was limited to the following matters28:
23 Winswall, op. cit., p. 8; Fitzgerald, op. cit., p. 111.
24 Vestiges of these are contained i the Merchant Shipping Act, 1894 (U.K.), Sections 510 - 529.
25 See Fitzgeral, op. cit., p. 111.
26 See generally, Wiswall , Roscoe op. cit., Marsden, R.G., op. cit., Fitzgerald, op.cit.
27 in particular: The Admiralty Court Act, 1840 (U.K.) 3 & 4 Vict. C. 65; The Admiralty Court Act, 1861,24
Vict. c.10.
28 See eg. Burcher Charles: Admiralty Law in Canada, p. 1.
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1. collision on the high seas;
2. towage on the high seas;
3. possession of but not title to ships;
4. bottomry and respondentia;
5. claims for seamen’s wages where no special contract existed;
6. salvage services on the high seas; and
7. goods of pirates and goods practically taken.
Here, it may be borne in mind that is was during this period that Jamaica w
as colonized by
England and English law was received in the Island.
The High Court of Admiralty continued as a separate court in its own right until
November
1, 1875. Then, by the operation of two Acts of Parliament: The Supreme Court ofJudi
cature
Act, 1873 (U.K.) and The Supreme Court of Judicature Commencement Act, 1874 (U.K.) it
along with other superior Courts in England were consolidated together and constituted as on
e
Supreme Court of Judicature in England. This Court was divided into two divisions having
respectively original and appellate jurisdiction.
The original jurisdiction included all the jurisdiction vested in or capable of being exercised
either by the the High Court of Admiralty as well as that of the other courts with which it was
consolidated
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Thus was constituted in England, the High Court
of Justice with original jurisdiction as
aforementioned and The Court of Appeal. The
High Court of Justice was as a matter of
adminiStrat1 convenience further divided into
five divisions one of which was called the
probate, Divorce and Admiralty Division.
The net result is that from then there has been no sep
arate court system administering
maritime law in England. The English “Admiralty
Court” exists today solely as a matter of
administrative convenience handling most of the marit
ime cases and applying the specialized
procedural rules relating to Admiralty actions.
The Judicature Act of 1873 (U.K.) and subsequent enactments by w
hich it has been
amended were consolidated in The Supreme Court ofJud
icature (Consolidation) Act, 1925
(U.K.).
The Admiralty Jurisdiction of the High Court if Justice has
since been extended
significantly, by various enactments, in particular, The Administr
ation ofJustice Act, 1956
(U.K.). This Act was, inter alia passed to give legislative effect to the provisions
of The
International Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules relatin
g to the Arrest of Seagoing
Ships, 1952 arid The International Convention for the Unification of Cer
tain Rules Concerning
Civil Jurisdiction in matters of Collision, 1952, to which the United Ki
ngdom had become a
Party.
Admiralty Jurisdiction may be said to have been introduced in Jamaica co
nsequent upon the
appointment of the fst English Governor in Jamaica.
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It was the then English practice upon the app
ointment of a Governor to a new colony to
;ue to him a commission making him ex offic
io Vice-Admiral of the colony. Such a
rnlnuSSlOfl would vest the Admiralty jurisdiction in the Gover
nor himself over an extensive list
C causes.
Thus it has been stated by Dr. Croke, learned judge of the Vic
e-Admiralty Court of Nova
cotia, Canada in: The Hiram, 1813, Stewart’s
Nova Scotia Rep. 92, that:
“Upon the establishment of colonial governmen
ts, it was thought proper to invest the
governors with the same civil and maritime pow
ers.. .“ [that is as were conferred upon former
Vice-Admirals of England] “. . . and therefore it became
usual for the Lord High Admiral, or the
Lord Commissioners, to grant a commission
of Vice-Admiralty to them.”
The vital precursor to Jamaica’s Admiralty Ju
risdiction was thus the appointment of the first
Governor to the then new colony of Jamaica in
February 1661 by a Commission which, inter
alia, directed him to “settle such Judicatories f
or Civil affares and for the Admiraltes as may b
e
proper to keep the peace of the Island and.. .d
etermine all matters of right and controversy
according to Justice and Equity.”29
Although this appointment and accompanying
directives were apparently only temporary
measures, 30 nevertheless by virtue of these dire
ctives to the Governor, “Courts were erected
and various Orders made by the Governor and Co
uncil.”31
29 See Morrison, op. cit., p. 43.
30 Ibid.
31 See Morrison, op.cit., p. 50, and his F.N. 6, citing: Chal
mers, G. (Ed.): “Opinions of eminent lawyers on
various points of English jurisprudence, chiefly concerning the
colonies, fisheries and commerce of Great
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Among the early courts establish
ed was a Vice-Admiralty Courts w
hose records date to
1662.32 However it appears th
at prior to this first properly est
ablished Court, there was a
Vice-AC11aitY Court in exi
stance with doubtful legal autho
rity.33 In practice, the jurisdiction
exercised by these courts in
Jamaica as elsewhere was often
ambiguous and rather flexible.
As already intimated, this jurisdiction
exceeded that exercised by the E
nglish High Court of
Admiralty itself. This situatio
n was reflected in the actual pract
ices and procedures adopted by
the court.
It appears that to some extent th
ere was acquiescence on the part
of the English Admiralty
Court in all of this. Thus, in the
case Le Louis Forest 2 Dodson,
239, it was held that: The
High Court of Admiralty will look
with tenderness on the informalit
ies in the practice of the
Vice-Admiralty Courts.tt
Nevertheless, the jurisdiction of the Vice-A
dmiralty Court in Jamaica as it sto
od from its
inception on to the mid nineteenth cen
tury may be roughly delineated.
Its skretch appears to accord with U
bblehode 35 observations:
“The colonial Vice-Admiralty Courts
operated on three distinct levels. O
n the local level they
heard and detemiined disagreements and pr
oblems of merchants and seamen
. . . . Late in the
Seventeenth Century the British Crown ha
d added a second jurisdiction: enforcement
of
Britain”; Vol 1, London 1814, page 207.
32 See RN. 8.
The writer has found in the records of The Pubkic Re
cords Office, London, England, reports
of Vice-Admiralty
cases from Jamaica dating to 1662; Also, see
Craton, op. cit.
See generally: Rediker, Marcus: Between the Devil an
d the Deep Blue Sea, 1987.
35 Ubbleiojje, Carl: The Vice - Admiralty Courts and the Amer
ican Revolution, 1960.
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imperial control of trade. In 1696 the coloni
al Vice-Admiralty Courts were chosen as tribunals
for prosecuting offenders against the tra
de and navigation statutes. And the court’s jurisdiction
became international in times of war, when the cro
wn created them prize courts with authority to
condemn captured enemy cargoes and vessels.’36
With the passage of the Imperial Vice-Admiralty Court A
cts of 1863 and 1867, 3 the
jurisdiction of the Vice-Admiralty Courts, then existin
g in the English colonies, including that of
Jamaica was clarified and extended.
Prior to the passage of the 1863 Act., it was held by the Ju
dicial Committee of the Privy
Council in England in 1859, in a case on appeal from the then
Vice-Admiralty Court at Hong
Kong, The Australia (1859), 13 Moo. P.C. 132 at 160 that the Jurisdicti
on of Vice-Admiralty
Copurts was continued to that of the English high Court of A
dmiralty before the enactment of
The Admiralty Court Act, Act 1840 (U.K.)
However, as is noted in another Privy Council case hearing an
appeal from Canada: The
Yuri Maru, The Woron, (1927) 17 Asp. M.L. 322 “The Vice-Admiralty Court
s Acts of 1863
and 1867 extended the powers of Admiralty Courts overseas, not by
reference to the powers of
the High Court in England, but by scheduled statement of the causes
of action in respect of
which jurisdiction was newly conferred and specification of other amendments.”
38
36 Ibid., p. 12.
37 Vice
-
Admiralty Courts Act, 1863, 26 Vict., Cap. 24; Vice - Admiralty
Courts Act Amendment Act, 1867,
30 & 31 Vict., Cap. 45.
38 Ibid., p. 325.
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Section 10 of the Vice-Adiniralty Courts Act, 1863 defmed the civil jurisdiction of the
Vice-AdmaltY Courts.
It provided as follows:
‘The matters in respect of which the Vice-Admiralty Courts shall have jurisdiction are as
follows:
(1) Claims for seamen’s wages
(2) Claims for Master’s wages, and for his disbursements on account of ship
(3) Claims in respect of pilotage
(4) Claims in respect of salvage of any ship or of life or goods therefrom
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
Claims in respect of tonnage
Claims for damage done by any ship
Claims in respect of bottomry or respondentia bonds
Claims in respect of any mortgage where the ship has been sold by a decree of the Vice-
Admiralty Court, and the proceeds are under its control
(9) Claims between the owners of any ship registered in the possession in which the Court
is established touching the ownership, possession, employment, or earnings of such
ship
(10) Claims for necessaries supplied in which the Court is established, to any ship of which
no owner or part owner is domiciled within the possession at the time of the necessaries
being supplied
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(11) Claims in respect of the building, equipping,
or repairing within any British possession
of any ship of which no owner or part owne
r is domiciled within the possession at the
time of the work being done.”
In 1880, the Judicature (supreme Court) Act was pa
ssed in Jamaica. By this Act various
superior Courts in Jamaica exercising jurisdiction over
different subject-matters were
consolidated together and constituted into
“the Supreme Court of Judicature of Jamaica.”
Section 4 of the Act provides:
“On the commencement of this Act, the severa
l Courts of this Island hereinafter mentioned,
that is to say —
The Supreme Court of Judicature,
The High court of Chancery,
The Encumbered Estates’ Court
The Court for Divorce and Matrimonial Causes,
The Chief Court of Bankruptcy, and
The Circuit Courts,
Shall be consolidated together, and shall constitute
one Supreme Court of Judicature. . .“
The Vice-Aclmirafty Court was thereby omitted from t
he list of courts constituting this new
Supreme Court. The logic (if any) behind this omission is not readily
apparent. In the analogous
U.K. enactment, The Supreme Court ofJudicature Act, 1873
(U.K.), the United Kingdom’s
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High Court of Admiralty was as
shown above, included in the consolidation of the Superior
Courts of England.
The effect of this omission was more than to
render the then Vice-Admiralty Court an
outcast as regards the new court schema.
The omission, it seems, constitutes the most culpable
precursor to the existing anamolous situation toda
y, where as will be shortly shown, the
Admiralty Jurisdiction of the present Supreme Co
urt resides on a footing quite out of
consonance with the rest of the Court’s jurisdiction.
A decade later, the Colonial Courts ofAdmiralty Act,
1890, (U.K.) was enacted. By this
Act the Jamaican Supreme Court was made a “Colonial
Court of Admiralty.” The Act abolished
the then existing Jamaican Vice-Admiralty Court.
As regards the jurisdiction to be exercised by the Supreme Court qua a colonial C
ourt of
Admiralty, Section 2(2) of the Act provides that:
“The jurisdiction of a Colonial Court of Admiralty shall, subject to the provisions of
this
Act, be over the like place, persons, matters and things, as the Admiralty
jurisdiction of the
High Court in England, whether existing by virtue of any statute or otherw
ise, and the Colonial
Court of Admiralty may exercise such jurisdiction in like manner and to as full an extent as the
High Court in England, and shall have the same regard as that Court to interna
tional law and the
COfliity of nations”.
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One question that was prompted by this
provision was whether by virtue of this provisi
on
the local Admiralty Jurisdiction w
as coextensive with that of the United Kingdo
m. Thus, for
instance, the question arose as to wheth
er enlargement of the U.K. Admiralty Jurisdic
tion by
The Supreme Court ofJudicature (Consolidati
on) Act, 1925 (U.K.) to include certain claims
also enlarged the local jurisdiction so as to include t
hose claims.
The issue arose in De Osca v The Lady D, w
here the Jamaican Supreme Court in 1961, ha
d
to decide whether it had jurisdiction to determine a cla
im in respect of the mortgage of a ship.
The Court in arriving at its decision adopted
the holding of the Privy Council in the Yuri
Maru, The Woron, when in reference to The
Colonial Courts ofAdmiralty Act, 1890, (U.K.),
it was held: “On the whole, the true intent of
the Act appears to their Lordships to have been
to
define as a maximum of jurisdictional authority for the co
urts to be set up thereunder, the
admiralty jurisdiction of the High Court in England as it existe
d at the time when the Act
passed.” 9
The Jamaican Court found that the claim in resp
ect of a mortgage of a ship was not within
the jurisdiction of the English High Court at the time the 1890 A
ct was passed and that further
in accordance with the holding in The Yuri Maru, T
he Woron, that “the Act of 1925 in England
giving power to hear mortgage actions does not apply to
the Admiralty Court in
Jamaica “40
39 Ibid.
40 op. cit., p. 518.
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The Court therefore held that “the jurisdiction of a
court of Admiralty in Jamaica was
established by the Colonial Courts of
Admiralty Act, 1890, that it conferred on the
court in
janaica jurisdiction similar to that possessed by the
Supreme Court in England, and that there
was not jurisdiction on the court in Jamaica to d
etermine a claim in respect of the mortgage
of a
ship.”41
The position as regards the competence of
a Court to hear ship mortgage and other m
aritime
claims has since changed with the enlarg
ement of the Jamaican Admiralty Jurisdiction
by the
passage of the Admiralty Jurisdiction (Jamaica) Or
der in Council, 1962, (U.K.) pursuant to
Section 56 of the Administration of Justic
e Act, 1956 (U.K.)
C: Present Scope:
Section 2 of the Order in Council provides
that “The Colonial Courts ofAdmiralty Act
,
1890, shall in relation to the Supreme Court o
f Jamaica, have effect as if for the referen
ce in
subsection (2) of Section Two thereof there were substitut
ed a reference to the Admiralty
jurisdiction of that court as defmed by Section One of the Ad
ministration ofJustice Act,
1956...” subject to certain specified “adaptations and modifica
tions of the said Section One.”
Section 3 of the order provides that “The prov
isions of Sections Three, Four, Six, Seven
and Eight of Part 1 of the Administration ofJustice
Act, 1956, shall extend to Jamaica with
certain specified ‘adaptations and modifications.”
41 Seethid.,p 516
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Accordingly, the Admiralty Jurisdiction of the S
upreme Court encompasses at present the
following questions or claims:
(a) any claim to the possession or ownership of a ship or to th
e ownership of any share
therein;
(b) any question arising between the co-owners of a ship as to p
ossession, employment or
earnings of that ship;
(c) any claim in respect of a mortgage of or charge on a ship or a
ny share therein;
(d) any claim for damage done by a ship;
(e) any claim for damage received by a ship;
(t) any claim for loss of life or personal injury sustained in conseque
nce of any defect in a
ship or in her apparel or equipment, or of the wrong
ful act, neglect or default of the
owners, charterers or persons in possession or con
trol of a ship or of the master or
crew thereof or of any other person for whose wron
gful acts, neglects or defaults the
owners, charterers or persons in possession or con
trol of a ship are responsible, being
an act, neglect or default in the navigation or manage
ment of the ship, in the loading,
carriage or discharge of goods on, in or from the shi
p or in the embarkation, carriage
or disembarkation of person on, in or from the ship;
(g) any claim for loss of or damage to goods carried in a ship;
(h) any claim arising out of any agreement relating to the carriage of goo
ds in a ship or to
the use or hire of a ship;
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I
(j) any claim in the nature of salvage (including any claim arising by vir
tue of the
application, by or under section fifty-one of the Civil Aviation
Act, 1949, of the law
relating to salvage to aircraft and their apparel and cargo);
(k) any claim in the nature of towage in respect of a ship or an aircraft;
(1) any claim in the nature of pilotage in respect of a ship or an aircraft;
(m) any claim in respect of goods or materials supplied to a ship for her o
peration or
maintenance.
(n) any claim in respect of the construction, repair or equipment of a ship or
dock charges
or dues;
(o) any claim by a master or member the crew of a ship for wages and any clai
m by or in
respect of a master or member of the crew of a ship for any mo
ney or property which,
under any of the provisions of the Merchant Shipping Acts, 18
94 to 1954, is
recoverable as wages or in the court and in the manner in which
wages may be
recovered;
(p) any claim by a master, shipper, charterer or agent in respect of disbursements made
on
account of a ship;
(q) any claim arising out of an act which is or is claimed to be a general average act;
(r) any claim arising out of bottomry;
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(s) any claim for the forfeiture or condemnation of a ship or of goods which are being
or have been carried, or have been attempted to be carried, in a ship, or for the
restoration of a ship or any such goods after seizure, or for droits of Admiralty.
Together with any other jurisdiction which either was vested in the High Court of
Admiralty immediately before the date of the commencement of the Supreme Court of
Judicature Act, 1873 (that is to say, the first day of November, eighteen hundred and
seventy five) or is conferred by or under an Act which came into operation on or after
that date on the High Court as being a Court with Admiralty Jurisdiction.”
The latter part of the quoted provision, that is the portion after sub-paragraphs defines the
Jamaican Admiralty jurisdiction in terms of what jurisdiction particular English Courts had at
certain times. In addition, certain qualifications are given to the Jurisdiction to be exercised by
reference to particular U.K. legislation.
Thus, although the list of claims is quite extensive and would normally cover most present
day maritime related claims, where a claim is not enumerated, then in Jamaica, again resort will
ultimately have to be made to “what the law was in England” at a given time.
This circuitous journey to ascertain the law is ipso facto undesirable. It is not in keeping
with Jamaica’s sovereign independent status for a claimant to be compelled by statutory
anachronisms to resort to a foreign legal system to find out whether his particular maritime
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related claim is within our Admiralty Jurisdiction.
practically, it creates uncertainty for the maritime claimant as well as others involved in the
admini5t1at10n of justice.
In addition, the observations made earlier about problems which arise in relatio
n to
extended legislation are here apposite •42 It seems to the writer that this state of a
ffairs ought to
be remedied by appropriate local legislation as it is manifestly undesirable tha
t Jamaica’s
Admiralty Jurisdiction is now only to be found in foreign Imperial Legislation. In this res
pect it
remains an anamolous eye sore within the present overall jurisdiction exercised by the Jamaican
Supreme Court, all other of which are founded on local statutory provisions.
Moreover, the list of maritime claims although quite extensive cannot be said to be
exhaustive. Thus, in another West Indian jurisdiction, with similar statutory provisions. The
Barbadian High Court found in Cooper Stevedoring Co Inc v MV Passat Bonaire (owners,
Master and Crew) 1977 WJ.R., 36 that “As the matter stands the endorsement of claim on the
writ for stevedoring services does not come within any specified head of jurisdiction laid do
by statute”43 and that in Barbados “A claim for remuneration for stevedoring is not a claim
known to the admiralty jurisdiction.”
Likewise claims for stevedoring services rendered are not within the Jamaican Admiralty
jutisthctjo Also excluded are others which will be considered in the following section.
42 See Chapter 2.
43 Ibid., p. 40.
44 Ibid.,p.4i.
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D: The International Dimension
The list of claims set out are essentially derived from Article 1(1) of the International
onvention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to the Arrest of Ships, 1952.
The Convention specifies claims in respect of which a vessel may be arrested. Such claims
re defined by the Convention as “Maritime Claims”.
Article 1 (1) provides as follows:
“Maritime Claim” means a claim arising out of one or more of the following:
(a) damage caused by any ship either in collision or otherwise;
(b) loss of life or personal injury caused by any ship either in collision or occurring in
connection with the operation of any ship;
(c) salvage;
(d) agreement relating to the use or hire of any ship whether by charterparty or
other’’ise;
(e) agreement relating to the carriage of goods in any ship whether by charterparty or
otherwise;
(0 loss of or damage to goods including baggage carried in any ship;
(g) general average;
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(h) bottomry;
(i) towage;
(j) piotage;
(k) goods or materials wherever sup
plied to a ship for her operatio
n or maintenance;
(1) construction, repair of equipme
nt of any ship or docks charg
es and dues;
(m) wages of Master, officers, or
crew;
(n) Master’s disbursements, includi
ng disbursements made by s
hippers, charterers or
agents on behalf of a ship or
her owner;
(o) disputes as to the title to or own
ership of any ship;
(p) disputes between co-owners of an
y ship as to the ownership, p
ossession
employment or earnings of th
at ship;
(q) the mortgage or hypothecation o
f any ship.”
From this list it can be seen that in
its much lengthier counterpar
t in Part 1 of The
Administration ofJustice Act, 1956
(U.K.) adaptations have been made to
assimilate the
Article 1 (1) provisions into English law.
Both lists are extensive and it is not n
ecessary to compare in detail
their respective
Stipulations. However, one important e
xample will be considered.
For claim (a) in &rjcle 1 (1), “damage caused by
any ship either in collision or
otherwise”,
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te words “or oth
erwise” were construed in E
ngland to cover all those situa
tions where damage
is caused by one s
hip to another without phys
ical Contact, by wash or by a
negligent
manoeuver. Thus in the
1956 Act (U.K.), the wording used
is “any claim for damage do
ne by
a ship.”45
As regards this provision t
he House of Lords in Engla
nd held in The Eschersheim
(1976)2
Lloyd’s Report 1, that alth
ough the ship itself must be t
he actual instrument by whi
ch the
damage was done, “physic
al contact between the ship
and whatever object sustains the dam
age
is not essential”.
Significantly, in the same judgment i
t was held that where any pro
vision of the Act which
appears to intend to give effe
ct to The Arrest Convention
, is ambiguous, the Court ma
y look at
the Convention in order to gain
assistance in deciding which
meaning is to be preferred
.47
As already noted, Jamaica is n
ot a party to the Arrest Con
vention. However, importan
t parts
of this Convention have found the
ir way into national law thro
ugh the backdoor of extende
d
Imperial Legislation earlier descri
bed.
In the circumstances, it remains to
be seen whether a Jamaican
Court would resort to
Scrutiny of a Convention to which J
amaica is not a party upon f
inding such an ambiguous
provision in the list of claims exten
ded to Jamaica by The Admir
alty Jurisdiction (Jamaica)
Order in Council, 1962 (U.K.).
45 See claim (d), supra.
46 Per Lord Diplock at p. 8.
47 Thid.
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Jt seems to the writer, th
at in principle, it would be desirab
le purely as a matter of statutory
construction, for a Jamaic
an Court in an appropriate case to
seeks the aid of the Convention as
the original source of t
hese provisions to interpret ambi
guous statutory stipulations extende
d
into Jamaican Law by the
Order in Council.
Under the joint auspices of IMO and UNC
TAD, active consideration is now
being given to
amending the Arrest Conventi
on. One of the main areas targeted
for change is the Article 1 (1)
list of maritime claims.48
As regards this list the (IMO/UNCTAD
) Joint Intergovernmental Group of Expert
s on
Maritime Liens and Mortgages and
Related Subjects has made the following fm
ding:
“The ... list appears to be incomple
te, outdated and the description of
some claims
unsatisfactory. It excludes certain cl
aims which are clearly of a maritim
e nature, such as claims
for agency fees and for unpaid insuran
ce premiums, and stevedoring char
ges. It has been
questioned whether this approach of p
roviding as extensive, albeit non-ex
haustive, list of
maritime claims is satisfactory, or wheth
er the list should be extended to co
ver other maritime
claims, alternatively whether some gener
al wording should be devised in ord
er to allow arrest
for all claims relating to the ship.”
It may be noted here that the approach of
setting out a hopefully comprehen
sive list of so
Called “maritime claims” reflects attempts to re
concile differences which existed b
etween English
law under which a ship could only be arrested in
respect of particular maritime claim
s raised
48 See: (IMO) LEG/MJM 22: Consideration of the scope
of the Revision of the International Conv
ention
Relating to the Arrest of Seagoing Ships signed at B
russels on 10 May, 1952.
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against it and the law of most civil law countries which permit the claim
ant to arrest any ship in
resPect of claims against the owner regardless of the nature of such
claims.49
Both the “extended list” or “general clause” options have their problems. If the present list is
extended to include new claims, with time such a list will get outdated, whereas a general
clause
would be more susceptible to varying interpretations by different countries.
It therefore seems to the writer that the best solution might be to combine both. By doing so,
certainty in international approach would be ensured in respect of an extensive list of claims
while allowing to national law a limited degree of flexibility as regards maritime related claims
not enumerated in the list. If the limited area of flexibility cannot be agreed then in the interest of
certainty, the list method seems best.
A further issue relates to Maritime Liens.5°Practically, liens do not come into issue without
claims, but not vice versa. Thus it seems essential that all claims that are granted maritime lien
status under any International Convention should be designated as “Maritime Claims”.
However, some of the claims giving rise to maritime liens under the International
Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to Maritime Liens and Mortgages,
1926 are not fully covered under the “maritime claims” listed in the Arrest Convention.51
Those claims not fully covered or not covered at all include the following:
(i) Law costs due to the State;
49 Ibid., p. 5.
50
51 International Convention For the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to Maritime Liens and Mortgages,
1967.
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(ii) Expenses incurred in the common interest of the creditors in order to prese
rve the
vessel or to procure its sale and the distribution of the proceeds o
f the sale;
(iii) Costs of watching and preservation from the time of the entry of the vessel
into the
last port; and
(iv) Claims resulting from contracts entered into or acts done by the Master, act
ing
within the scope of his authority, away from the home port, w
hen such contracts
or acts are necessary for the preservation of the vessel or the co
ntinuation of the
voyage.
Jamaica is not a party to the 1926 Convention nor its 1967 coun
terpart52,neither of which
attracted much international acceptance.
Work has now reached an advanced stage on the preparation of
Draft Articles53 for a new
Convention on Maritime liens and Mortgages.
These Draft Article have been incorporated in the Draft Jamaica Shipp
ing Bill, 1989.
Intemationai Convention For the Unififacaon of Certain Rule Re1ang to M
ariümc Liens and Mortgages,
1967.
53 See: (IMO) LEG/1vjM,21: Final Reading Of The Draft Articles For A Convention On Maritime Lie
ns and
Mortgages.
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Section 68 of the Bifi parallels Article 4 o
f the Draft Articles which lists the claims giving
ise to Maritime Liens. Section 68
provides as follows:
“(1) Subject to the provisions of this Act the following claim
s may be secured by
maritime liens —
(a) wages and other sums due to the master, officer and
other members of the
ship’s complement, in respect of their emplo
yment on the ship;
(b) port canal and other waterway dues and pilotage dues
;
(c) claims against the owner in respect of loss of life or
personal injury occurring,
whether on land or water, in direct connection
with the operation of the ship:
(d) claims against the owner, based on a wrongful act a
nd not on contract, in
respect of loss of or damage to property occurr
ing whether on land or on
water, in direct connection with the operation o
f the ship;
(e) claims for salvage, wreck removal and contribution in
general average.
(2) In subsection (1) owner includes in relation to a ship, the
charterer, manager or
operator of such ship”
However, there are significant differences between th
e section 68 provision in the
Jamaican Bill and those of Article 4 in their present state. I
t appears the Jamaican provisions
may have been based on an earlier version of the Draft Article
s. In any event both provisions are
Draft provisions and subject to change.
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Suffice it to say that efforts are being mad
e by the Joint Committee to ensure that like
rtrii11o10gY is used in reference to maritime c
laims in future Conventions dealing separately
with A1Test and Maritime Liens r
espectively and generally to ensure that such Con
ventions
operate in consort.
The aim of ensuring full compatibility betw
een enumerated “Maritime Claims” and those
claims which are designated as giving rise t
o Maritime Liens should in time find expression
in
provisions of local legislation.
It would seem to the writer desirable to have
in one enactment provisions setting out those
claims falling within the Admiralty Jurisdiction a
nd the ones giving rise to Maritime Liens.
Local Admiralty practice in any given case is muc
h influenced by whether a particular Maritime
claim gives rise to a maritime lien or not.M
Thus such an enactment would be a convenient fac
ility for legal practitioners.
5’Vide:infra, chapter 4.
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E: CONCLUDING REMA
RKS
By tracing and examining the
origins and development of the Jama
ican Adrnirality
Jurisdiction, its legal foundatio
ns and present scope has been estab
lished. The Jurisdiction in
significant respects rest uneas
ily on its Imperial legislative found
ations. There is urgent need for
legislative ratification of this situ
ation.
As the law now stands, it is prob
able that a claimant will find that his
maritime related claim
is among those covered by the ex
tensive list of enumerated claims w
ithin the Jamaican
Admiralty Jurisdiction Court when f
aced with the relevant statutory pro
visions to bear in mind
this ultimate international aspect in
construing or otherwise applying th
ese provisions.
The need to ensure compatibility bet
ween separate lists of Maritime Clai
ms and Maritime
Liens is being tackled in the internatio
nal maritime law making sphere. Jam
aica should not miss
out on this process and should in time en
sure that its legislation and jurisprudence bene
fit from
this process.
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E: Concluding Remarks
By tracing and examining the origins and deve
lopment of the Jamaican Admiralty
Jurisdiction, its legal foundation and present sc
ope has been established. The Jurisdiction in
significant respects rest uneasily in its Imperial
statutory foundations. There is urgent need for
legislative rectifications of this situation.
As the law now stands, it is probable that a claiman
t will fmd that his maritime related
claim is among those covered by the extensive list of
enumerated claims within the Jamaican
Admiralty Jurisdiction. It seems advisable for a Jamaic
an Court when faced with the relevant
statutory provisions to bear in mind this ultimate interna
tional aspect in construing or otherwise
applying these provisions.
The need to ensure compatibility between separate list
s of Maritime Claims and Maritime
Liens is being tackjecj in the international maritime law making sphere. Jamaica
should not miss
Out in this process and should in time ensure that its legislation
and jurisprudence benefit from
this process.
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Chapter 4:
Arrest of Ships
A: Introduction
1. Ship Arrest
and the Maritime Cl
aimant.
For the Maritime Claima
nt, it is particularly imp
ortant to obtain provisio
nal
security for his claim pr
ior to its hearing on the
merits. Also of vital im
portance is the
basic need to put the cou
rt in a position where it
may exercise and effecti
vely so, its
jurisdiction as regards his partic
ular claim.
Overall, as ships are mo
bile and can easily move
beyond the tentacles of th
e
court’s jurisdiction, the facility of
ship arrest is an importa
nt device in the armoury
of the
maritime claimant at the p
reliminary stages of his q
uest for enforcement of
his claim.
2. The Concept of
Arrest.
Since ships may be detaine
d in a variety of circumst
ances, it is important to
clarify at the outset when shou
ld it be said that a ship ha
s been arrested.
Guidance on this point may
be obtained from the Int
ernational Convention fo
r
the Unification of Certain Rules
Relating to the Arrest of
Seagoing Ships, 1952.
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Article 1(2) of this Convention provides as follows:
“Arrest” means the detention of a ship by
judicial process to
secure
a maritime claim, but does not include t
he seizure of a ship
in execut
ion or satisfaction of ajudgement’.
Further, Article 4 provides that a ship “
may only be arrested under the Authorit
y
of a Court or of the appropriate judicial authority of
the contracting state in which the
arrest is made”.
/
From this it is clear that “Arrest” is not
simply equivalent to “detention” of a
ship. As conceived and regulated by the
Convention, “Arrest” is necessarily a judicial
remedy.
“Arrest”, is also to be distinguished from
attachment, that is the “seizure of a
ship in execution or satisfaction of a judgement”.
As defined in the Convention, “Arrest” is a
lso a security obtaining device. This
accords with the emphasis on this aspect in c
ivil law countries.
However, the power to secure claims by w
ay of arrest is limited to the claims
listed in Article 1(1) of the Convention. 1 These claims, as
already shown, are
encompassed in the list of claims enumerated as f
alling within the Jamaican Admiralty
1See: Chapter 3, part D.
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Jurisdiction.
3. The International Dimension
As previously noted, Jamaica is not a party to the Arrest Convention, although
some of its provisions have found their way into Jamaican Law by way of extended U.K.
legislation.
Hill 2in reference to the Convention has observed that:
“One distinct and basic feature of the Convention is the absence from it
of an international law of arrest. The law and procedural rules applicable is/are
those of the forum within which any particular arrest takes place” 3
Nevertheless, it is the writers contention that particular provisions of the
Convention are worthwhile considering in an examination of the Jamaican law pertaining
to ship arrest.
2 Hill, Christopher et al: Arrest of Ships, Lloyds of London Press Ltd., 1985.
Ibid., p.v.
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However, in accordance with Hill’s intimation, such
examination is rooted in,
and necessitates focusing on the relevant
municipal law stipulations applicable in Jamaica.
4. Ship Arrest and the Jamaican Admi
ralty Jurisdiction.
The facility of ship arrest is only available under Ja
maican law pursuant to the
institution of in rem proceedings.
In rem proceedings are proceedings instituted again
st a particular res, such as a
ship, its cargo or freight.
These proceedings are to be distinguished from in
personam proceedings which
are directed against a particular person.
In Jamaica, in rem proceedings may only be instituted
under the Supreme
Court’s Admiralty Jurisdiction, which also has jurisdiction to entertain in p
ersonam
proceedings.
5. Functions of Arrest.
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Here, Jackson has noted as follows:
“The arrest of ships has three possible functions. First
and most
obviously, it is a form of interim relief o
r provisional remedy - a “saisse
conservatoire” (and in this context it should be noted
that a creditor may
obtain some protection through a caveat aga
inst release).
Secondly, it may operate as a ground of jurisdiction over the merits. Th
irdly, it
may provide ‘security’ for the claim on the merits.4
6. Historical-jurisprudential theories and ship arrests.
Over the years, various conflicting views have been adv
anced in common law
jurisdictions as to the legal implications of arresting a vessel.
The two main theories are the so-called personificatio
n and procedural
theories.5Toa large extent they entail a tracing and comp
rehension of the historical
development of maritime liens and the use of the arrest dev
ice in England.
4
See: Thomas, D.R.: Maritime Liens, London Stevens & S
ons, 1980, para 8 et seq.
A third theory, “the conflict theory” is related to the hi
storical conflict between the
common law courts and the High Court of Admiralty in E
ngland; Also see generally:
Price, Wiswall and Marsden, op. cit.
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Under the personification theor
y, the ship is viewed as a distinct
judicial entity,
endowed with a personality a
nd capacity to contract and com
mit torts,. The ship is both
the source and limit of liabilit
y.
American jurisprudence recognizes the pe
rsonification theory. There, an a
ction
in rem is directed solely against
the maritime property.
6
Where the owners of the proper
ty appear, they do so as claiman
ts of an interest
not as defendants (unless joined as defend
ants in personam).
The jurisdiction of an American Court in a
n action in rem is limited to the v
alue
of the property: an appearance by
the owner does not, without mor
e, give the Court
jurisdiction in personam.
]n contradistinction, English jurisprudence a
ccedes to the procedural theory
whereby the seizure of the res by an
action in rem, is held to be merely
procedural to
compel the owner to appear before th
e court.
The premise inherent in the proced
ural theory, is that historically the o
bject of
arrest, was to secure the appearance o
f the defendant and the provision o
f bail.
However, Tnomas has noted:
6 See: Harley, SJ. and Batra, V: The
security of a Maritime Lien, Tri
box Ltd.
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“The historical planks on which the t
heory is based are however of
disputable validi
ty and there is much in the modern la
w which it is
impossible to relate to the
tenets of the procedural theory”
‘
Nevertheless, the writer does not prop
ose to here, delve here into a
historical search
to unearth the true object and roots of ship arre
st
and the maritime lien with which it h
as been associated.
Various studies have yielded divergen
t results in this regard. Although,
admittedly there has now emerged in
English jurisprudence some consensus on the
matter.
Suffice it to say that despite any histor
ical English antecedents or idiosyncras
ies,
Jamaica can fashion its own maritime
jurisprudence as it deems best.
This is not to suggest however that as
a matter of law, the correctness or
otherwise of the different on establishin
g what the law on arrest is in particula
r situations.
However, as earlier intimated any such
voyage into the inner recesses of Engl
ish
legal history as these pertain to maritime lie
ns and ship arrest is decidedly beyond t
he
scope of this study.
‘ ibid.
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The writer contents himself with the observation that although
discussion of the
different theories are no where to be found in any rep
orted Jamaican case it appears that at
least implicitly Jamaica ascribes to the procedural t
heory.
Thus the analysis in this chapter proceeds on the basis that thi
s is indeed the
case. Simultaneously, there is the implication of inherita
nce of the dubious features of
this theory from English law.
B. The law governing Arrest of Ships in
Jamaica.
The main procedural provisions are to be found in the Rules of
the Supreme
Court of Judicature of Jamaica in the Admiralty Division. (hereinafter referred to a
s “the
Admiralty Rules”,).
These Rules were made pursuant to Section 7 of the Colonial
Courts of
Admiralty Act, 1890 (U.K.) and in keeping with “...the manner prescribed by
Section 36 of the Judicature Law (Law 24 of 1979) as amended by Section 1 of
the Judicature Law, 1879, Amendment Law 1885. (Law 31 of 1885) for
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framing Rules of Court to regulate
the Procedure and Practice of the said
Supreme Court
in the exercise of its ordinary c
ivil jurisdiction”.
Section 7 of the colonial Courts of A
dmiralty Act 1890 (U.K.) provides that:
(1) Rules of court for regulating the procedure
and practice (including
fees and costs
) in a court in a British possession in the exer
cise of
the jurisdiction conferred by this
Act, whether original or appellate, may
be
made by the sam
e authority and in the same manner
as rules touching
the practice, proce
dure, fees and costs in the said court
in the exercise of
its ordinary civil
jurisdiction respectively are made:
Provided that the rules under this sec
tion . . shall not (save
as
provided for by this Section) come into opera
tion until they
have been app
roved by Her Majesty in Council, but on coming
into operatio
n shall have full effect as if enacted in
this Act; and
any enactment
inconsistent therewith shall, so far as it i
s so
insonsistant, be repealed...”
The approval of “Her Majesty in Council” is no lo
nger required.
Section (5) of the First Schedule to the Jam
aica Independence Act, 1962
provides that:
section four of the Colonial Courts of
Admiralty Act, 1890 (which
requires certain laws to be reserved for
the signification of Her Majesty’s pleasure
95
or to contain a suspending clause), and so much of section seven
of that Act as
requires the approval of Her Majesty in Council to any rules of court for
regulation the practice and procedure of a Colonial Court of Admiralty,
shall cease to have effect in Jamaica”.
Of special significance is the stipulation in Section 7 that on the comi
ng into
operation of the Admiralty Rules “any enactment inconsistent there
with shall so for as it
is so inconsistent, be repealed”.
This implies that any applicable Rules of Court then existing would con
tinue to
apply in those areas (if any) not covered by the new Rules of Court but which are covere
d
by the existing Rules provided they are not inconsistent with the Admiralt
y Rules
provisions.
Here it may be noted that the Act, despite abolishing the previously existing
Vice- Admiralty Courts, nevertheless saved the Rules applicable to the Vice-Admi
ralty
Courts in then British “possessions”, including Jamaica. This was provided for by
Sections 16(3) and 18 of the Act.
Section 16 provides that:
“If on the Commencement of this Act in any British possession, Rules of
Court have not been approved by Her Majesty in pursuance of this Act, the
Rules in force at such commencement under the Vice-Admiralty Act
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1863... shall so far as applicable, have effect in the Colonial
Courts of
Admiralty of such possession... as Rules of Court under this Act, a
nd may be
revoked and varied accordingly...”
Section 18 provides that:
“All enactments and rules at the passing of this Act in force touching the
practice, procedure.. .in Vice-/Admiralty Courts shall hav
e effect as
rules made in pursuance of this Act... and shall apply to the Colo
nial
Courts of Admiralty, and may be altered and revoked according
ly...”
Here it is to be noted that the Colonial Courts of Admiralty Act had come into
force in Jamaica by July 1, 1891. The Admiralty Rules came into force later in 1893.
Accordingly when the Act came into force there were not yet any Rules of Court
“approved by her Majesty” in pursuance of the Act for operation in Jamaica.
Hence the Rules of Court of the abolished Jamaican Vice-Admiralty Court
continued in operation in Jamaica when the Act took effect in Jamaica.
These Rules are the “Rules for the Vice-Admiralty Courts in Her Majesty’s
Possessions Abroad”. They had earlier come into operation in Jamaica on January 1,
1884.
The Admiralty Rules do not expressly repeal these rules. Thus in accordance
with the Section 7 stipulation, it appears they were on the coming into operation of the
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Admiralty Rules repealed only to the exte
nt that they were inconsistent with these Rules.
So far the examination leads in the direction of thin
king that where the Admiralty
Rules fail to cover a particular matter, the
n resort may be had to its predecessor Rules of
the abolished Jamaican Vice-Admiralty Cou
rt.
Here, it should be noted, that in turn, these Vice-Adm
iralty Court Rules provide
for resort to English High Court practice.
Rule 207 under the caption “Cases not provided for”
stipulates as follows:
“In all cases not provided for by these rules, the pract
ice of the High
Court of Justice of England shall be followed”.
However, Rules 79 of the Admiralty Rules, provides a
s follows:
“Subject to the provisions contained in the foregoing rules, the
provisions of the “Civil Procedure Cod
e 1888”. and the Rules of
Court regulating the general practice of the Supreme
Court, shall so far as they
are applicable, apply to procedure and practice in A
dmiralty actions”.
Thus, by its terms, Rule 79 requires resort to other local civil
procedural Rules
and Rules of Court to supplement the provisions of the Admiralty Rules.
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This means resort to the Civil Procedure Code and the Supreme Court Rul
es
However, section 686 of the Civil Procedure Code provides that:
“Where no other provision is expressly made by Law or by Rules of
procedure and practice for the Time being of the Supreme
England shall, so far as applicable, be followed,
with such variations as circumstances may
This means that ultimately resort may be had to English Admiralty Practice an
d
Procedural rules via this mechanism.
However there is some doubt as to whether Section 676 provides for continu
ed
reception of U.K. Rules or they only relate to (again!) what the English Rules were at a
particular time.
A similar question may also be raised as regards to Rule 207 stipulation.
However, in practice as regards section 676, resort is permitted to the latest
edition of the U.K. “White Book” (“The Annual Practice of the U.K. Supreme Court) in
various civil matters.
However, the position is not without its doubts as local legal counsel are divided
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of Court.
Court, the
Court of Judicature in
and the forms prescribed shall
require, be used”.
j
on the true legal import of section 676.
Any application of the section as regards Admiralty Cases need to at l
east take
into account the fact that whereas Jamaican Admiralty Jurisd
iction is based on the 1956
U.K. Act, the U.K. have made a number of progressive changes
to the 1956
stipulations, in particular by the Supreme Court. Act, 1981, (U.K.)
8
Moreover, strictly speaking, Admiralty Jurisdiction in Jamaica and th
e relevant
Rules of Court have always had different statutory foundations.9
Overall, the law pertaining to ship anest in Jamaica may be said to be
governed
by or based on the following:
1. The Admiralty Rules.
2. The Civil Procedure Code
3. The Supreme Court Rules of Court.
4. The Admiralty Jurisdiction (Jamaica) Order in Council,
1962.
5. The Colonial Courts of Admiralty Act, 1890 (U.K.)
6. The Administration of Justice Act, 1956 (U.K.)
8Cannot find on man:
9See: Chapter 3
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7. Applicable English Rules of Practice and Procedure.
8. Jamaican Case Law.
Also, Practice Directions pertaining to Ship Arrest (if any) issued by the
Supreme Court would also be of assistance. However, it appea
rs to date, none had been
issued.
C. Types of claims which may give rise to
right of arrest.
The types of claims for which ship arrests may take place are all those claim
s for
which in rem proceedings may be instituted in the Admiralty division of the Supreme
Court.
These encompass claims which give rise to maritime liens and others which m
ay
be teed “stamto rights in rem’.
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It is important to distinguish the two concepts.
Indeed, Goffey notes that: “when arrest is contemplated the first thing to be
considered is whether the cause of action confers a maritime lien or merely a r
ight in
rem”. 11
1. Maritime Liens.
The expression “marjtjnie lien” was probably first coined in English law by Sir
John Jervis in the Bold Buccleugh, (1852) 7 Moo P.C, 267.12
There is to date no statutory definition of the term in Jamaican or English law.
Also there is no international law definition. The 1926 and 1967 Convention on Maritime
Liens and Mortgages as well as the present Draft Articles for a new Convention on
Maritime Liens and Mortgages have all avoided any attempt at a distinct and
10 See: Goffey, WWiam: Arrest of Ships, 1975 L.M.C.L.Q., 34
Ibid.
12 See Thomas, ibid., para 1.
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rcomprehe1i’e definition of the term.
However, in the Bold Buccleugh itself, a defmition was proferred by Sir John
JerviS.
There, he stated that:
“...a maritime lien is . ..a claim or privilege upon a thing to be carried into
by legal process... that process to be a proceeding in rem.. .this claim or
travels with the thing into whosoever possession it may
from the moment the claim or privilege attaches,
legal process by a proceeding in rem, related
attached”. 13
effect
privilege
come. It is inchoate
and when carried into effect by
back to the period when it first
In The Tolten, Scott L.J. noted:
“The essence of the ‘privilege’ was and still is, whether in Continental or
law, that it comes into existence automatically without any antecedent
and simultaneously with the cause of action, and confers a
and freight of a proprietary kind in favor of the
goes with the ship everywhere, even in the
without notice, and has a certain ranking with
take precedence over mortgages”.’4
English
formality,
true charge on the ship
privileged creditor. The charge
hands of a purchaser for value
other maritime liens, all of which
13 (1851) 7 Moo. P.C. 267, 284
14(1 946) P. 135,150, cited by Thomas, ibid., para 10, who notes that the word
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Tetly has put forward a defmition which appears to have attracte
d some
international approval.15
He defines a maritime lien as ..a privilege against property
(a ship) which
attaches and gains priority without any court action or
any deed or any registration”. 16
Thomas 17, in what appears to be, at present, the major English work on the
subject, describes a lien as:
“(1) a privileged claim or charge,
(2) upon maritime property,
(3) for service rendered to it or damage done by it,
(4) accruing from the moment of the events out of which the cause of
action arises,
(5) Travelling with the property secretively and unconditionally, and
(6) enforced by an action in rem.18
Under Jamaican law following the English position, the concept of a m
aritime
lien is limited to a relatively small number of claims.
“privilage’ as used here is synonymous with “maritime lien”.
15see Chapter 6, F.N. 93
16Ibid.
170p cit.
18lbid., para 12
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The claims currently recognized
as giving rise to maritime liens ar
e:
1. damage done by a ship.
2. Salvage.
3. Seamen’s and master’s wage
s.
4. Master’s disbursements, and
5. Bottomry and respondentia
•19
Here, Thomas notes that: “Thes
e represent the ‘principal’ or ‘ge
nuine’ maritime
liens although others may arise b
y implication from statutory ena
ctments”.2°
Section 3(3) of the Administration of Ju
stice Act, 1956 (U.K.) as adapted and
extended to Jamaica21 provides as
follows:
“In any case in which there is a m
aritime lien or other charge on an
y
ship, aircraft or othe
r property for the amount claime
d, the Admiralty
Jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court of Jamaica may b
e invoked by an
action in rem against that ship,
aircraft or property”.
Accordingly, a vessel may be aneste
d in Jamaica for any of the afore
mentioned
19See eg. Thomas, ibid., para 6
21per The Admiralty Jurisdiction (Jamaica)
Order in Council, 1962, Section
3.
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claims giving rise to maritime lie
n.
In keeping with the basic nature of the maritime lien, a change
of ownership of
the vessel, does not affect the right to have
it arrested in respect of such claims.
2. “Other charges”
One question raised by the wording of section 3(3) is as regards the import of the
words “or other charge’. Prima facie, the words suggest that there a
re situations where
there are charges other than maritime liens for which the Admiralty jurisdiction may be
invoked.
Thomas suggests that the expression “maritime lien or other charge” in section
3(3) points to instances where maritime liens arise by implication from statutory
enactment.
Here, he states that:
“It may be that it is these implied statutory maritime liens which were, in
part in the contemplation of the legislature when enacting the Administration of
Justice Act, 1956 Section 3(3), and wherein reference is made to a “maritime
lien or other charge”.22
He cites certain occasions when under U.K. law maritime liens may possibly be
22Thomas, op. cit., para 20
106
iniplied by statute. These generally enco
mpass certain unfulfilled obligations that may be
due to government authorities such as
unpaid fees and expenses of the Receiver of wre
ck
and due remuneration for services rend
ered by coastguards.23
Tetley has referred to special legislative rights
” which he describes as “rights in
favor of governmental authorities (and sometimes individ
uals) against the ship and
sometimes against her cargo, usually rankin
g aheai of maritime liens. 24
These rights, Tetley indicates, relates to matters
such as the recovery of dock and
harbour charges and the removal of wreck.25
Overall, it appears as Thomas intimates, that the
re is doubt as regards the exact
label to be placed on such claims which may possibly
fall within this category of “other
charges”.
The character or description of such “other charges”
have apparently not been
subject to any judicial discussion. At least there appears to be no reported
cases on the
para 20 et seq.
240p cit., p.42
25Ibid., p43
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matter.
In the final analysis, it suffices for immediate purposes to emphasize that any
such “other charge” falling within Section 3(3) will give rise to a right of arrest.
3. Maritime Liens and the International Dimension
The problem of construing Section 3(3), inter alia, highlights the need for there
to be a clear definition of a maritime lien. More importantly, there is a need to have a
statutorily enumerated exclusive list of maritime liens. Not only does it appear that there
is no such definition to be found in Jamaican law, but there is no such list of liens.
Section 68 of the draft Jamaica Shipping Bill now has such a list. 26 This is
to be welcomed as this will bring more certainty as to which claims defmitely give rise to
maritime liens.
Importantly, Jamaica can use this mechanism of statutory enactment to ensure
26see chapter 3
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that those claims which it has under its law as giving rise to maritime liens are compatible
with its national interests.
As earlier noted the draft Bill provisions in this regard, is based on those of the
Draft Articles for a New Convention on Maritime Liens and Mortgages.
Hence the international dimension to the proposed statutory enactment on
maritime liens is here quite manifest.
This highlights not only the general need to pay attention to this international
dimension in dealing with preliminary issues in the domestic maritime law context.
Importantly, it signifies the need for Jamaicas participation in international fora involved.
27
For present purposes it is important to emphasize the link between the maritime
lien and arrest of ships. This link is also recognized in the international context.
Hence, there is an attempt to ensure full compatibility in the future between
different international Conventions dealing respectively with maritime liens and arrest of
ships.28
Statutory rights in rem
27See also chapters 3 and 6
28See: chapter 3
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Basically, these are the claims within the Jamaican Admiralty jurisdiction which
do not have attached to them the status of maritime liens.
A statutory right in rem exists independently of a maritime lien. Although where
a maritime lien exists there is concomitantly an available action in rem, it is not the case
that where an action fri rem is made available a maritime lien is thereby inferred.
29 This
points to the existence of statutory rights in rem.
Unlike the maritime lien which is a substantive right, the statutory right in rem, is
in essence, a procedural remedy. It accrues at the issue of the writ and is defeated by a
sale to a
bona fide purchaser.
Required Procedures
1. Effecting Arrest.
Firstly, in rem proceedings have to be commenced by the filing of a Writ of
Summons in the prescribed form.
A Praecipe for warrant to arrest the vessel along with a supporting Affidavit, are
to be filed.
29See: eg. Karthingesu, M: Actions in rem in the Far East, in Carriage of Goods by
Sea Peter-Koh Soon Kwang, Ed Singapore, Butterworths, 1986, 25,31
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The Affidavit to be filed on
behalf of the party seeking to h
ave the vessel arrested
should contain certain p
articulars.
Rule 3 of The Admiralty Rule
s provide as follows:
“Jn actions in rem, a warrant
for the arrest of property ..ma
y be issued
instance of the plaintiff at any
time after the writ of summon
s has been
the defendant after appearance
, but no warrant of arrest
affidavit by the party or his ag
ent has been filed
complied with.
(a) The affidavit shall state the name
and description of the
whose instance the warrant is t
o be issued, the nature of the
or counter claim, the name and
nature of the property to be
arrested and that the claim or
counter claim has not been
satisfied.
(b) In an action of wages, or of posse
ssion, the affidavit
shall State the na
tional character of the vessel pr
oceeded
111
r
at the
filed or of
shall be issued until an
and the following provisions
party at
claim
against: and if
commeflcemel1t of the
.
State to which the
Jamaica and a copy of the
foreign
the
bond or
annexed
against a foreign vessel, that notice of the
action has been given to the Consul of the
vessel belongs if there be one resident in
notice shall be annexed to the affidavit.
(c) In an action of bottomry, the bottomry bond, and if in a
language also a translation thereof, shall be produced for
inspection and perusal of the Registrar and a copy of the
of the translation thereof, certified to be correct, shall be
to the affidavit.1’
However the Court or Judge may as deemed fit, allow the warrant to issue,
although the affidavit may not contain all the aforementioned particulars. 30
In an action for wages the court or Judge may also waive the service of the notice
and in an action of bottoniiy, the production of the bond. 31
Once the warrant of Arrest is issued, the writ of summons, along with the
Warrant to Arrest, are then served on the vessel in a particular manner.
This is the normal practice although, strictly speaking in terms of sequence of
activity, service of the writ of sunons is what is first required since this is what gives
3Oper Rule 4
31lbid.
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the court jurisdiction over the vessel. The arresting of the vessel
is then said to “perfect
the court’s jurisdiction over the vessel.
Rule 6 provides that: “In actions in rem the warrant of arre
st shall be served by
the bailiff of the court...”
However, in actions in rem, service of the Warrant as well
as that of the Writ of
Summons must be carried out in a particular manner.
Service of the writ of summons or warrant against the ship
, needs to be effected
by nailing or affixing a copy of the writ or warrant on th
e mainmast or on the single mast
of the vessel and leaving it there, nailed or affixed.
32
However, actual service of the writ or warrant as describe
d may be dispensed
with where, say the owner of the vessel or his lawyer agrees
to accept service and put in
bail or pay money into Court in lieu of bail.
3
However, once the documents have been duly served on th
e vessel as aforesaid,
then it becomes effectively under arrest.
In practice, the Bailiff takes possession on the vessel and seeks
to ensure that no
one gains access to the vessel so as to move it out of the court’s jurisdiction.
2. Release from Arrest
32See: Rule 8.
335ee: Rule 5
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Rule 25 provides that: ‘property arrested by warrant shall only be released under
the authority of an instrument issued from the office of the Registrar, to be called a
Release”
Normally, once a vessel has been arrested, its owner or other interested party,
will take steps to procure its release.
Bail may be put up or money paid into Court in lieu of bail.
Such ball or payment is to provide alternative security for the Plaintiffs claim and
to obtain release of the vessel.
The plaintiff is entitled to sufficient security to cover the amount of his claim,
together with interests and costs. Security is usually provided in the form of a bank
guarantee or letter of undertaking from a P&I Club.M
Bail or payment into court takes the place of the ship in the action and if after
judgment it appears inadequate, nevertheless the ship cannot be arrested or rearrested for
this reason.
A person desirous of preventing the release of the vessel under arrest, is required
to file a praecipe for a caveat against release.
Once this is done, no order of the court affecting the vessel or money mentioned
345ee eg appendix 17
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in the caveat, may be issued unless the caveato
r is notified.35
Forced Sale of Arrested Ship
The court may order an arrested ship to be sold either on
giving judgement at trial
or by default, or prior to judgement pendent lite.
The circumstances under which the court may authorize t
he pendente the sale,
/
/
include high maintenance costs of the vessel, mounting
daily expenses, the ships
deteriorating condition and unpaid crew wages.
Overall, the considerations would centre around whether the
interests of the
creditors would be best served by the immediate sale prior to
judgment. Also of particular
importance here is the residual interest of the defendants themselv
es.
Parnell,J, in the Jamaican Supreme Court case of Morgan v. M.V
. Vacuna and
Others, 1968, 15 W.LR.280, 296 emphasized that:
“Every sale must be preceded by a commission for the appraise
ment and
35See eg Georghadjis
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sale and the commission must be addressed to the bailiff an
d executed by him
unless the court directs to the contrary”.
The object of the appraisement is to prevent the sale of a valuable property, as a
ship, at an unreasonably low price.
The sale is usually carried out by public auction, after having been duly
advertised in such local and foreign newspapers as the court directs.
As regards sale by private treaty Parnell J. points out:
“Before a sale by private treaty can properly take place, the name of the
person purchasing; the sum to be paid and in what manner,
and the terms of the
agreement for sale must be submitted to the court for approval. And the
sale must be effected by the bailiff unless the court otherwise
directs”.
Thus in the said case, a purported sale of a vessel in contravention of the
relevant
rules was treated as a nullity.
Where there is a sale of a ship the bailiff is required to deposit the gross proc
eeds
in court for eventual payment out to the various claimants subject to the doctrine of
priorities.
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F: The International Dimension.
Here, the convention that is of primary relevance is The International Co
nvention
for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to the Arrest of se
agoing Ships, 1952. Also,
of relevance are those International Conventions pertaining to M
aritime Liens, that is,
those of 1926 and 1967. Importantly, as already noted preparatio
n of a new draft
Convention on Maritime Liens and Mortgages is now at an advancec
stage. /‘
The main objective of the 1952 Arrest Convention was to protect the interests of
both ship and cargo by securing free movement of vessels and by prohibitin
g arrest for
claims not relates to the operation of the ships as under most national lega
l systems, arrest
was permitted for any claim regardless of its nature. However here, it may be
noted that
this was not the case under the Common Law where a vessel could only be arreste
d with
a view to enforcing claims against the ship.
The resulting compromise position adopted by the Convention is to specify a
list
/
of maritime claims in respect of which a ship may be arrested.
36
It provides the claimant having a “maritime claim” with the possibility of ha
ving
the vessel arrested. At the same time, it restricts the power of arrest to the claims
See also: chapter 3
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specified in it.
As earlier noted, it is this list of claims which essentially comprises the Jamaican
Admiralty Jurisdiction.
The Convention provides that a claimant may arrest either the particular ship
in
respect of which a claim is made, or any other ship in the same ownership, excep
t in
cases where the owner is not personally liable (for example in the case of a ship under
bareboat charter). In the latter case, another ship owned by the person liable may be
arrested.37
Under the Conventiorships are deemed to be in the same ownership when
all
the shares therein are owned by the same person or persons.
Article 3 (3) provides that:
“A ship shall not be arrested, nor shall bail or other security be given
more than once in any one or more of the jurisdictions of any of the
Contracting States m respect of the same maritime claim by the came
claimant: and, if a ship has been arrested in any one of such jurisdictions, or
bail or other security has been given in such jurisdiction either to release the ship or
in particular, sub-paras 1&4 of Article 3
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claim.
Hifi has cited the case:
The Despina G.K. (1982’) 2 Lloyd’s Rep 555, as one in
which the issue of whether it is possible to arre
st the same ship twice, came up for
decision in England.38 In that case, the English
Admiralty Court decided that a
judgement creditor who has obtained a fmal judgment against
a shipowner pursuant to
proceedings in rem in a foreign Admiralty Court,
is permitted to bring a subsequent action
in England if necessary to complete the execution o
f the judgement provided that the
vessel is still in the same ownership of the judgment debtor at the tim
e of the re-arrest.39
This holding apparently applies under English
Law where a previous arrest can
Correctly be defined as a maritime attachment either und
er the law of the country where the
38See HHI, op cit., pp 19-21
391b1d., p. 21
to avoid a threatened arrest, any
subsequent arrest of the ship or of any ship in
the same ownership by the same
claimant shall be set aside, and the ship
released by the Court or other appropriat
e judicial authority of that state unless
the claimant can satisfy the Court or o
ther appropriate judicial authority that the
bail or other security had been fmally
released before the subsequent arrest or that
there is other good cause for ma
intaining that arrest”,
The convention thus restricts the ability to arre
st to one ship in relation to each
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arrest took place or under English Law. Once this is the
case then according to Hill, the
English Court will permit the second arrest as being merely to enforce the
foreign
judgment.
He emphasizes however, that:
“What cannot happen under any circumstances is for the same vessel to
be arrested twice, both times being the putting into effect of an in rem right
against the vessel whether or not the arrest is in the enforcement of a maritime
lien on the vessel’. 40
In Cyprus, another common law jurisdiction, the issue of whether a second or
subsequent warrant of arrest may be taken out against the same vessel has come up for
decision.4’There, it was held that the circumstances are such that the plaintiffs in the
first case were not yet ready to proceed to judgement and execution and the plaintiffs in
the second case were ready to proceed to judgment, it would be necessary and right for a
second warrant of arrest to be granted.
In determining the mater, it appears the important consideration is as regards the
prejudice the second plaintiff would suffer by the first plaintiffs inability to take immediate
405ee: Georghadjis,Andreas et al: Arrest of Ships-7, Cyprus. Egypt. Pakistan.
Poland, Lloyds of London Press Ltd 1988 at p. 21 where he cites in support:
Comm ercial Bank of the Near East Ltd v the Ship “Peg asos 111” now lying at
Limassoi Port (1978) i C.L.R.l; Haissan Bahlawan V. The Motor Yacht ‘sand’,
unreported Admiralty Action 29/88.
41Georghadjis opcit, p.21
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action.42
The position in Cyprus is in keeping with
the provisions of Article 3(3), since
different claimants were involved. What th
e convention is basically against, is the sam
e
person arresting the same ship in respect o
f the same claim more than once. Such a
possibility would prima facie, be inimical to
the interests of the free flow of maritime
commerce and the overall objectives of the Convention.
The exceptional situation referred to as reg
ards England, although spoken of in
terms of a second arrest of a ship appears t
o be more skin to attachment.
As earlier indicated, “arrest” does not inc
lude the seizure of a ship in execution or
satisfaction of a judgement. Thus, it appears The Despi
na G.K. Case is not ipso facto
concerned with arresting the same ship tw
ice in the sense of the Convention.
Hill’s observation in this context is, in the
writers respectful opinion, based on a
false notion, at least as far as the Conventi
on is concerned.
Hill, after posing the question as to whet
her it is possible to arrest the same ship
twice, states that: “The tempting answer is
no. But it is not quite so simple as that”.
‘
He then cites The Despina G.K case as o
ne in which the matter came up for
decision since: “This ship was seized (arrested) twice
”.
He thus, it appears erroneously, equates
“seizure” with “arrest” of a ship. It is
42 cit., p. 19
43lbict., p.19
441b1d.
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this false notion which is the basis for the subsequent fallacious reasoning which in turn
underlines his reluctance to give a defmitive negative answer to the question he poses.
There appears to be no reported Jamaican case on this issue of the same claimant
arresting the same ship twice in respect of a particular claim.
This part of the Convention Provisions are not expressly enacted into the
Administration ofJustice Act. 1956 (U.K.)
Hence, this part of the Convention provisions have not had clear express
legislative force in Jamaican law.
However, it is the writers submission that due regard should be had to these
convention stipulations whenever the issue arises for determination in Jamaica.
Here the interests of uniformity, certainty and justice in international maritime
matters as mentioned by Tetley45 would be served by the adoption of such a course of
action in Jamaica despite the fact that Jamaica is not a party to the Convention.
As earlier intimated, the Convention allows under specified conditions for the
arrest of a ship other than the one in relation to which the claim arose. This provision of
the Convention reflects a compromise between the traditional English position which
restricted arrest to the particular ship in respect of which the claim arose and the
45See chapter 1, part F
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Continental European approach w
hich enabled the claimant to arrest any chattel b
elonging
to the defendant shipowner c
oncerned.
The relevant Convention stipulations may b
e said to be reflected in Jamaican law
in the form of the extended Section 3
of Administration of Justice Act. 1956 (U.K.)
Section 3 as adapted and extended to Jamaica
provides as follows:
“...(l) The Admiralty jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of Jam
aica may
in the case mentioned in paragraphs
(a) to (c) and (s) of subsection (1) of
section one of this Act be inv
okes by an action in rem against the ship
or property in question.
(2) In any case in which there is a maritime lien or other pro
perty for the
amount claimed, the Admiralty jurisdiction of the Supreme C
ourt of Jamaica may
be invoked by an action in rem against that s
hip, aircraft of property.
(3) In the case of any such claim as is mentioned in paragrap
hs (d) to (r)
of subsection (1) of section one of this Act, being a claim ari
sing in
connection with a ship, where the person was,
when the cause of action
arose, the owner or charterers of, or in posse
ssion or in control of, the
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jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of Jamaica may
a maritime lien on the ship or not) be invoked
(a) that ship, if at the time when the action is brought, it is
beneficially owned as respects all the shares therein by that
person; or
(b) any other ship which, at the time when the action is
brought, is beneficially owned as aforesaid.
(4) In the case of a claim in the nature of towage or piotage in respect of
aircraft, the Admiralty jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of Jamaica may
invoked by an action in rem against that aircraft if at the time when the
brought it is beneficially owned by the person who would
in an action in personam.
ship, the Admiralty
(whether the claim gives rise to
by an action in rem against-
an
be
action is
be liable on the claim
(5) Notwithstanding anything in the preceding provisions of this section,
the Admiralty jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of Jamaica shall not be
invoked by an action in rem in the case on any such claim as is
mentioned in paragraph (D) of subsection (1) of section one of this Act unless
the claim relates wholly or partly to wages (including any sum allotted out of
wages or adjudged by a superintendent to be due by way of wages).
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(6) Where, in the exercise of its Admiralty jurisdiction, the S
upreme
Court of Jam
aica orders any ship, aircraft or other property to
be
sold, the court shall have
jurisdiction to hear and determine any question
arising as to the title to the
proceeds of sale.
(7) In determining for the purposes of subsections (4) and
(5) of this
section whether a person would be
liable in an action in personam it shall be
assumed that he has his h
abitual residence or a place of business
within Jamaica”.
From this it can be seen that section 3(4) permits the arrest of a
ship other than
the one in respect of which the claim arose.
However the provisions of section 3(4) lends itself to different i
nterpretations.
Thus, Hazzlewood46has observed that the interpretat
ions of the sub-section has
presented a dilemjia in the form of the extent to which paragraph (b) is gover
ned by
Paragraph (a).
He notes that:
46Hazzelwood, Steven J: Gaps in the action in rem- p’ugged?
L.M.C.L.Q 422
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“-the more liberal construction is that the two paragraphs operate
independently with the effect that “any other
ship” beneficially owned by
the defendants may be arrested, notwiths
tanding that the defendant was
not the owner of the offending vessel. The r
estrictive interpretation is that
“any other ship’ in paragraph (b) may be arrested only if it is in the
same ownership
as the offending ship; ie the two ships must be
“sisterships”...47
The issue involved here is of much practical significance. Its res
olution will
determine whether a shipowner can with impunity, charter ex
cess tonnage and commit
wrongs in respect of the chartered vessels without having his
own vessels arrested.
It often happens that a shipowner A time charters his ship S t
o B, another
shipowner, who commits a breach of charterparty. A may now w
ish to arrest a ship
beneficially owned by B. The question is therefore whether sectio
n 3 (4) sanctions such
an arrest.
The facts of The Span Treza 181982)1 Lloyd’s Rep225 were essentially those
Outlined in the preceding paragraph. The issue involved was basically whe
ther section 3
(4 could be successfully used to arrest a vessel under the (beneficial) ownership of
Someone not the owner of the involved (or offending) ship.
The English Court of Appeal favored the more liberal construction of sec
tion 3
p.423
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(4). The decision thus sanctioned the arrest of a
vessel which is not under the same
ownership of the involved or offending sh
ip.
This did away with the restrictive view which had
formerly held sway in English
Admiralty jurisprudence.
Prior to the Span Terza case, the english Courts had
required a common
ownership link between the offending or involv
ed vessel and the alternative ship selected
for arrest. The two vessels had to be in effect “s
ister-ships”, that is, under the same
beneficial ownership as regards all their shares.
As a result the expression “sister-ship arrest” has bee
n in vogue in English
Admiralty jurisprudence since the 1956 Act based on the section 3 (4
) stipulation.
However, as shown in The Span Terza case, such an e
xpression would now appear to be
misleading. A better expression, it appears, is alternati
ve ship arrest”, which is wider in
scope.
The doubts surrounding the construction of section 3(4) has its roots
in the
United Kingdoms bungled attempt at giving effect to the relevan
t provisions of the Arrest
Convention.
Here it should be noted that paragraphs 1 and 4 of Article 3 o
f the Convention
provide, in so far as relevant, as follows:
“(1) Subject to the provisions of paragraph (4) of this Article.., a
elalznaflt may arrest either the particular ship in respect of whi
ch the
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any other ship which is owned by the person who
maritime claim arose, the owner of the particular
The provisions of this paragraph shall apply to any case in which a
than the registered owner is liable in respect of a maritime
ship”.
The opening words of paragraph 1 clearly indicate that it is to be read as be
ing
subject to paragraph 4. Clearly therefore in the present context it will be the provisions
of paragraph 4 which will be one of overriding significance.
Paragraph 1 taken by itself requires both the involved or offending ship an
d the
Ship to be arrested to be in the same ownership.
maritime claim arose, or
was, at the time when the
ship...
(4) When in the case of a charter by demise of a ship the charterer and
not the registered owner is liable in respect of a maritime claim relat
ing to that
ship, the claimant may arrest such ship or any other ship
in the
ownership of the charterer by demise, subject to the provisions of this
convention, but no other ship in the ownership of the registered owne
r shall be
liable to arrest in respect of such maritime claims.
person other
claim relating to that
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It does not require either of them to be owned by the person liable for the claim.
Thus a literal reading ofparagraph 1 alone would lead to the odd result where, if the
person liable in respect of the claim is not the owner of the offending ship, none of his
ships can be arrested while at the same time the offending ship owned by the innocent
shipowner as well as all other ships owned by him could be arrested. However,
thankfully as already emphasized,paragraph 1 is made subject to paragraph 4.
The final sentence in paragraph 4 makes it clear that the paragraph applies not
only to demise charterers but also to any other person other than the involved or offending
ship’s registered owner. This surely is wide enough to encompass all ship charterers.
Accordingly, paragraph 4 is to be construed as affecting all such persons.
Paragraph (4) may be said to have three main effects in the present context.
Firstly, it exempts the other ships of the innocent owner from arrest. Secondly, it
confirms that the involved or offending ship itself may be arrested. Thirdly, it allows the
arrest of ships owned by a person other than the innocent registered owner of the
involved or offending ship. Here the relevant person is the one who is liable in respect of
the maritime claim. Accordingly his ships along with the involved or offending ship may
also be arrested.
Hence, from the provisions of Article 4, it is clear that there need not be an
ownership link between the involved and the alternative ship.
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The English draughtsmen in draughting the 1956 legislative provisions
purporting to give effect to Article 3, failed to include Article 3 (4) in the enabling
legislation. As a consequence English law went off course with a restrictive judicial
interpretation as to what alternative ship could be arrested.
Happily, The Span Treza case as well as subsequent amendments to the 1956
provisions have helped to provide a rudder for a path more in keeping with the
Convention stipulations.
The matter of the interpretation of Section 3(4) has also come up for decision
in other common law jurisdictions.
In a 1973 Cyprus case, Elias Rigas v The Ship “Baalbeck” now lying
at Larnaca Harbor (1973) 11 J.S.C. 1519 the then restrictive English approach
was followed. 48
However, in 1978, the Singapore Court of Appeal in The Permian, (1978)
I Lloyd’s Rep. 308. embraced the liberal approach and held that there was no
requirement for the offending and arrestable ships to be sisterships and allowed the arrest
of the defendant’s vessel where the defendant was merely a charterer of the vessel in
respect to which the claim had arisen.
The Singapore Court of appeal declined following the then restrictive approach
adopted by the U.K. Rather this Singapore case in turn provided an important precedent
48See Georghadjis, op cit, p.11
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for the English Court in the Span Terza case.
The liberal approach is more in keeping with international consensus in the
matter as reflected in the Convention provisions.
Moreover, to the extent that the Section 3(4) provisions may be amenable to
differing interpretations, it is submitted that as a matter of policy the liberal approach
ought to be preferred. It is therefore hoped that this approach will commend itself to a
Jamaican Court faced with the task of construing Section 3(4).
As Tabbush 9 has observed:
“...The purpose of allowing the arrest of sister ships, in rem can only be
/
to found jurisdiction against the person liable and to give the plaintiff
security for his claim; there is no question of imputing liability to the ship
itself because of its part in the incident, as there is when <the offending
ship > is arrested because of a maritime lien. To serve this purpose, and to
avoid doing injustice to third parties, the only important requirement is that <
the ship to be arrested > be wholly owned by the person liable; no rational
49Tabbush, S.J.: Arrest of Ships owned by Charterers, L.M.C.L.Q., 585
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purpose is served by any special relationship between <the offending ship>
and <the ship to be arrested >..
Also as already shown the relevant Convention provisions clearly support the
liberal interpretation. Thus, in the present context, the question as to whether a Jamaican
court should in an appropriate case resort to this Convention to which Jamaica is not a
party to clarify any perceived ambiguities such as may be obtained in respect of Section
3(4) takes on particular significance.
In The Banco, (1971) I Lloyd’s Rep. 49 when the matter of the
interpretation of Section 3(4) came before the English Court, it was held by Lane, J at
first instance that:
“In the construction of a statute such as the Administration of
Justice Act, 1956, passed to enact matters agreed at a prior
Convention, the Court may, in the event of, ambiguity, look at the
Convention even though the statute may have
given effect to broader terms of agreement than those of a precise
definition...”51 When the case went up to the English Court of Appeal,
50Ibid., p. 587
51 Ibid
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approach and holding of Lame, 3 was
approved.
There, Lord Denning, M.R., stated a
s follows:
“It is now fully established that when
an Act of Parliament is passed so
as to give eff
ect to an international Convention, w
e can look at the
Convention so as to help
us to construe the Act, see Salomo
n v.
Commissioners of Customs and
Excise, (1967) 2 Q.B. 116;
(1966)2 Lloyds Rep. 460; Post Office
v Estuary Radio Ltd., (1968) 2Q.B. 7
40; (1967) 2 Lloyd’s Rep.
299, and this is to even though the Ac
t of Parliament does not mention
the Convention”.52
Here, it must be emphasized that in the
words of Lord Denning, it matters not
whether or not the Convention is mentione
d in the statute as is the case with the
1956
Act, (U.K.) in respect of both U.K. and Jamaica.
Ultimately the important question is
the intent of the legislature. Where the
intent
of the enactment was decidedly to give legislat
ive effect to a Convention, then it seem
s to
the writer that this ought to be overriding consid
eration as regards whether to seek the
aid
p. 52
the
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of the Convention Provisions in statutory interpretation.
Thus, whether the Country is or not a party to the Convention,is but one of the
factors that should enter into the matrix of Considerations. Hence it seems to the writer
that like the English Courts did in the case of The Banco, a Jamaican court may in an
appropriate case pray in aid the Convention provisions for purposes of construing
stipulations of the 1956 Act (U.K.) such as those of Section 3(4).
Also as earlier shown, support for The Banco approach may be found in The
Eschersheim (1976) 2 Lloyd’s Rep .1. 53
The phrase “beneficially owned” is used in both paragraphs (a) and (b) of
Section 3(4). In The I Congress del Partido (1977) I Lloyd’s Rep. 536,
atp. 561, Robert Goff, J., at first instance stated that the phrase was introduced to take
account of trust law and that it refers to equitable ownership.
To determine who truly in the beneficial owner of a vessel it must be investigated
not only who is the legal owner of its shares but also who has an equitable interest. It is
only by taking into account both legal and equitable ownership that the beneficial
ownership can be determined,
Thus, whereas the Convention simply refers to ownership without any
53see chapter 3, part D
54see: Hill, op cit., p. 15
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qualificati0n the 1956 Act by virtue of the English trust notion has added some
complexitY to the matter which has been extended to Jamaica as well via the applicable
Section 3(4)) provisions.
Under the Convention ,all questions relating to liability for wrongful arrest and
for the costs of providing security as well as all procedural matters are referred to the law
of the state where the arrest takes place. 55
The basic procedural requirements in Jamaica for ship arrest have already been
noted, As regards wrongful arrest it appears damages will only be available for gross
negligence and where malafides are proven:56 The prevision of security for costs by the
arrester of the vessel in not mandatory and application for this has to be made to the
Court.
/
The Convention contains provisions regarding jurisdiction based on arrest
for hearing claims on the merits which are elaborated upon in the next chapter dealing
with Jurisdiction.
Here it may be briefly noted, that the Convention requires that where the court in
whose jurisdiction the ship was arrested has no jurisdiction to decide upon the merits, the
55see: Article 6, and Chapter 5
56see eg, Jackson, op cit, p. 178
see Article 7, and
Chapter 5
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security given to procure the release of the ship is to be held as security fo
r the satisfaction
of and judgment by a Court having jurisdiction to decide, and the Court of the State in
which the arrest is made must fix a time within which an action must be brough
t. The
Convention further provides that the ship may be released if the proceedings aie n
ot
brought within the time so specified.58
Accordingly, the Convention, by necessary implication, provides for arrest (or
bail or other security in lien) in one Contracting State as security for proceedings in
another or for arbitration. 59 This also operates in tandem with the prohibition of arrest
of more than one ship for one more claim in any one or more of the contracting states.
The law of the United Kingdom has traditionally linked, and subsequent to the
United Kingdom’s ratification of the Convention have continued to link arrest to
proceedings on the merits.
Such linking of arrest to proceedings on the merits contravened the provision of
the Convention. Thus there has been judicial criticism of the failure of the United
Kingdom to implement this aspect of the Convention.60
It appears that Jamaican law follows the English traditional approach. It is very
doubul, whether at present a Jamaican Court would hold on to property over which it
58 Ibid.
see Jackson, op cit, p.
170; Articles 3(3), 5, 7(2) and (3)
60 see Jackson, ibid; The AndreaUrsula (1973) 1 Q.B.265; The Maritime Trader
(1981) 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 153 (Sheen. J.)
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has no jurisdiction on the merits.
This appears to follow from the basic principles concerning Jurisdiction
examined in the next Chapter as well as from what it is necessary for th
e would be ship
arrest the show, (by way of affidavit) before a warrant for the arrest of the ship may be
procured.
Significantly, as regards Jamaica, the Conventions permits the arrest of ships
flying the flag of non-contracting states, in the jurisdiction of any Contracting State, in
respect of maritime claims specified within the Convention and for any other claim
permitted by the law of the Contracting State. 61
Thus the restriction of the right of arrest to the enumerated maritime claims
applies only to ships having the nationality of a Contracting state, Thus, if as is the case
in must civil law countries, the arrest of a vessel is generally permissible to secure any
claim, whether maritime or not, vessels flying the flag of non-contracting states such as
that of Jamaica may be so arrested, provided, however, the requirements of the lex fori
are met.
Also, Article 8(3) provides that:
..any Contracting state shall be entitled wholly or partly to exclude
from the benefits of this Convention any Government of a non
61 see: Article 8
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ntracting state or any person
who has not, at the time of his arrest, his
habitual residence or principal
place of business in one of the contracting
states”.
The size of the fleet flying Jamaican flags is rather mi
niscule.
However, to the extent that such a fleet exists, the ships
concerned stand to be
affected as aforesaid.
While, in the Jamaican municipal law context, ship arrest i
s also linked to
maritime liens, the Convention itself did not ipso facto affect t
he existing law pertaining to
maritime liens.
Indeed, Article 9 provides:
“Nothing in this Convention shall be construed as creating a rig
ht of
action, which apart from the provisions of this convention, would no
t arise
under the law applied by the Court which had seisin of the cas
e nor
os creating any maritime liens which do not exist under such law or
under
the Convention on Maritime Mortgages and Liens, if the latte
r is
applicable”
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Thus, the 1956 Act in giving effect to provisions of the
Convention did not
create any new maritime lien
s, rather it allowed for arrest of a vessel in respect of the
“waritime claims” set out in the Conventio
n. Jamaican Admiralty Jurisdiction was
accordinglY expanded as a result while the previously e
xisting list of maritime liens
remained unaffected.
However, a point worth reiterating here is that at present attempts are
being made
to ensure the fullest compatibility between International -conventi
ons dealing respectively
with Ship Arrest and Maritime Liens. Then, should Jamaica become
party to both of such
Conventions, this should bring not only greater harmony between the oper
ative principles
pertaining to ship arrest and maritime liens interse, but also ensure greater ha
rmony
between Jamaican law and that of other countries implementing such conven
tions.
2. Forced Sale of arrested Ship and International Stipulations
.
Enforcement of a security interest in a vessel is carried out by arrest and forc
ed
sale of the vessel. Earlier in this chapter the relevant local procedural rules pertaining t
o a
forced sale of an arrested ship were generally considered. However, there are also some
international stipulations pertaining to forced sale of ships.
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These will be noted only briefly here since although they may be related to ship
arrest, on the whole they are more concerned with the actual enforcement of security
interests. As such they do not necessarily fall within the framework of the preliminary
issues being examined in the thesis.
However, to the extent that they may affect procedures pertaining to ship arrest
they deserve to be mentioned here.
Such stipulations are contained in the 1967 Convention on Maritime Liens and
Mortgages. Importantly as regards Jamaica, the Draft Articles for a new Convention on
Maritime Liens and Mortgages contain such provisions.
The relevant provisions of these Draft Articles have been incorporated into the
new Draft Jamaica Merchant Shipping Bill, 1989. Sections 75-78.
Section 75 requires 30 days notice to be given by the executing officer to
various holders of security interests in the vessel as regards the time and place of its sale.
This is based on Article 10 of the Draft of Articles.
The objective here is to provide protection to creditors, enabling them to
participate in the distribution of the proceeds of sale in accordance with their respective
priorities.
There is no such 30 day notice requirement at present. Hence, Section 75, if it
becomes law would bring about a significant change to this aspect of the procedural rules
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pertaining to ship arrest and sale.
The other Sections 76-78 are basically concerned with ensuring a transfer of a
clean title in the vessel to the purchase and the issuing of a certificate to that effect. There
is provision as to the actual disposition of the proceeds of sale. However, until a new
Maritime Liens and Mortgage Convention finally comes into being these draft statutory
provisions are likely to remain such and subject to change with changes in the Draft
Articles’ provisions.
F. “Postscript”: The Mareva Injunction - an alternative to ship arrest?
In The Span Terza case, considered earlier, Donaldson L.J. in the course of
argument suggested to counsel that his cause, which he sought to protect by means of
ship arrest, would be equally well served by employing instead the device which now
bears the sobriquet of “The Mareva Injunction”.
The Law Lord suggested that in the particular case such a device would be just as
effective in preventing the respondents from removing the vessel from the jurisdiction and
giving rise to the provision of security “...in exactly the same way as security will, no
doubt, be provided in respect of this arrest... “62
This firstly raises the question as to what exactly is the Mareva Injunction? A
62 (1981) I Lloyd’s Rep. 225, at p. 229; Also: see: Powles, David G: The Mareva
Injunction and Associated Orders, Professional Books Limited, 1985, at p. 119;
O’Neill, Terry 0 :Mareva Injunctions, Lecture 22nd June 1982, Mareva Injunctions,
The Tower Hill London One day Conference, Lloyds of London Press, 1982, at p.9.
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second question is whether such a device is available under Jamaican law? Thirdly, there
is the question as to how in fact does it compare to the facility of ship arrest? In the latter
case, the suggestions of Donaldson, L.J. makes such an inquiry particularly pertinent.
The Mareva Injunction is essentially a Court Order restraining a defendant from
removing assets from the jurisdiction.63 It is a species of interlocutory injunction. As
such, it continues until final disposition of the action or until a further order is made.M
The Mareva Injunction took its name from an English case. 65 It was actually
developed in 1975 in England largely through the judicial initiative of Lord Denning.
Prior to the development of the Mareva doctrine in 1975, it was a fundamental
principle of the law of interlocutory injunctions, that no injunctions would be granted
prior to trial to restrain the defendant from disposing of or dealing with his assets. This
appears throughout the literature of the Common Law as the rule that there shall be no
execution before judgment.66In Robinson v Pickering (1881)16 Ch. D. 660, it was
bluntly stated that :“ you cannot get an injunction to restrain a man from parting with his
property”.
The Mareva Doctrine developed out of the increasing need for swift judicial
63 See Appendix 18
64 See eg: Mc Allister, Debra M.: Mareva Injunctions, Carswell, Canada, p.9
65 Mareva Companie Naviera SA v. International Bulcarriers S.A. The Mareva,
(1975) 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 509; However, the Injunction was earlier granted in
Nippon Yusen Kaisha v. Karageoris (1975) 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 137
66 See eg: Mc AHister, op cit. p. 18; Lister & Co. v. Stubbs 1890, 45 Ch. D.!.
142
action to prevent a person moving his assets out of the jurisdiction so as to render
ineffectual any judgment given against him.67
Such assets may be anything that has a pecuniary value such as a ship. Indeed,
the Mareva injunction has for some time now been applied to ships.68
The conditions for the grant of the Mareva Injunction are basically the following:
69
1. The Plaintiff must have a substantive cause of action within the
jurisdiction;
2. The Plaintiff must show he has a good arguable case.
3. The defendant must have assets in the jurisdiction;
4. There must be a real danger that the defendant will remove the assets
from, or dissipate them within the jurisdiction; and
5. it must be just and convenient to grant the injunction.
As regards the jurisdiction for its grant, it may be noted that it developed in the
67 See: Harvey, Brian: Judicial Interpretation in Commercial Law- The Proper
Limits of Judicial Inventiveness, Paper 11A2(b), 8th Commonwealth Law
Conference, Ocho Rios, Jamaica, September 7-13, 1986, at p.3
8 See eg. Clipper Maritime Co. Ltd of Monrovia v. Mineralimport export, Tje
Marie Lernhardt (1981) 3 All E.R. 307, (1981) 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 458.; The Rena
K (1979) I All E.R. 397; (1979) 3 W.L.R. 431
See: generally, Powles, op.cit, chapter 2
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U K. based on the wide
discretionary power granted by Section 45 of the Supreme
Court ofJudicature (Consolidation) Act, 1925 (U.K.) which provides as follows:
H... A mandamus or injunction may be granted or a receiver appointed by
interlocutory order of the court in all cases in which it shall appear to be
just of convenient...”
Morrison, 70 writing in an Article published in 1985, after reviewing the
various English decisions on the Mareva Injunction observed in reference to the section
45 provision that:
“It is because that provision is in pan materia with section 49 (h) of the
Judicature Supreme Court Act, that it is thought that these decisions and the subsequent
learning on Mareva injunctions in the United Kingdom may, in a proper case, be given
effect in Jamaica”.71
However, since that Article was written, applications for Mareva Injunctions
have been often made and granted in Jamaica. Thus the device is definitely available
70 Morrison, C. Dennis: Interim and Interlocutory Injunctions in the Supreme
Court, W.I.L.J., Vol. 9, No. 1, May 1985, 3.
71 Ibid., p.16
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under the law of Jamaica and now is an important facility in the practice of law in
Jamaica. 72
The basis for the grant is as Morrison contemplated, Section 49 (h) of the
Judicature Supreme Court Act 1880. The Section 49(h) provisions are originally based
on Section 25(8) of the Judicature Act, 1873 (U.K.) which was Section 45 of the
Supreme Court ofJudicature
(Consolidation) Act 1925 (U.K.). the basis of the first grants of the Mareva Junction.73
The essential similarity between ship arrest and the Mareva Injunction is that they
both operate to restrain the movement Out of the jurisdiction of the ship concerned and
thereby to prompt the provision of security for the claim.
However, there are clear distinctions between them, which, inter alia, will affect
the advantages one may have over the other in any given situation.74
Firstly, an injunction can only operate in personam. It does not operate to give
the plaintiff any proprietary interest in the assets of the defendant.
Hence, such assets are accordingly available to satisfy the claims of other
creditors. The plaintiff caunot treat such assets as security for his yet undetermined claim.
72 Although todate, there are no reported cases
But now see : Section 37 (1) of The Supreme Court Act, 1981 (U.K.)
See Powles, op. cit., pp 7-10
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On the other hand, Arrest of the vessel by the plaintiff necessarily operates in
rem and gives a priority and a security which the Mareva does not. Lord Justice
Donaldson said in The Span Terza that a Mareva Injunction must inevitably have led to
the provision of security, presumably by some guarantee..
However, it would not have assisted the arrester in that case if before security
was provided, which of course the vessel owners are not obliged to give, another cre
ditor
had come along and arrested the vessel.
This, no doubt operated strongly on the mind of counsel when he would not
allow himself to be persuaded by Lord Justice Donaldson’s attempts to entice him
with
the Mareva option.
A second important distinction in that whereas Arrest operates as an actual
seizure of assets this is clearly not the effect of the injunction which merely orders the
Defendant not to do certain things with his assets, breach of such an order, being
Contempt of Court with its attendant consequences.
Thirdly, an arrest must fasten is to a particular asset whereas a Mareva Injunction
may only relate to pai-ticularised but unspecified assets of the defendant, that is those
assets within the jurisdiction.However, this is not the case where the injunction applies to
the defendant’s arrest in the toto and a fortiori, to a particular asset such as a ship. In
these instances, the practical effect is more akin to ship arrest.
An application for an interlocutory order such as a Mareva injunction may be
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made at any time before or after trial. “Arrest” as defined in the 1952 Arrest Convention
is not a post trial device although it may be said cynically that “arrest” in the non-forensic
sense of “detention”, merely goes by a different name when it takes place after trial, that
is, “attachment”.
Generally, applications for the Mareva may not be made before a writ is issued
but in cases of urgency, this may be done. For an arrest to take place, as earlier shown, a
writ in rem is required. Thus in this respect a Mareva may lend itself to greater dispatch.
Usually, application is like arrest, made ex pane in case of urgency, although as
a general rule, application for interim relief should be made by motion or summons.
A supporting affidavit is required and should contain certain particulars in
keeping with the conditions for the grant of the injunction, mentioned earlier. But, it
appears even this requirement may be dispensed with temporarily in order to ensure
speedy action.
Here it may be emphasized that:
75
“The whole point of the Mareva jurisdiction is that the
plaintiff proceeds by stealth so as to pre.empt any action by the
defendant to remove his assets from the jurisdiction”.76
See Powes, op. cit., pp 7.10
76 Mustill, J in Third Chandris Shipping Corporation v. Unimarine S.A. (1979)Q.B. 645, at p. 653.
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I
Overall, the advantages of the Mareva injunction as applied to ships when
compared to ship arrest include the following: ‘
1. It prevents whatever assets are covered in the injunction and not only
from being removed from the jurisdiction. Thus it can
more than one ship. Arrest is of a particular ship
that the Mareva Injunction can prohibit the
contrary to the provisions of the 1952 Arrest
2. In a Mareva Injunction, the property remains in the possession of the
defendant and, consequently, the attendant costs and expenses incurred
exercise are not high. Where the ship is arrested, the custody of the ship
the Bailiff of the Supreme Court and the overall costs inclusive of
and security while the ship is in such custody may be very
3. The plaintiff applying for a Mareva Injunction need only make an
undertaking to issue proceedings and to file an affidavit. Arresting a
ship requires the plaintiff to actually take out a writ in rem and file an
The list of ‘advantages” are based on a list set out by Tetly : See Tetly, William
Attatchment, the Mareva Injunction and saisse conservatoire, L.M.C.L.Q., February
1985, 59 at pp 79-80
the ship
prohibit the movement of
and no more. (To the extent
movement of more than one ship, it is
Convention
in its
is with
maintenance
high.
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affidavit.
The advantages of ship arrest vis-a-vi
s the Mareva Injunction include the
following:
1. By ship arrest, the ship is physical
ly put into the custody of the court an
d
placed with the Bailiff. With a
Mareva injunction, the owner or master is in effec
t
ordered not to move his ship, the on
ly remedy for breach of this order is c
ontempt of
court
2. Where a ship is arrested, the claima
nt arrestor becomes a secured creditor
from the date of the issue of the writ
in rem and his claim will receive priori
ty as of that
date. The Mareva injunction does not give th
e plaintiff any security interest in the
ship or any priority over other claim
ants
3. As earlier shown, when the offendin
g ship is under charter and the person
who is liable on the claim is the charterer
, the claimant in an action in rem may ar
rest
either the offending ship or a ship own
ed by the charterer. The Mareva Injunction
can only be taken out against the pr
operty of the defendant, that is, in this
case, the charterer.
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4. It is seldom that the arrestor of a ship is
subject to damages, whereas a Mareva
Injunction will entail a damages suit if it is shown to hav
e been unjustified or
abusive.
It is clear from the foregoing list of respec
tive “advtages” that care has to be
taken to ensure that the more appropriate de
vice is employed for the particular situation.
On the whole the Arrest device in practice se
ems to be a more potent weapon.
As early as 1980, Bland expressed the view
that:
_
_
_
_
_
_
“...the time may come when the Mareva ma
y prove a
powerful pr
ocedural device in the Caribbean Courts...”
That time has already in Jamaica. It rema
ins to see how and to what extent the
Mareva device will be used where ship ar
rest is also available.
F: CONCLUDING COMMENTS
Examination of the arrest device has shown
that it is a useful device for the
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maritime claimant. However, certain procedural requirements need to be adhered to in
seeking to make use of the facility.
The relevant procedural and other rules pertaining to ship arrest are largely
extended or sanctioned by the U.K. Rules of Court promulgated a century ago remain
basically unchanged.
There is doubt surrounding the applicability of present U.K. Rules where there
is lacunae in the local stipulations. Also, with extended legislation has come certain
deficiencies inherent in U.K. law such as relate to that country’s attempt to give legislative
effect to the 1952 Arrest Convention.
Jamaica, it seems, may have to resort to this Convention to deal with some of
these deficiencies especially as regards the relevant statutory interpretation.
Also, it has been shown that there are possibly adverse consequences for
Jamaica not becoming a party to this Convention.
In the case of Maritime Liens, the incorporation of a list of maritime liens as well
as certain rules pertaining to forced sale of an arrested ship is a positive development
which had its roots in the provisions of Draft Articles for a new International Convention
on Maritime Liens and Mortgages.
This again highlights the international dimension to some of these preliminary
and related issues such as ship arrest. The need to take note of the relevant Convention
provisions therefore can hardly be overemphasized. Also it seems that in the case of the
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extended provisions of the 1956 U.K. Act, legislative amendments
seem advisable.
Such amendments should take note of the provisions of the initial
source, that is, the
Arrest Convention.
This should not only give rise to greater clarity in the presently am
biguous
provisions but aid in the quest for uniformity, certainty and justice internationally in
maritime matters.
Serious thought should also be given to Jamaica becoming a party
to the Arrest
Convention. As elsewhere mentioned, but here bears reiterating,
Jamaica should also
seek to involve itself fully in the making of any new internation
al rules pertaining to ship
arrest and Maritime Liens as clearly these rules have important co
nsequences in the
domestic context of Jamaica.
Consideration of the Mareva Injunction has shown that there are basic similarities
in the practical purposes served by this device and that of ship arr
est.
Although, like the Arrest device, it is quite useful in restraining t
he movement of
a ship and in prompting the furnishing of security, overall, it appe
ars, arrest is likely to be
preferred in the majority of cases.
Finally and importantly, it was noted that Arrest is also a jurisdiction obtaining
device. The matter of Jurisdiction is the subject of the next chapter.
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Jurisdiction and it’s exercise in Maritime Matters-
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B: International Maritime Convention Provisions and Jurisdiction and Choice If
Law issues - implications for Jamaican law and the maritime claimant.
C: Concluding Remarks
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CHAPTER 5
Jurisdiction and its exercise in Maritime Matters —
the international dimension
A: General Legal Framework
1. Introduction
It is axiomatic that maritime claims by nature tend to have an international dimension.
They may for instance relate to any one of the vast number of maritime contracts entered into
daily by parties from different countries.
In Jamaica, such contractual claims may be those of shippers or seafarers against foreign
shipowners or a local assured against a foreign marine underwriter. Also the maritime claimant
may be a foreign shipowner clainring against a Jamaican charterer.
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Otherwise, a claim may arise because a tort was committed a certain distance from shore
thus falling within a particular nationally proclaimed maritime zone. Thus Jamaican fishermen
may for instance, wish to claim damages from a foreign carrier which has spilled oil a certain
distance from Jamaica’s shoreline.
In general, as ships are always moving to and from different countries and maritime
zones, while occupying their central position in various international maritime transactions and
relationships, inevitably problems with an international legal dimension will arise.
In today’s shipping world, the ownership, master, crew, management and registry of a
ship might probably involve in each case a different country.
In the fmal analysis, different legal systems of different states may have an interest in a
particular claim. A related issue might ultimately be as regards what one state or the other may
or may not do.
As such, there is a necessary interplay between the umbrella public international law
governing relationships between states and the narrower circumscribed municipal law,
especially the conflict of laws of the particular state(s) concerned as regards maritime claims.
For the maritime claimant in Jamaica these preliminary issues, in this context, ultimately
translate into questions as to the “Jurisdiction” (if any) exercisable by the Jamaican Court in
respect of the claim concerned.
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2. The Public International Law Context
From the perspective of public international law “Jurisdiction’trefers to the competence
of the state to affect legal interests.1In effect, it refers to the authority of a state to govern
persons and property by its municipal law (civil and criminal).2
This competence embraces jurisdiction to prescribe and proscribe, to adjudicate and enforce
the law.3
At the most basic level, the raison d’eire for a state’s exercise of jurisdiction is that the
state has some relationship to, or interest in the person or property concerned.4
Jurisdiction is an attribute of state sovereignty.5 Thus, traditionally, the basis for
jurisdiction of a state is predicated either on the fact that as every state has sovereignty within its
own territory, that state can control and regulate matters concerning all persons, property and
acts done within its territory, 6 or alternatively, that a state has a right to exercise jurisdiction
over its nationals wherever they may be.7
1 See eg: Ott, David H.: Public International Law if the Modem World Pitrnan, London, 1987 at p 135
2 See eg: Wallace, Rebecca M.M; International Law A Student Introduction, Sweet & Maxwell, London, 1986
atp. 101
Ibid.
‘ See. Ott,op cit
See, Brownlie, Ian; Principles of Public International Law, 3rd Edn, Clarendon Press Oxford, 1983 at p. 298
6 ie the territoriality principle, see eg. Ott, op cit, p136 and Bates,John W: United Kingdoms Marine Pollution
Law, Lloyds
of London press Ltd; 1985 at p. 9.
ie the nationality principle, see Ott, op. cit, p138; Bates, ibid.
158
3. Municipal Law Considerations
(a) General
Jurisdiction from the municipal law perspective basically refers to the competence of a
state court to hear and determine a matter brought before it.
Here the initial concern of the maritime claimant wifi be whether the selected court will
hear and determine his case.
Accordingly, an initial question for any party to potential litigation in Jamaican Court has
jurisdiction over the dispute.
If yes, the next question is whether the court will agree to exercise its jurisdiction.
Thirdly, there is the related question of whether the Jamaican Court will apply Jamaican
Law or the law of some other country.
(b) Whether the Court has jurisdiction
(in) General
The relevant common law rules are purely proclaimed in character.8The court’s
jurisdiction in respect of any maritime claim is based on service of a writ of summons (or other
originating process) on the defendant.9For purposes of founding jurisdiction in a maritime
matter the Court is not concerned with the connection the parties have with Jamaica.1°Such
8 See eg: Cheshire and North: Private International Law, London, Butterworths, 1987, Chapter 11.
Ibid, also see generally Dicey and Morris on the Conflict of Laws, 10th Edn, London, Steven & Sons Ltd,
Chapter
9&10.
10 Vide: ibid.
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considerations may only be relevant to whether the court will exercise jurisdiction.
Thus, the mere service of the writ on the defendant will give the Jamaican Court power
to try an action which may have no factual connection with Jamaica or is otherwise
inappropriate for trial in Jamaica.
In Jamaica, Maritime claims may be brought against the person liable on the claim,
through an ‘taction in personam” or against property (ship, cargo or freight) with which the
claim is concerned through an ‘action in rem”.11
See also: Chapter 4
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(ii) Actions in Personam
The Jamaican Supreme Court has jurisdiction12to entertain an admiraky action:
(1) if the defendant (or his agent) is served with a writ in Jamaica;
(2) where the defendant (or his agent) submits13 to the jurisdiction of the court; or
(3) where the court assures jurisdiction under its discretionary power to permit the
service of the writ outside the jurisdiction of the defendant (or his agent).
The circumstances under which the Jamaican Supreme Court may assume “extra-
territorial” jurisdiction, that is, grant permission for service of a writ outside the jurisdiction is
governed by Section 45 of the Jamaican Civil Procedure Code.
The section provides (in so far as is relevant to maritime claims) as follows:
“Service out of the jurisdiction of a writ of summons, or notice of a writ of
summons may be allowed by the court or a Judge whenever
(c) any relief is sought against any person domiciled of ordinarily resident within the
jurisdiction; or
.(e) the action is founded on any breach or alleged breach, within the jurisdiction, of and
contract wherever made, which according to the terms thereof ought to be executed according to
the law of this island; or
12 See also infra, for special stipulations re exercise of this jurisdiction in Collision cases, and generally Dicey
and Morris, and Cheshire and North, ibid.
Such submission may take place in various ways eg; by instituting court proceedings in a particular matter,
a Plaintiff in effect submits to the court’s jurisdiction to entertain a counterclaim against him in some related
matter; see Dicey and Morris, op ciL p.19I et seg.
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(ee) the action is founded on a tort committed within the jurisdiction
• . . (f) any injunction is sought as to anything to be done within the jurisdiction...
(g) any person out of the jurisdiction is a necessary or proper party to an action properly
brought against some other person duly served within the jurisdiction.
(iii) Actions in Rem
The Supreme Court has jurisdiction to entertain an Admiralty action in rem if the writ is
served on the res in Jamaica or is deemed to have been duly served on the defendant.14
(c) Whether the court will exercise Jurisdiction
(in) General
Jamaican courts have a discretionary jurisdiction, whenever it is necessary to prevent
injustice, to stay or strike out an action or other proceeding in Jamaica.
A mere balance of convenience is not sufficient ground for depriving a plaintiff of the
advantages of prosecuting his action in a Jamaican Court, if it is otherwise properly brought.
However, a stay will be granted if:
(a) continuance of the proceedings will cause injustice to the defendant and,
(b) a stay will not cause injustice to the plaintiff.
See: chapter 4 and The Rules of the Supreme Court of Judicature of Jamaica in the Admiralty Jurisdiction,
Rules 1 and 5.
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Lord Diplock stated the applicable considerations thus:
In order to justify a stay, two conditions must be satisfied...
(a) the defendant must satisfy the court that there is another forum to whose jurisdiction
he is amenable in which justice can be done between the parties at substantially less
inconvenience or expense, and
(b) the stay must not deprive the plaintiff of a legitimate personal or juridical advantage
which would be available to him if he invoked the jurisdiction of the ... court.’15
(ii) Lis alibi pendens16
One ground on which the court may be asked to interfere by staying Jamaican
proceedings is that simultaneous actions are pending in Jamaica and in a foreign country
between the same parties and involving the same or similar issues.
The court may be asked to stay an action in Jamaica in two distinct situations:
(a) where the same plaintiff sues the same defendant in Jamaica and abroad: or
(b) where the plaintiff in Jamaica is defendant abroad, or vice versa. 17
In Mac Shannon v Rockware Glass Lid (1978) A.C. 795 at 812.
16 Literally means “a Suit pending elsewhere” per Osbom’s Concise Law Dictionary, 7th Edn, 1983, London,
Sweet&
Maxwell, p.207
17 See also, infra, re collision cases.
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r(iii) Foreign Jurisdiction Clauses
The common law position is that where a contract provides that all disputes between the
parties are to be referred to the exclusive jurisdiction of a foreign tribunal, the local court should
stay proceedings instituted in breach of such agreement, unless the plaintiff proves that it is just
and proper to allow them to continue.’8
(d) If the Court exercises Jurisdiction, which law is to be applied
(i) General
The presence of a foreign element of any kind in any dispute raises the possibility that
foreign law may be used by the Jamaican Court to resolve that dispute.
In order to determine which rules of foreign law (if any) are to be applied, a court will
classify a maritime claim or issue and attach to it its concomitant choice of law rule.
if the issue is a procedural one, then the law to be applied is the lex fori.19 if it is a
substantive law issue the choice of law rule is selected and applied as is appropriate to the claim.
What rule is appropriate will depend on whether for instance, the claim is one arising from
breach of contract or commission of a tort.
18 See: Oland, A. Barry: Forum non conveniens in Canada: The Common Law position, The Federal Court of
Canada,
suggested Reform, Meredith Memorial Lectures, Richard de Boo Publishers, 1987; Dicey and Morris, op.
Cit., p255
19 the law of the forum or court in which the cases is tried.
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(ii) Maritime Contracts
The basic principle applicable in Jamaica is that, subject to statutory provisions (if any),
and public policy considerations, issues will be referred to their proper law. Each maritime
contract is thus to be linked to its proper law.
Thus, in National Chemesearch Corporation Caribbean V. Davidson 1966, 9
JL.R.468, 471, Graham-Perkins, J. (Ag) in a judgement of the Jamaican Supreme Court
states that:
the legal system by which the essential validity of a contract must be determined is
what has been called the proper law of the contract.”
The proper law of the contract is the system of law by which the partied intended their
contract to be governed, or, where the intention is neither expressed nor to be inferred from the
circumstances, the system of law with which the transaction had its closest and most real
connection.2°
(iii) Maritime Torts
Cheshire and North21 state the position at common law thus:
The law that governs maritime torts depends upon whether they have been committed
within the territorial waters of some state or upon the high seas”.22
see eg. Scott, A:W:: Private International Law, (Conflict of Laws), 1979 at p. 208 quoting Dicey.
21 op cit.
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If the tort is committed in the territorial waters of some foreign state, then the ordinary
rules relating to torts committed in foreign countries would apply.
As a general rule,23 an act done in a foreign country is a tort and actionable as such in
Jamaica, only if it is both:
(a) actionable as a tort according to Jamaican law (lex fori) or to put it differently, is an
act which, if done in Jamaica would be a tort; and
(b) actionable according to the law of the foreign country where it was done (lex loci
delicti commissi)24
Thus, according to the common law position, where torts are committed within Jamaican
Territorial Waters, the applicable law is Jamaican.
Where the tort is committed in the territorial sea of a foreign state, the locus delicti is
deemed to be the littoral state rather than the country of the ship’s flag and the applicable law is
accordingly that of the littoral state.
For acts committed on the High Seas a distinction is made between torts having
consequences external to the ship and those having purely internal consequences.
In the latter case, the maritime claimant who sues in Jamaica, in respect of acts, all of
which have occurred on board a single foreign vessel, must prove that the conduct of the
defendant was actionable by the law of the flag and that it would have been actionable had it
Ibid.,p
The exceptional circumstances relate to where resort may also be had to the law of another country if this has
the most
significant relationship with the occurrence and the parties; see Dicey and Morris, p 927.
the law of the place where a tort has been committed, see Scott, op. cit; p.7
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occurred in Jamaica.
All other acts occurring on the high seas and later put in Suit in Jamaica must be tested
solely by Jamaican maritime law.25
B: International Convention Provision and Jurisdiction and Choice of Law
issues-implications for the maritime claimant.
(in) General
In the United Nations publication, “Guidelines for Maritime Legislation”, it is stated:
“There is no International Convention regulating Conflicts of Law problems on a worldwide
basis.”26
Although this statement remains apposite today, there are a number of maritime
conventions with provisions dealing directly with the question of Jurisdictions and/or rather
more indirectly with that of choice of law.
Even where such issues are not at all adverted to by any provision in a maritime
convention, Jurisdiction and Choice of Law jurisprudential ramifications may yet be inferred for
the maritime claimant from such convention provisions.
Of the various Conventions dealing more directly with issues of Jurisdiction and (to a
lesser extent) Choice of Law, Jamaica is only party to those pertaining to the Law of the Sea.
In the case of the International Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules
See generally Cheshire and North, op cit. p. 545 et seq.
at p. 246.
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Concerning Civil Jurisdiction in Matters of collision, 1952, provisions of this Convention have
slipped into Jamaican Law by way of extended Imperial Statutory provisions. This is by virtue
of Section 3 of The Admiralty Jurisdiction (Jamaica) Order in Council, 1962 (U.K.)
extending provisions of The Administration ofJustice Act, 1956, (UK) which gave legislative
effect to that Convention.
Jamaica is a party to The Montego Bay Convention of 1982 27 The Geneva
Convention Zone on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone, 1958 28 and The Geneva
Convention on the High Seas, 1958. 29
Generally, these Conventions raise somewhat different issues as regards Jurisdiction and
Choice of law than the rest of the Conventions, provisions pertaining to such issues.
Accordingly, it is convenient for this reason as well as the fact that Jamaica is only a
party to the Law of the Sea Conventions to first consider for purposes of analysis these
Conventions and the others after.
However, as the relevant provisions of the two Geneva Conventions have been
essentially reproduced in the more recent and comprehensive Montego Bay Convention,
discussion will primarily be focused on the provisions of the Montego Bay Convention.
Moreover, the provisions to be considered are generally acknowledged to be , in any event,
now part of international customary law.
27 JamaicaratifiedMarch2l, 1983
Jamaica acceed October 8, 1965
Jamaica acceed October 8, 1965
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(2) Law of the Sea Conventions
Only one of the very extensive Montego Bay Convention deals exclusively with the
question of civil jurisdiction, that is Article 28.
This Article is captioned ‘Civil Jurisdiction in relation to foreign ships. It provides as
follows:
1. The coastal state should not stop or divert a foreign ship passing through the
territorial sea for the purpose of exercising civil jurisdiction in relation to a person on board the
ship.
2. The coastal state may not levy execution against or arrest the ship for the purpose of
any civil proceedings, save only in respect of obligations or liabilities assumed or incurred by
the ship itself in the course or for the purpose of its voyage through the waters of the coastal
state.
3. Paragraph 2 is without prejudice to the right of the coastal state to levy execution
against or to arrest for the purpose of civil proceedings, a foreign ship lying in the territorial
sea, or passing through the territorial sea after leaving international waters.”
Accordingly, where a writ has been issued against a particular person, of that person is
known to be on board a ship passing through the Jamaican Territorial Waters, the stopping or
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diverting of the ship for the purpose of serving a writ (or other originating process) on such a
person so as to make him subject to the court’s jurisdiction.
Thus, one may sardonically picture a frustrated maritime claimant sitting on a Jamaican
beach with his high powered binoculars, watching and lamenting: “there he goes cruising
through again! !“
Where a ship is not lying in or passing through the territorial sea on its way from local
internal waters (or otherwise within local jurisdiction) it may only be arrested in respect of
obligations or liabilities assumed or incurred by the ship itself in the course or for the purpose
of its voyage through Jamaican waters.
Otherwise, arrest is permitted in accordance with Jamaican law as discussed in the
preceding chapter.
One basic objective of the Article, it appears, is to ensure that innocent passage through
the territorial Sea is not fettered by the application of the littoral state’s civil jurisdiction. (There
is less restraint imposed on the coastal state as regards exercise of its criminal jurisdiction in
appropriate cases: (see:Article 27).)
Article 28 (3) uses the expression “lying in the territorial sea”. Presumably this is not
simply equivalent to “stationary in the territorial sea”
If “lying” is to be taken to mean “stationary simpliciter” then it seems to the writer that
this would run counter to the objective referred to , in light of Article 18 (2) of the Convention.
Article 18 is captioned: “Meaning of passage”. Article 18 (2) provides as follows:
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“Passage shall be continuous and expeditious. However, passage includes stopping and
anchoring, but only in so far as the same are incidental to ordinary by force majeure or distress
or for the purpose of rendering assistance to persons, ships or aircraft in danger of distress”
Hence, if a vessel has stopped and is thus stationary, in the territorial sea solely for the
purposes of rendering assistance to another vessel in distress, presumably it should not be
deemed as “lying” in the territorial sea so as to render it amenable to arrest, if it was not so
amenable before stopping. This appears to be so, since the good Samaritan vessel would be still
in “passage” through the territorial sea.
Although, clearly, it would be literally lying in the sense of being stationary in the
territorial sea.
It should be noted that except for a minor cosmetic change the third paragraph, Article
28 is identical in wording to that of its predecessor, Article 20 of the 1958 Convention on The
Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone.
Further, Article 20 is already enacted into Jamaican Statute Law: Schedule to The
Territorial Sea Act, 1971. This Act was passed to give effect to the provisions of the said
Geneva Convention, to which Jamaica became a party on October 8, 1965.
As regards Article 20, SectionS of The Territorial Sea Act under the caption,”
Restriction of execution of civil process”, provides as follows:
“Nothing shall be lawful to any extent to which it is inconsistent with any provisions of
the convention in so far as they are restrictive of the taking, pursuant to Jamaica’s sovereignty
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over The territorial sea of measures for the purposes of the execution of civil process of the
exercise of civil jurisdiction.
The territorial sea itself qua maritime zone within national jurisdiction, ipso facto,
ultimately entails consequences for the maritime claimant as regards Jurisdiction and Choice of
Law issues.
Starke 30 notes that “For the purpose of territorial jurisdiction, besides actual territory, it
has been customary to assimi (the territorial sea)... to state territory.31
Here, it should be borne in mind the provisions of Article 2 of the Montego Bay Convention
which (like its predecessor Article 1 of the 1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea and
Contiguous Zone) provides that:
“The sovereignty of a coastal state extends beyond its land territory and internal
waters...to an adjacent belt of sea, described as the territorial sea”.
Article 3 of the Montego Bay Convention provides that:
“Every state has the right to establish the breadth of its territorial sea up to a limit not
exceeding 12 nautical miles...”
The extent to which this is done by a particular state is left up to its municipal law. In the
case of Jamaica, its territorial sea breadth has already been established by The Territorial Sea
Act.
° Starke, J.G.: An Introduction to International Law, London, Butterworths, 1977.
31 Ibid., p 264, See also: Menon, P.K.: The Commonwealth Caribbean and the Development of the Law of the
Sea, Commonwealth Caribbean Legal Essays, Faculty of Law, U.W.I., Barbados, 82 at p 91.
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Section 3 (2) of this Act provides that:
“The territorial sea shall be twelve miles in breadth or have such other breadth as may be
prescribes”.
The Jamaican Parliament was empowered to pass such legislation in accordance with the
provisions of Section 3 of the First Schedule to The Jamaica Independence Act, 1962,
(U.K.)
Section 3 provides that : “The legislature of Jamaica shall have full power to make laws
having extra-territorial operation”.
Despite this provision, it appears that up to the time of the passage of The territorial Sea
Act, the prerogative of the Crown, (that is, the English Monarch), to prescribe the limits of
Jamaica’s Territorial Sea was still intact or at least the position as regards this was not
unequivocal was in light of Jamaica’s constitutional status as a monarchy and the position at
common law as regards the Crown’s prerogative to delimit maritime territorial bounderies.
Regina v. Kent Justices Ex parte Lye (1967) Z W.H.R 765.
Such a situation was patently undesirable in light of Jamaica’s independent status.
Moreover as intimidated in the present context, significant consequences appertain to the
bounderies of the territorial sea as regards the possible enforcement of a maritime claim.
Accordingly: it is only appropriate that such powers should vest indubitably and solely
with the Jamaican Parliament.
Thus, Section 6 (1) of The Territorial Sea Act vests the relevant Minister with power,
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inter alia, to defme the limits of the Territorial sea (per sub-paragraph (b) and to prescribe
“anything authorised or required by this Act to be prescribed” (per sub-paragraph (f)). Most
importantly, Section 7 of the Act stipulates: “This Act binds the Crown”.
Accordingly, Henriques 32 observes that: “In Jamaica the prerogative right of the
Crown to determine the maritime boundary of the state and the limits of the territorial sea has
been abrogated by statute. The Crown has lost the right to extend the sovereignty of the state
beyond its land territory by virtue of the Act. The prerogative power of the Crown has been
replaced by the statute. The extent of the Sovereignty of the State of Jamaica has been fixed by
the Territorial Sea Act, which can only be altered by an amending Act of Parliament”.33
The net result is that Jamaica’s sovereignty is extended to the 12 miles breadth of the
Territorial Sea and the power to affect such breadth resides solely with the Jamaican Parliament.
Further, where there are Adjectival law or conflict of Laws stipulations which refer to “in
Jamaica” or “the jurisdiction”, or whose ramifications relate to the territorial extent of Jamaica
and its waters, then such stipulations, prima facis, bring into issue the territorial sea of Jamaica
and its ambit.
Such considerations as will be shown shortly are particularly relevant to questions such
as those of the exercise of the court’s assumed or extra-territorial jurisdiction and Choice of
Law as regards maritime torts.
Henriques notes that:
Henriques, R.N.A.: The Jurisdiction of the Courts in Territorial Waters, 3.L.J. July 1975, p. 46
Ibid.,p51
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“Since the sovereignty of Jamaica is extended to the breadth of the territorial sea,
concomitantly, its laws, both common law and statute are similarly extended. It follows by
parity of reasoning that the Laws of Jamaica will be applicable to all persons found in the
Territorial sea”
From this it is clear that the restraints placed in respect of the exercise of civil jurisdiction
in the territorial sea operates as a fetter on the sovereign rights of Jamaica.
In this context Starke indicates that provisions such as those of Article 28 “... impose
limitations on the jurisdictional rights of the coastal state in the interests of minimizing
interference with shipping in transit”.35
A significant feature of the Law of the Sea traditionally is its division of international
maritime space into zone which fit neatly into a dichotomy of being within or beyond national
jurisdiction.36
O’Connel notes that “The division of the sea into various zones which in modern
parlance are zones of “national jurisdiction” or “beyond national jurisdiction” has meant that
there are varying scales of competence of coastal states and shipping states over things,
persons, and events at sea” 3’
The territorial sea and internal waters are well established zones of national jurisdiction.
Thus, expect where there are particular derogations from the littoral state’s jurisdictional rights,
Ibid., p 50
Opcit, at p. 265
O’Connel, D.P.: The International Law of the Sea, Clarendon Press, 1984, vols 1&2
Ibis., p. 733 (Vol.2).
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in accordance with international law, ships and persons entering such zones are normally
subject to the littoral states civil jurisdiction.
Exceptions in respect of the Territorial Sea have already been noted.
Internal Waters encompass ports, harbours, lakes and canals and generally the baselines
used in measuring the breadth of the territorial sea38 One possible exception regarding the
exercise of civil jurisdiction in these waters has been noted in respect of Ports.
Starke states:
“The general rule is that a merchant vessel enters a port of a foreign state subject to the
local jurisdiction. The derogations from this rule depend on the practice followed by each state.
There is, however, an important exception which belongs to the field of customary international
law, namely that a vessel in distress has a right to seek shelter in a foreign poet, and on account
of the circumstances of its entry is considered immune from local jurisdiction, subject perhaps
to the limitation that no deliberate breaches of local municipal law are committed while in port.
On the other hand, some authorities concede only a qualified immunity to such vessels”.39
It cannot be said with any certainty what approach would be taken in Jamaica in such
emergency cases as regards the exercise of local civil jurisdiction.
However, largely on an apriori basis, it seems to the writer that it would be unlikely that
such a claimed immunity would easily move a court to say, order the release of a vessel that has
38 Vide: Article 8, Montigo Bay Convention; Churchill, R:R and Lowe, A.V.: The Law of the Sea,
Manchester University Press, 1st edn, 1983, at p. 45; Akehurst op cit., at p. 26<; Shaw, Malcom:
International Law, 1977, London, at pp 239-240
op cit, at p267
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been arrested in such alleged circumstances.
This is, so because of the evidentiary questions involved and if such a claimed immunity
was to easily succeed then this would conceivably open the floodgates for such immunity
claims in the future. In time perhaps what would have started as an immunity based on noble
considerations would conceivably degenerate into a mere “defence” in the armoury of legal
councsel.
Although, admittedly there is a strong parallel between this situation and the hypothetical
situation discussed as regards a ship stationary but presumably not “lying” in the Territorial Sea
because of special considerations.
Other traditional maritime zoned include the High Seas which is outside national
jurisdiction.
Importantly, the Montego Bay Convention has introduced the concept of the Exclusive
Economic Zone (EEZ).
Although the Convention is not yet in force, this concept is generally regarded as now
part of international customary law.4°
It is being contended by the writer that this new concept may ultimately have significant
See generally: Attard, David: The Exclusive Economic Zone in International Law, Claredon Press Oxford,
1987, chap. 8;
Lupinacci, Julio Cesar: The Legal States of the Exclusive Economic Zone in the 1982 Convention on the
Law of the
Sea and Schreiber, Alfonso Arias: The Exclusive Economic Zone: Its Legal Nature and the Problem of
Military Uses,
Chapters 6&7 respectively of: Vienna Francisco Ouuego: The Exclusive Economic Zone: A Latin American
Perspective,
Western Press U.S.A. 1984
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jurisprudential ramifications as regards Jurisdiction and Choice of Law issues under Jamaican
Law.
This is so as, inter alia, it appears to disturb the traditional and more jurisprudentially
convenient dichotomy of maritime zones being clearly within or beyond national jurisdiction.
Yet, some of the rules which arise in the context of the Conflict of Laws seem to be, inter alia,
predicated on just such a dichotomy
Two examples to be considered later in this chapter are in respect of:
(1) the assumption of extra-territorial jurisdiction by a Jamaican Court in relation to
maritime torts; and
(2) the choice of Law rules applicable to such maritime torts.
However, it is first necessary to consider the legal character of the E.E.Z.
Articles 55,56,58,59and 86 point to the essence of the concept.
Article 55 provides the captain “specific legal regime of the exclusive economic zone” as
follows:
“The exclusive economic zone is an area beyond and adjacent to the territorial sea,
subject to the specific legal regime established in this Part, under which the rights and
jurisdiction of the coastal state and the rights and freedoms of other states are governed by the
relevant provision of this convention”
Article 56, captioned “Rights, jurisdiction, and duties of the coastal state in the exclusive
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economic zone” provides:
1. In the exclusive economic zone, the coastal state has:
(a) sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring and exploiting, conserving and
managing the natural resources, whether living or non-living, of the waters superjacent to the
sea-bed and of the sea-bed and its subsoil, and with regard to other activities for the economic
exploitation and exploration of the zone, such as the production of energy from the water,
currents and winds;
(b) jurisdiction as provided for in the relevant provisions of this Convention with regard
to:
(i) the establishment and use of artificial islands, installations and structures;
(ii) marine scientific research;
(iii) The protection and preservation of the marine environment;
(c) other rights and duties provided for in this Convention.
2. In exercising its rights and performing its duties under this Convention in the
exclusive economic zone, the coastal State shall have due regard to the rights and duties of other
States and shall act in a maimer compatible with the provisions of this Convention.
3. ...
Article 58 deals with Rights and duties of other states in the E.E.Z.
Here, all states are granted certain freedoms of communication as pertains to the High
Seas, such as freedom of navigation and overflight.
179
However, states are required to .. . ‘comply with the laws and regulations adopted by the
coastal state in accordance with the provisions of this Convention and other rules of
international law in so far as they are not incompatible with this part”
Article 86 in reference to Part 7 of the Convention which deals with the High Seas states
that:
The provisions of this Part apply to all parts of the sea that are not included in the
exclusive zone, in the territorial sea, or in the internal waters of a state, or in the archipelagic
state. This article does not entail any abridgement of the freedoms enjoyed by all states on the
exclusive economic zone in accordance with article 58”.
Accordingly, the E.E.Z. is an area beyond and adjacent to the territorial sea, constituted
by a part of the sea not included in the high seas and subject to a specific legal regime
embracing:
(1) sovereign rights of the coastal state for economic purposes;
(2) other rights and duties contemplated in the convention as appertaining to the coastal
state;
(3) jurisdiction of the coastal state as regards specified matters such as protection and
preservation of the marine environment; and
(4) other state’s freedoms of communication such as those of navigation, overflight
and laying of submarine cables.
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rFrom the foregoing, one is prompted to ask to whom really does the zone belong?
Related to this is the issue of to whom may be attributed the so-called residual rights, that is,
those rights which are not expressly conferred either on the coastal state nor on other states.
These issues are of relevance in the present context because the convention does not
specifically address the question of the exercise of civil jurisdiction in or regarding the
E.E.Z.41
This seeming omission from the convention could simply be because the issue does not
at all arise as regards this maritime zone.
Alternatively, despite any express reference to the exercise of civil jurisdiction pertaining
to the E.E.Z., inferences as regards such exercise may nevertheless be drawn upon perusal of
the Convention Provisions.
It is being contended that the latter is indeed the case.
At this point, the provisions of Article 59 should be noted. Importantly, they attempt to
address the residual rights issue.
Article 59 provides:
“In cases where this convention does not attribute rights of jurisdiction to the coastal
state or to other states within the exclusive economic zone, and a conflict arises between the
interests of the coastal state and any other state or states, the conflict should be resolved on the
41 Church hill and Lowe, op cit, at p. 129 for instance indicates that if the E.E.Z. is deemed To have a residual
territorial
sea character, then a presumption would arise: ‘that nay activity not falling within the clearly defined rights
of non-
coastal states would come under the jurisdiction of the coastal state”.
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basis of equity and in the light of all the relevant circumstances, taking into account the
respective importance of the interests involved to the parties as well as to the international
community as a whole’.
This was the closest the convention comes (and apparently could have come42)in
addressing the residual rights issue.
It is clear from its wording that Article 59 does not resolve the residual rights question.
Essentially, the Article merely proffers resort to equitable principles in resolving disputes
between states when in fact the matter of residual rights do come into issue.
Thus Article 59, in effect, leaves open for instance, the question as to whether the littoral
state has rights under international law to prescribe and enforce rules in the E.E.Z. as regards
say, ship arrest in a manner analogous to and in extrapolation of such right in The Territorial
Sea.
So, in spite of Article 59, there is still the basic question of whether the E.E.Z. is a zone
of national jurisdiction so as to render it generally up to the coastal state to, as it wishes,
exercise its civil jurisdiction territorially over the zone, as it does over the Territorial Sea.
It is widely accepted that the E.E.Z. is a zone sui generis.43 It is clearly distinguishable
from the territorial sea and the high seas although containing elements of both.
Thus Lupinacci states in reference to the Law of the Sea Conference and the zone:
“In the view of the great majority of the delegates, participating in the conference, the
42 In order to arrive at a compromise position, see Luppinacci and Schreiber, ibid
See eg. Churchill and Lowe, op cit., p 130
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Exclusive Economic Zone is not a part either of the territorial sea or of the high seas; it is a zone
sui generis, with a statute of its own that does not fit into the classic moulds.44
Schreiber argues 5 that the E.E.Z. is not only a zone sui generis but also a zone of
national jurisdiction.
His arguments may be summarized as being based on the following:
1. the nature of the concepts used to characterise the zone, that is, “sovereign rights”,
and “rights of sovereignty” and importantly that of “jurisdiction as used in Article 56(1)(b);
2. the scope of the rights ascribed to the coastal state in the E.E.Z., which leaves to other
states only the freedom of international communications the exercise of which is itself limited;
3. related to (2), a balancing of the rights and jurisdiction of the coastal state against the
freedoms and rights of other states in the E.E.Z., from both a qualitative and quantitative
viewpoint tilts the scale a great deal in favour of the coastal state;
4. the powers accorded to the coastal state to ensure compliance with its laws and
regulations in cases expressly provided for, including the visit, inspection and seizure of
vessels and the institution of proceedings against vessels;
5. the great majority of coastal countries consider the E.E.Z.a zone of national
jurisdiction in relation to which they feel empowered to legislate;
6. the prevailing opinion today is that due to geographical, economic, social and security
considerations, the coastal state has a right superior to that of any other over resources of its
Ibid., p105
Ibid.
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adjacent seas and to protect other interests of its population within a zone not exceeding 200
miles;
7. the uses of third states are marginal with respect to this zone, in which they do not
exercise any special competence but only jurisdiction over their own vessels; and
8. the continental shelf is a zone of national jurisdiction and as the seabed and subsoil
sector of the E.E.Z. is indistinguishable from the continental shelf up to a distance of 200 miles
from the relevant baselines and also since that sector of the E.E.Z. along with its superjacent
waters form an indivisible zone, the E.E.Z. is a zone of national jurisdiction.
If indeed the zone is one of national jurisdiction, then this would imply that the coastal
state would have the blessing of international law to pass laws relating to the exercise of its civil
jurisdiction so as to fully affect foreigners or vessels in the zone, subject to any derogations
from the exercise of such rights as provided for by international law.
However, Attard, while acknowledging the sui generis character of the zone, warns of
the danger as well as questions the validity in modern times of dividing up world maritime
space on the basis of sovereignty.
He asserts:
The division of the oceans today on the basis of sovereignty, however, is a solution as
dangerous and as obsolete as the maintenance of an unrestricted concept of the freedom of the
seas. Clearly, therefore, neither sovereignty nor freedom today provides an acceptable basis for
a viable regime to regulate uses of the sea beyond the territorial sea46
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Lupinacci observes that:
“the classic clean-out division between maritime spaces, subject either to the statute of
sovereignty or to the statute of freedom, has been left behind by the evolution of the Law of the
Sea”.47
In the E.E.Z., Lupinacci sees that:
“...there is a distribution of residual rights in favor of the coastal state with respect,
essentially to economic and associated interests and in favor of all states with respect to the
interest of international communication. There remains the no-man’s-land, which would seem
to be constituted of other interests with no well defined legal protection and governed by the
provision of Article 59, whose application to each specific case may give rise at the time to
serious difficulties of interpretation”.48
The precise legal states of the E.E.Z. is clearly enmeshed in doubt. State practice or
further international rules might in time help to clarify the matter. Hence, in the context of this
chapter sweeping generalization as regards the effect of the new concept would seem
inadvisable.
Nevertheless, in so far as Article 56 (1)(b) specifically invests the coastal state with
jurisdiction in respect of a number of matters, it seems to the writer that littoral states are at least
competent to extend their civil jurisdiction to encompass such matters as they pertain to the
E.E.Z.
‘ Op. cit., pp 308-309
0p. cit. p.105
Ibidp.110
185
Perusal by the writer of various post-convention national enactments49on the E.E.Z.
did not reveal any specific reference to the exercise of state civil jurisdiction in the zone.
Typically, in the various enactments such as those of the U.S.S.R.50,Indonesia 51,
Equatorial Guinea 52 and the U.S.A.53 there are only stipulations as to the particular state’s
jurisdiction in the E.E.Z. over the matters mentioned under Article 56 (l)(b).
Jamaica is yet to declare an E.E.Z. However, the preparation of an E.E.Z. bill is
underway.54
While, specific reference need not be made to the exercise of civil jurisdiction in such a
bill, it is the writer’s submission that the declaration of an E.E.Z. should be followed up by
alterations being made to particular Jamaican Conflict of Laws rules pertaining to maritime
claims.
Thus, the statutory requirement for the exercise of the court’s extra-territorial jurisdiction
as regards maritime torts should concomitantly be changed.
It should stipulate that torts committed within the E.E.Z. and failing within the ambit of
those matters embraced by Article 56 (1) (b) should be deemed as committed within the
jurisdiction for purposes of the relevant statutory provision.
As reproduced in. The Law of the Sea: Notional Legislation on the Exclusive Economic Zone and the
Exclusive fishery Zone, U.N.. New York, 1986; See also: Moore, Gerald: Coastal State requirements for
foreign fishing, FAO Legislative Study 21 Rev. 3. Rome, 1988
50 Decree of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Economic Zone of 28 February 1984
51
52 act No 15/1984 of 12 November 1984 on the Territorial Sea and Exclusive Economic Zone.
Proclamation 5030, 10 March 1983 by the President of the United States of America.
See eg. daily Gleaner Report, January 13, 1989 at p.2 The Bill appears to be at its very formative and
“confidential” stage and thus attempts by the writer to procure a copy of what has been done so for was
unsuccessful.
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Similar considerations should also apply in respect of the application of Choice of Law
Rules pertaining to Maritime torts.
Both conflict of Laws issues are in fact presently reside on the traditional dichotomy of
maritime zones being within or beyond national jurisdiction.
An oil spill in a state’s E.E.Z. clearly runs afoul that state’s interests in protecting and
preserving the marine environment as provided for by Article 56 (1)(b).
Hence, Jamaica, when it enacts E.E.Z.legislation ought to ensure that there are no
jurisdictional impediments as now presently exists as regards prosecuting a claim for
compensation arising from such a spill, say twenty miles from shore.
Firstly, it seems the E.E.Z.law ought to be enacted as a matter of urgency.
It is obvious that Jamaica has nothing to loose by declaring such a zone. Although,
Jamaica as a “Carib-locked” geographically disadvantaged country with an E.E.Z., with
resources of relatively limited economic value, has never been particularly enthusiastic about the
E.E.Z.in the first place.55
However, it ought to see the matter of the Commission of maritime torts such as the
spilling of oil in its E.E.Z. as cogent reason to enact E.E.Z. legislation and concomitant
jurisdictional provisions to protect its interest in having its nationals obtain compensation from,
say, delinquent shipowners’ for damage and losses sustained of a result of such a spill.
See: Rattray, K:o:, Kirton; A and Robinson, P. The effect of the Existing Law of the Sea on the Caribbean
Region and the Gulf of Mexico, in Pacem in Maribus: Caribbean Study and Dialogue 256-257 (Borgese, E.
(Ed) 1974); Lewis, Vaughan A: The Interests of the Caribbean Countries and the Law of the Sea
Negotiations in Maritime Issues in the Caribbean, Thabvala, Farrokh (Ed), 1,3.; and Hyman, Hugh: The
Common Heritage of Mankind, LLB dissertation (unpiublished) U.W.I. Cave Hill, Barbados, pp 94-97.
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As the law stands at present, if such an oil spill was to take place one hundred miles
from shore causing extensive damage to fisheries stocks up to a distance of thy, fifteen miles
from shore then the tort is deemed to have taken place outside of Jamaica’s jurisdiction.
It appears to the writer, that such an issue may also be seen in terms of whether or not
the facts give rise to a cause of action.
However, in the present context, it is appropriate to emphasize the maritime conflict of
laws dimension. In any event, it would have to be made to the Jamaican private international
law rules.
This is so because assuming that there is a cause of action, then it is probable that such a
ship, its master, owner and crew would not be within the reaches of the courts normal territorial
jurisdiction.
Thus Abecassis 56 notes:
“unfortunately for the potential plaintiff in an oil pollution case, the chances of the ship
which caused the damage, or a sister ship or its owner or master being within the jurisdiction at
some time after the writ has been issued are not very great”.57
This therefore rules out the ship’s arrest as well as that of service within the jurisdiction.
The only alternative would thus be to attempt to effect service out of the jurisdiction.
Abecasis, David William: The Law and Practice relating to Oil Pollution from Ships, London, Butterworths,
1978.
Thid., p. 152.
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Here, the most relevant basis for seeking to obtain the court’s necessary blessing for
service outside the jurisdiction, is likely to be That “the action is founded on a tort committed
within the jurisdiction.. “58
But, with the law in its present state, such a spill would be deemed to have been
committed (on the High Seas) beyond national jurisdiction.
Thus, the court could not assume jurisdiction.
Thus it is being submitted that changes in the relevant procedural and private
international law rules should ultimately be effected so as to ensure the efficacy of the court’s
exercise of its civil jurisdiction in respect of the E.E.Z. and specifically the Article 56 (1)(b)
matters:
(1) the establishment and use of artificial islands, installations and structures;
(2) marine scientific research; and
(3) the protection and preservation of the marine environment.
Of these matters (3) appears to be of most immediate relevance to Jamaica.
This is because of the grave danger that would be posed to the island’s tourist industry,
economy and general well being if there was a large oil spill affecting in particular the island’s
beautiful beaches.
Vide: supra
To Date, Jamaican beaches have been largely free of oil pollution. A Study conducted between 1980-1983
has confirmed this: vide: Wade, Barry A., Provan, Maura and Gillet, Vincent Oil Pollution of Jamaican
Coastal Waters and Beaches: Results of the IOCARIBE/CARIPOL Monitoring Programme (Jamaica), 1980-
1983, Carib. J. Sci 23(1): 93-104 (1987)
189
Thus, Ratiray, in reference to the Caribbean, has alluded to the potential for oil spill
aid pollution... .thereby threatening the lifeline of the economies of many of the states,
particularly those heavily dependant on Tourism”.61
In such circumstances, it would be absolutely vital that the island’s own laws do not
fetter maximum compensation recovery as in fact they could possibly do now.
Since the adoption of the Montego Bay Convention, two international treaties have
incorporated
provisions pertaining to the E.E.Z.. which lend support to the writer’s foregoing
submissions.
These Conventions are,
The International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage, 1969 as
amended by its 1984 Protocol and the International Convention on the Establishment of an
International Fund for Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage, 1971 as amended by its 1984
Protocol.
Article 2 of the 1969 Liability Convention (as amended by Article 3 of its 1984 Protocol)
provides that:
“This Convention shall apply exclusively:
(a) to pollution damage caused:
(i) in the territory, including the territorial sea, of a Contracting State, and
Ranray, K.O.: Law of the Sea and its implications for the Caribbean, Port News, 1983, p.6.
61 Ibid.
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r(ii) in the exclusive economic zone of a Contracting State, established in
accordance with international law, or if a Contracting State has not establishe
d
such a zone, in an area beyond and adjacent to the territorial sea of that state in
accordance with international law and not extending more than 200 nauti
cal
miles from the baselines from which the breadth of its territorial sea is m
easured;
(b) to preventitive measures, wherever taken, to prevent or minimize such damag&’.
Abecassis and Jarashow 62 indicate that the protagonissbehind the develop
ment of this
provision “... felt that recent developments in international law gave states
the jurisdiction to
protect the environment within the exclusive economic zone. They clea
rly had in mind not only
the provisions of the Law of the Sea Convention 1982, but the existing as
sumption by many
states of jurisdiction over areas beyond the territorial sea”. 63
This Convention, it must be borne in mind, basically provides for civil l
iability
compensation for oil pollution damage. 64
The Fund Convention jurisdictional and related provisions parallel those of the Liability
Convention and, in this and other respects the two Conventions operate in
tandem.
Enactment of enabling legislation pursuant to becoming a party to these Co
nventions
could take the form of creating a new cause of action, that is , to say that oil p
ollution committed
Abecassis, David W and Jarashow, Richard L: Oil Pollution from Ships, 2 nd, London
, Stevens & Sons,
1985
Ibid.,p.235
See: chapter 6
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in the E.E.Z. or its equivalent, is actionable locally and/or the form of extending the court’s civil
jurisdiction to include specified torts, committed within the E.E.Z. affecting the preservation of
the marine environment.
Whichever option is utilized, the effect would be to ensure that not only the court would
have jurisdiction over the matter, but that Jamaican law would be applied.
Another aspect of the Montigo Bay Convention that is of particular relevance to the
issues under discussion in this chapter, is its provisions in respect of the nationality of ships.
Article 91(1) provides as follows:
“Every state shall fix the conditions for the grant of its nationality to ships, for the
registration of ships in its territory, and for the right to fly its flag. Ships have the nationality of
the state whose flag they are entitled to fly. There must exist a genuine link between the state
and the ship”.
Article 92 (1) provides that: “Ships sail under the flag of one state only and, save in
exceptional Cases.. .shall be subject to its exclusive jurisdiction on the high seas”.
Article 94 deals with the duties of the flag state and provides.
“1. Every state shall effectively exercise its jurisdiction and control in administrative,
technical and social matters over ships flying its flag.
2. In particular every state shall:
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(a) maintain a register of ships...
(b) assume jurisdiction under its internal law over each ship flying its flag and its master,
officers and crew in respect of administrative, technical and social matters concerning the
ship...”
The quoted provisions are similar to those contained in Articles 5 and 6 of the Geneva
Convention on the High Seas, 1958 which never came into force. However as Singh 65 notes
“since the preamble of the convention declares that its provisions are based on ‘established
principles of international law’, it may be regarded as stating the existing law on the
subject” 66
The effect of the Montego Bay Convention provisions and their Geneva predecessor,
and as reflected in state practice, have been to leave it up to the particular state to determine the
conditions under which it will allow a ship to fly its flag.
The phenomena of flags of convenience67have made a mockery of the “genuine link”
requirement, showing it up as an ineffectual stipulation.
Braekhus, for instance notes that the genuine link demand .. .“is somewhat vague...and
the requirement seems as yet, to have had little real effect...”
Singh, Nagendrs: International Maritime Law Conventions, (Vol 1-4), 1983
Ibid., Vol.4., p. 2638
67 Alderton defmes a flag of convenience countty as one whose laws “allow and in fact make it easy for ships
owned by foreign nationals to fly their flag”,:See: Alderton, Patrick M.: Sea Transport Operation and
Economics, 3rd Edn, Thomas Reed Publications Ltd, London & Sunderland, 1984 at p. 97.
op. cit., p. 280
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The fact that in practice, shipowners’ often choose national flags for their ships with
impunity that, in accordance with the quoted provisions, they likewise make choices as regards
the national jurisdiction and law to which they wish to may be subject, as regards, for instance a
particular maritime claim.
Thus Braekhus observes:
The choice of a flag is a choice of legal affiliation to a certain state, and, as for as that
goes, a choice of law far-reaching in nature”.69
This can lead to unsavory consequences in the application of Jamaica’s maritime conflict of
laws rules.
Basically, a Jamaican Court may be obliged by its Choice of Law rules to apply the law
of a Flag of Convenience Country in circumstances where there is virtually no link with that
country and a particular matter giving rise to a claim.
The only link might well be the fact of paper registration of the vessel in the Registry of
the Flag of Convenience Country. 70
This might typically operate against a Jamaican seafarer working on such a vessel.
It is not proposed to delve any further into the problems posed by the loophole provided
for Flags of Convenience Countries by the Montego Bay Convention.
Suffice to say, however, that whenever Jamaica’s choice of Law rules require resort to
Ibid., p. 282
Thus Nye notes that although the Law of the Sea requires a “genuine link”, “...in practice simply entry into
a register may be enough “: Nye, Daniel A: Jurisdiction and Choice of Law, Lecture: The Norwegian
Shipping Academy, 28 March 1984 (unpiublished).
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rthe law of the flag then this may discreetly brings into play the relevant provisions of the
Convention dealing with ship registration and nationality.
Subsequent attempts to give more substance to the “genuine link” requirement have on
the whole had the effect of giving legal blessing to open registries and flags of convenience.
The United Nations Convention on Conditions for Registration of Ships, 1986 seem to
generally have had just such an effect.
Jamaica, unlike a number of its Caribbean counterparts,71is not a flag of Convenience
country. Its ship registration requirements are governed by Part 1 of the Merchant Shipping
Act,1894, (U.K.)
Vide: Hyman, Hugh: Legal Insight Column, Caribbean Shipping Journal, November 1987, pp. 31)32.
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(3) OTHER INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION PROVISIONS
(a) An Overview
A number of international conventions contain provisions dealing directly or indirectly
with issues of jurisdiction and choice of law. Unlike the just discussed Law of the Sea
provisions, the provisions to be now considered generally tend to address these issues more
specifically from a private international law perspective.
The Seamen’s Articles of Agreement Convention, 1926 (Article 4)
This Convention provides that “national law” shall govern a number of specified matters
pertaining to the seaman’s employment contract with the shipowner.
This national law means in effect that of the country of the ship’s flag in keeping with the
Article 94 (2) provisions of the Montego Bay Convention, discussed earlier. Indeed, the ILO
Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations in interpreting
the provisions of the seamen’s Articles Convention has stated that the terms of maritime
employment contracts should be subject to the law of the state of registration. This generally
translates in practice to mean the law of the flag.
Article 4 of the Seaman’s Articles Convention provides as follows:
1. Adequate measures shall be taken in accordance with national law for
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ensuring that the agreement shall not contain any stipulation by which the parties
purport to contract in advance to depart from the ordinary rules as to jurisdiction
over the agreement.
2. This Article shall not be interpreted as excluding a reference to arbitration’.
This Article appears to be directed against the use of the Jurisdiction Clause 72 device to
circumvent the intent of the Convention to inter alia, ensure a minimum amount of protection is
afforded the seaman under his contract of employment.
However, it appears that the flag shopping shipowner is able to avoid any inconvenient
effect of this stipulation by choosing an appropriate flag of convenience, such as one that is not
a party to this Convention.
International Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules
Concerning Immunity of State-owned Ships, 1926 (Article 3)
Article 3 provides for the immunity of specified State-owned vessels from inter alia,
arrests or in rem proceedings, thus, in effect, precluding the exercise of another state court’s
jurisdiction over such vessels.
See also mfra for further discussion
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Article 3, however goes on to provide as follows:
‘Nevertheless, claimants shall have the right to proceed before the appropriate Courts of
the State which owns or operates the ships in the following cases:
(i) Claims in respect of collision or other accidents of navigation;
(ii) Claims in respect of salvage or in the nature of salvage and in respect of general
average;
(iii) Claims in respect of repairs, supplies or other contracts relating to the ship:
and the State shall not be entitled to rely upon any immunity as a defense...”
The same rules apply to State-owned cargoes carried on board the State-owned ships
granted immunity as aforesaid.
The other non-immune State-owned ships, generally those operated for commercial
purposes, are as regards its liabilities and obligations, subject to the same rules relating to the
jurisdiction of the courts and procedure as their privately owned counterparts.
The Montego Bay Convention to which Jamaica is a party similarly recognises a
distinction between commercially and non-commercially operated government owned vessels
for purposes of granting immunity. 73
Overall, the approach of national courts internationally seem to be inclined towards
immunity along the lines reflected in the provisions referred to. It is not clear what precise
approach the Jamaican Courts will take, although one may surmise that they will probably
See eg. Articles 29-32
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T
embrace some sort of a restrictive approach to sovereign immunity. There appears to be no
locally reported cases on the subject.
However, the Solicitor General of Jamaica and former Rapporteur at the last law of the
Sea Conference, Dr Kenneth Rattray, has opined that:
The doctrine of restrictive immunity is an attempt to achieve some measure of justice
but, as articulated, it prejudges the legitimacy of certain areas of State activities. It may
well be that the state should be placed in the same position of ordinary individuals in
respect of all activities. It is then that both the ends of justice and non-differentiation
between political systems might be harmonized”. ‘
The International Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules
Concerning Civil Jurisdiction in matters of Collision, 1952.
Article 1 of this Convention permits a claimant in a collision case, to commence his
action at his choice;
(a) either before the Court where the defendant has his habitual residence or a place of
business;
(b) or before the Court of the place where arrest has been effected of the defendant ship
or of any other ship belonging to the defendant which can be lawfully arrested, or where
arrest could have been effected and bail or other security has been furnished;
In: Sovereign Immunity: W.I.L.J., May 1978, 4 at pp.7-8
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(c) or before the court of the place of collision when the collision has occurred within
the limits of a port or in inland waters”.
Collision cases by nature tend to be the most amenable to forum shopping. This is so
because of the potentially large number of legal contacts such incidents can have with different
legal systems, thus rendering courts of different states competent to exercise jurisdiction in the
matter.
For the forum shopping maritime claimant it appears Article 1(b) allows him the most
scope for ‘shopping” as he can hold strain after a collision incident and simply wait until the
offending ship enters a jurisdiction he likes and have it arrested there.
The state court of such a place will have jurisdiction in accordance with the provisions of
Article 1(b). However, it may elect not to exercise such jurisdiction on the basis of forum non
conveniens or for some other reason.
Importantly, provisions of this Convention have been given effect in Jamaican law,
although, as noted, Jamaica is not a party to this Convention. This is by virtue of the extension
of the provisions of Section 4 of the Administration ofJustice Act, 1956 (U:K:) to Jamaica,
pursuant to Section 3 of the Ad.’niralty Jurisdiction (Jamaica) Order in Council, 1962.
The Section 4 provisions gave legislative effect in the U:K: to provisions of the
Convention. The U:K: had earlier become a party to this Convention but never at the time, or
subsequently, made Jamaica also a party to this Convention.
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Despite the existence of the section 4 provisions in its law which are ultimately based
on those of the Convention , Jamaica is yet to become a party to the Covention.
Section 4 of the Administration ofJustice Act, 1956 U:K: as adapted and extended to
Jamaica provides as follows:
(1) No court in Jamaica shall entertain an action in personam to enforce a claim to which
this section applies until any proceedings previously brought by the plaintiff in any court
outside Jamaica against the same defendant in respect of the same incident or series of incidents
have been discontinued or otherwise come to an end.
(3) The preceding provisions of this section shall apply to counter-claims (not being
counter-claims in proceedings arising out of the same incident or series of incidents) as they
apply to actions in personam, but as if the references to the plaintiff and the defendant were
respectively references to the plaintiff on the counter- claim and the defendant to the counter
claim.
(4) The preceding provisions of this section shall not apply to any action or counter
claim of the defendant thereto submits or has agreed to submit to the jurisdiction of the court.
(5) Subject to the provision of sub-section (2) of this section, the Supreme Court of
Jamaica shall have jurisdiction to entertain an action in personam to enforce a claim to which the
section applies whenever any of the conditions specified in paragraphs (a) to (c) of subsection
(1) of this section are satisfied, and the rules of court relating to the service of process outside
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the jurisdiction shall make such provisions as may appear.
(6) ..< omitted> 5
(7) The claims to which this section applies are claims for damage, loss of life or
personal injury arising out of a collision between ships or out of the carrying out of or omission
to carry out a manoeuvre in the case of one or more of two or more ships or out of non
compliance, on the part of one or more of two or more ships, with the collision regulations.
(8) For the avoidance of doubt, it is hereby declared that this section applies in relation to
the jurisdiction of any court not being Admiralty jurisdiction, as well as in relation to its
Admiralty Jurisdiction, if any”.
From this it is clear that the provisions of Article 1 of the Convention, with the exception
of its paragraph (1) is reflected in Section 4 (1)
Overall Section 4 deals with “Jurisdiction in personam of courts in collision and other
cases” 76
Accordingly, Article 1 (b) dealing as it does with in rem jurisdiction is beyond its scope.
Moreover, English law as well as that of Jamaica in any event already allowed for the
exercise of such jurisdiction as provided for by Article 1(b)
Basically, section 4 (1) lays down the essential conditions for the exercise of the courts
in personam jurisdiction. “Territorial waters of Jamaica” as used in sub-section 1 presumably
‘ See: Cloumn2, Second Schedule, The Admiralty Jurisdiction (Jamaica) Order in Council, 1962
76 per marginal note, see also section 4(7); “other cases” presumably includes Allision cases.
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encompasses the Territorial Sea of Jamaica. The sub-section also applies the principle of res
judicata,77
Sub-sections 2-4 of Section 4 deals with the matter of lis alibi pendens.
They clearly require the Jamaican Supreme Court to stay proceedings where proceedings
between the two parties instituted in some foreign country in respect of the same matter are in
esse.
The court is required to so act except where a defendant submits to the jurisdiction of the
court.
Sub-sections 2-4 of section 4 largely relate to Article 1(2) and 3 of the Convention.
A claimant shall not be allowed to bring a further action against the same defendant on
the same facts in another jurisdiction, without discontinuing an action already instituted.
Article 3 provides:
(1) Counterclaims arising out of the same collision can be brought before the Court
having jurisdiction over the principal action in accordance with the provisions of Article 1.
(2) In the event of there being several claimants, any claimant may bring his action
before the Court previously seized of an action against the same party arising out or the same
collision.
(3) In the case of a collision or collisions in which two or more vessels are involved
‘n persection4(1)(c)
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nothing in this Convention shall prevent any Court seized of an action by reason of the
provisions of this Convention, from exercising jurisdiction under its national laws in further
actions arising out of the same incident”.
It therefore appears that the provisions of sub-sections 2-4 are in keeping with or at
least do not run counter to those of Articles 1(2) and 3.
Section 4 (5) contemplated the making of Rules of Court relating to the assumption of
the courts extra-territorial jurisdiction in Collision cases.
However, no such Rules have so far been promulgated in Jamaica.
In keeping with the overall provisions of Section 4, such Rules ought to stipulate that
the court may assume jurisdiction over a claim for damage, loss of life or personal injury arising
out of a collision or like navigational incident78 involving two or more ships where:
(a) the defendant has his habitual residence or a place of business in Jamaica; or
(b) the cause of action arose within the territorial waters, including any port, dock or
harbour in Jamaica;
(c) an action arising out of the same incident or series of incidents is proceeding in the
Supreme Court or has been heard and detemined in that court.
78
See clicey and Morris, Op. Cit., Rule 24 (18), p. 226; Order 75, Rule 4, Rules of the Supreme Court (U.K.).
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As regards (b), when Jamaica enacts its E.E.Z. legislation, then this stipulation should be
extended to take account of the Articles 56 (1) (b) stipulations of the Montego Bay Convention,
discussed earlier.
Then, where for instance a collision takes place in the E.E.Z. resulting in pollution of the
marine environment, the court would be able to assume jurisdiction in respect of the relevant
claim.
With the present lacuna in the Jamaican law as regards the contemplated Rules of Court
in respect of Collision cases, it is probable that Section 686 of the Jamaica Civil Procedure
Code79,would be brought into play in a given collision case requiring service out of the
jurisdiction.
This the relevant English Rules, namely those contained in Order 75, Rule 4 of the
Rules of the Supreme Court (U:K:) would be relied on.
This Rule is similar in terms to the writers suggested stipulations for Jamaica’s Rules.
There appears to be no reported Jamaican case dealing with the Section 4 stipulations.
Despite, the apparent disuse it seems Jamaica ought to update its law in this area by
enacting the relevant Rules of Court contemplated by section 4 (5).
Also, it might wish to consider its position as regards the Convention itself.
Afterall, Jamaica actually has the essential stipulations of the Convention reflected in its
laws.
At present, as a non-contracting party, its position is dealt with by the provisions of
Article 8 of the Convention.
See Chapter 4
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International Convention Relating to the Liability of Operators of Nuclear Ships, 1962
(Article 8)
Article 8 provides:
“The provisions of this Convention shall be applied as regards all persons interested
when all the vessels concerned in any action belong to States of the High Contracting Parties.
Providing always that:
(1) As regards persons interested who belong to a Non-contracting State, the application
of the above provisions may be made by each of the contracting States conditional upon
reciprocity;
(2) Where all the persons interested belong to the same State as the court trying the case,
the provisions of the national law and not of the Convention are applicable”:
Here, it appears that Jamaica should easily satisfy the reciprocity criterion since its own
municipal laws essentially require it to act in accordance with the Convention provisions.
Nevertheless, it is submitted that Jamaica ought to consider the Convention provisions as
a whole with a view as deemed appropriate from such consideration of “regularizing” its
position vis-a-vis the Convention by acceding to it.
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FInternational Convention Relating to the Limitation of the liability of
owners of seagoing ships, 1957 (Article 4)
Artical 4 of this Convention provides that the rules relating to the constitution and
distribution of the limitation fund and all rules of procedure shall be governed by the national
law of the state in which the fund is constituted.
International Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to
the Arrest of Seagoing Ships, 1952
(Article 7, 10)
Ship arrest was examined in the previous Chapter. Here it may be briefly noted in the
present context that the Convention sanctions the use of ship arrest as a basis for jurisdiction on
the merits in particular circumstances.
Also, it provides that the law of the country where the ship is arrested is to be the one to
govern procedural and related matters.
It has already been shown that in the case of Jamaica, ship arrest is predicated upon the
court having in rem jurisdiction. The Converse is not true. Also, under Jamaican private
international law, procedural matters are in any event governed by the lex fori.
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Article 10 gives a claimant against an operator of a ship equipped with a nuclear power
plant the option of instituting proceedings before the courts of the ship’s licensing state “or
before the courts of the Contracting State or States in whose territory nuclear damage has been
sustained”.
This Convention which is not yet in force has attracted very limited international support
and its relevance has waned very much since its adoption in 1962.
International Convention on Civil Liability for oil Pollution Damage,
1969 (Articles 9&10) as amended by its 1984 Protocol; and
International Convention on the Establishment of an International Fund
for Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage, 1971 (Article 7) as amended by
its 1984 Protocol.
Both Articles 9 (of the Liability Convention) and 7 (of the Fund Convention) require that
where an incident has caused oil pollution damage in the territory (including the territorial sea),
the E.E.Z. (or its equivalent) of a contracting state (or states) or where preventitive measures
have been taken to avert or minimize such pollution damage, actions for compensation may only
be brought in the Courts of any such Contracting State (or States).
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This requirement also obtains in respect of indemnification claims as provided for 80
under the Fund Convention (per Article 7).
Each Contracting State is required to ensure that its courts possess the necessary
jurisdiction.
Although Jamaica is not a party to either Convention it is a party to the regional:
Convention for the Protection and Development of the Marine Environment of the Wider
Caribbean Region, 1983 and the Protocol Concerning Co-operation in Combatting Oil Spills in
the Wider Caribbean Region, 1983.
Article 14 of the Convention stipulates that:
“The Contracting Parties shall co-operate with a view to adopting appropriate
rules and procedures, which are in conformity with international law, in the field
of liability and compensation for damage resulting from pollution of the
Convention area”.
It seems to the writer that among the “appropriate rules” should be Jurisdictional and
Choice of Law rules dealing with the occurrence of oil spills in the various maritime zones
spanned by the Convention area.
Here, due cognizance should be paid to the precedence set by these two international
Conventions as regards the E.E.Z.
The opportunity should be taken to harmonize in the region the relevant Rules at least as
per Article 5, Fund Convention, 1971
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these pertain to the critical matter of oil pollution of the marine environment.
In the past, attempts have been made to harmonize shipping legislation in the Caribbean.
This has been through the instrumentality of the Caribbean Community Secretariat.
However, those attempts have focused on the preparation of comprehensive Merchant
Shipping Codes dealing in the main with substantive law issues.
It appears the basic issues under focus in this thesis are yet to entice any regional co
operative legislative or other activity.
However, it is submitted that Article 14 could provide a launching pad for an effort
inclusive of such activity in respect of the critical matter of oil pollution of the marine
environment along lines so far put forward in this chapter.
Athens Convention Relating to the Carriage of Passengers and their
Luggage by Sea, Athens, 1974 (Article 17) as amended by its 1974 Protocol
Article 17 gives a claimant in an action against a carrier for damage suffered as a result of
the death of or personal injury to a passenger of the loss or damage to luggage, the option of
bringing his action in one of a number of different courts provided that the court chosen is
located in a state party to the Convention.
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rThe options are:
‘(a) the court of the place of permanent residence of principal place of business of the
defendant, or
(b) the court of the place of departure or that of the destination according to the contract
of carriage, or
(c) a court of the state of the domicile or permanent residence of the claimant, if the
defendant has a place of business and is subject to jurisdiction in that state, or
(d) a court of the state where the contract of carriage was made, if the defendant has a
place of business and is subject to jurisdiction in that state”.
However, sub-section 2 of Article 17 provides that:
‘After the occurrence of the incident which has caused the damage, the parties may agree
that the claim for damages shall be submitted to judicial proceedings or to arbitration”.
Convention on Limitation of Liability for maritime claims, 1976 (Article 14)
Like its 1957 predecessor’s Article 4, Article 14 provides that the rules relating to the
constitution and distribution of the limitation fund and all rules of procedure are to be governed
by the national law of the state in which the fund is constituted.
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United Nations Convention on the Carriage of Goods by sea, 1978
(Hamburg Rules) (Articles 21 and 22)
Article 21 provides:
1. In judicial proceedings relating to carriage of goods under this Convention, the
plaintiff, at his option, may institute an action in a court which, institute an action in a court
which, according to the law of the state where the court is situated, is competent and within the
jurisdiction of which is situated one of the following places:
(a) the principal place of business or, in the absence thereof
the habitual residence of the defendant; or
(b) the place where the contract was made provided that the
defendant has there a place of business, branch or agency
through which the contract was made; or
(c) the port of loading ir the port of discharge; or
(d) any additional place designated for that purpose in the
contract of carriage by sea.
2. (a) Notwithstanding the preceding provisions of this article,
ad action may be instituted in the courts of any port or place in
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a Contraction State at which the carrying vessel or any other
vessel of the same ownership may have been arrested in
accordance with applicable rules of the law of that state and international
law. However, in such a case, at the petition of the defendant,
the claimant must remove the action, at his choice, to one of the
jurisdictions referred to in paragraph 1 of this article for the
determination of the claim, but before such removal the
defendant must furnish security sufficient to ensure payment of any
judgment that may subsequently be awarded to the claimant
in the action.
(b) All questions relating to the sufficiency or otherwise of
the security shall be determined by the court at the port or place
of the arrest.
3. No judicial proceedings relating to carriage of goods under
this Convention may be institutes in a place not specified in
paragraph br 2 of this Article. The provisions of this
paragraph so not constitute an obstacle to the jurisdiction of the Contracting
States
for provisional or protective measures.
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4. (a) Where an action has been instituted in a court competent
under paragraph 1 or 2 of this article or where judgement has been delivered by such a
court, no new action may be started between the same parties on the same grounds unless
the judgement of the court before which the first action was instituted is nor enforceable in
the country in which the new proceedings are instituted;
(b) for the purpose of this article the institution of measures
with a view to obtaining enforcement of a judgement is not to be considered as the starting
of a new action;
(c) for the purpose of this article, the removal of an action
to a different court within the same country, or to a court in another country, in
accordance with paragraph 2(a) of this article, is not to be considered as the starting of a
new action.
5. Notwithstanding the provisions of the preceding
paragraphs, an agreement made by the parties, after a claim under the contract of carriage
by sea has arisen, which designates the place where the claimant may institute an action,
is effective’t.
Article 22 provides for the settlement of disputes by Arbitration proceedings. It provides
that:
“...3. The arbitration proceedings shall at the option of the claimant, be instituted at one
I
214
of the following places:
(a) a place in State whose territory is situated
(i) the principal place of business of the defendant
or, in the absence thereof, the habitual residence of the
defendant; or
(ii) the place where the contract was made,
provided that the defendant has there a place of business,
branch or agency through which the contract was made;
or
(iii) the port of loading or the port of discharge; or
(b) any place designated for that purpose in the arbrition
clause or agreement.
4. The arbitrator or arbitration tribunal shall apply the niles of this convention.
5. The provisions of paragraphs 3 and 4 of this article are deemed to to be part of every
arbitration clause or agreement, and any term of such clause or agreement which is
inconsistent therewith is null and void.
6. Nothing in this Article affects the validity of an agreement relating to arbitration made
be the parties after the claim under the contract of carriage by sea has arisen”.
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The provisions of the Hamburg Rules relating to Jurisdiction are of particular
importance. They have a special significance for Jamaica and its shippers who often
today find themselves with Bills of Lading with exclusive foreign jurisdiction clauses.
The Hamburg Rules were developed to replace the Hague8’and Hague-Visby
Rules.82
Jamaica is a party to and applies the Hague Rules. These Rules are enacted into
Jamaican Law by way of incorporation into the Carriage of Goods Act, 1900. They are
actually contained with limited modifications in the Schedule to that Act.
The Hague Rules did not at all assess the question of jurisdiction. This matter
was therefore left to be dealt with by the national law of the various contracting states:
In time, various countries including Jamaica have been faced with the use of
exclusive jurisdiction clauses in Bills of Lading.
Carriers usually attempt to avoid dealing with courts and jurisprudence that may
operate against their interests by inserting jurisdiction clauses in their Bills of Lading
specifying that a particular Countrys Courts should exclusively determine any dispute
that may arise under the Bifi of Lading.
Typically also, such clauses would contain a choice of applicable law stating that
the law of a particular country, is to govern.
In practice, such jurisdiction clauses in Bills of Lading usually take one of two
81Inmational Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules of Law relating to Bills of Lading,
1924; See also chapter 6.
82meHague Rules as amended by its 1968 Brussels Protocol; see also chapter 6.
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forms.
It may take the form of the following:
“The contract evidenced by this bill of lading shall be governed by X law and
dispute determined in X (or at the option of the carrier, at the point of destination)
according to X law to the exclusion of the jurisdiction of the courts of any
other country”
Alternatively, the clause may provide as follows:
“Any dispute arising under this Bill of Lading shall be decided in the country
where the carrier has his principal place of business, and the law of
such country shall apply”
In both instances there is a choice of both jurisdiction and applicable law.
As is noted by Judge Hand in The Tricolor (193 ) AMC 919: “The choice of a
court may be more important than many of the (other) express terms of the contract
“and” may indeed be determinative of the outcome”.
Jurisdiction clauses have partly a prorogatory effect, in that they refer the parties
concerned to the courts of or to arbitration in a specified state and partly a derogatory
effect, in that by their wording or intention preclude suits in all other jurisdictions.83
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For the Jamaican shipper, faced with a Jurisdiction Clause, it is the purported
derogatory effect which appears to loom largest.
Here, the clause may require that disputes are only to be adjudicated in, say,
London. The inconvenience and costs involved will often make recourse to such
proceedings in London impractical for the shipper. Yet, essentially, the objective behind
the insertion of the clause in the Bill of Lading, by its draughtsman in such a case is likely
to be that of ensuring that disputes between the parties are adjudicated in London only.
Braekhus has indicated that generally courts have an easier time accepting the
prorogatory effect of these clauses than they have as regards their derogatory effect.
He points out that:
The unwillingness of Courts in certain states to accept derogation is sometimes
based on principles of public policy: the effect of a jurisdiction clause is to oust the
jurisdiction of the national courts; private individuals ought not to be able by contract to
limit the authority of the courts of a state in that way. Courts have been especially
unwilling to accept the clauses where the result is that one of the citizens of the state is
being denied the right to bring his case before the courts of his homeland”.84
However, internationally there has been different approaches to this important
83See: Braekhus, op. cit., p 300.
pp 300-301
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matter of jurisdiction clauses.
The provisions of Article 21 must, inter alia, must seen against this background.
Article 21 allows a choice of jurisdiction to be still made by way of jurisdiction
clause. However, most importantly, it denies such a clause, any exclusive character.
Thus the Article is in this respect, essentially directed at the derogatory effect
purported any such clauses.
Thus it does by enumerating a number of places with direct connection with the
carriage (as well as the contractually designated jurisdiction) at which an action may be
brought by the palintiffs at his option.
Thus, where the jurisdiction clause purports to give jurisdiction exciusivelly to
the courts of a particular country, this will not prevent the Plaintiff from having his claim
heard elsewhere.
Here, other courts whose state had some connection with the contract of
affreightment, such as say the port State of loading or discharge ate deemed to be
competent by the convention and may accordingly hear and determine the claim.
However, while Article 21(1) enumerates a number of places connected with the
contract of affreightment, Article 21(2) provides for the possible exercise of jurisdiction
by a state court whose State has no connection with the contract of carriage.
Here, the basis for the exercise of jurisdiction is the arrest of the offending
vessel or another in the same owernship.
However, the defendant may have the action to one of the places specified in
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paragraph 1 upon furnishing security sufficient to ensure payment of any judgement that
may subsequently be awarded to the claimant in the action.
At present, it appears a Jamaican court has security of it does not possess
jurisdiction of declined jurisdiction on the merits.85
Hence, adoption and enactment of Article 21(2) into Jamaican law would
apparently result in the fifing of this gap in Jamaican law.
Also, as regards selection of jurisdiction, Article 21 mist be read with Article 22
which deals with arbitration.
The Convention recognizes that parties may agree to refer their disputes to
arbitration. 86
In so doing they are in fact selecting their jurisdiction in the sense that they are
nominating the tribunal which is to have the power of adjudication
However, selection of where to have such arbitration proceedings is limited in a
manner similar to that as regards court proceedings.
Arbitration proceedings may only be brought in one of a number of specified
places. Apart from the place of arrest, provided for in Article 2 1(2), those places are
identical with those where legal proceedings may be brought.
However, after the claim has arisen the parties may by agreement designate the
place where court or arbitration proceedings may be heard.
eg. The Golden Trader (1975) Q.B. 348
86S also: chapter 6
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It is to be noted that the places of jurisdiction are, except as just noted, exclusive
and apart from the places of arrest, are not contained to contracting states.
This has the effect of giving the claimant a wide variety of options.
It is clear that the aim of the jurisdictional provisions was to achieve a balance
between the carrier and cargo interests.
As the law now stands internationally this balance tilts very much in favor of the
carrier.87
However, the Convention does not at all deal with the second limb of the
jurisdiction issue that arises in practice.
This as noted above, embraces the question as to whether the court will exercise
the jurisdictions permitted under the Convention to refuse to hear a case on the grounds of
say forum non conveniens.
Article 21(4) essentially prohibits the bringing of more than one action between
the same parties on the same ground where the normal principles pertaining to us alibi
pendens and res judicata apply.
As regards the Jurisdiction and Choice of Law clauses it may be noted that
although they are being focused on in the present context in relation to the carriage of
goods by sea they also operate elsewhere in the Jamaican Maritime context.
Thus there may arise in relation to contracts of marine insurance where a
87Salso: chapter 6.
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Jamaican assured, often has his contract of insurance 88 with a foreign insurer. Also,
they may be in issue in a contract of employment 89 between a Jamaican seafarer and a
foreign shipowner.
However, in the present context, the thrust of the discussion is as regards the
effect to be given to these clauses in Bills of Lading.
Simultaneously, it is to be borne in mind that some of the considerations equally
apply in other contexts in Jamaica.
As alluded to, the Hague Rules make no reference to “Jurisdiction Clauses” and
neither so their enabling Act in Jamaica: The Carriage of Goods Act, 1900.
There are no Jamaican Admiralty cases dealing with the issue of Jurisdiction
Clauses. However, there is some slight indication in Jamaican Jurisprudence of the
possible attitude a Jamaican Court might take to such clauses.
In National Chemsearch Corporation Caribbean v. Davidson, ° Graham
Perkins, J, stated that:
“The law of this country is committed to the principle of the unfettered freedom
of contract and where the parties to a contract have therein expressed an intention that a
particular legal system shall govern their rights and obligations that intention almost
invariably must prevail... .But the law of this country is also committed to another
88See: Legal and documentary aspects of Marine insurance, INCTAD, TD/B/C.4/lLS27/Rev.1, at
p.25
89Sec fenerally, Morgenstern, op. cit
90(1969). 9 J.L.R.468
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principle which I may state thus: where a contract, the proper law of which is that of a
foreign jurisdiction is, by the law of this country, prima facie void as being contrary to the
public policy of this country, it must be shown to be essentially valid not only by its
proper law, but also by the law of this country if it is sought to be enforced here”.91
In the case, Graham-Perkins, J (Ag.) applied these principles in holding that a
certain restrictive covenant in a sales representative agreement was void ab initio.
The contract had provided that it was to “...be construed under and governed by
the laws of the state of Texas...”92 Nevertheless Graham-Perkins J (ag) found that as
the restrictive covenant stipulation was contrary to public policy, it was treated as void ab
initio.
It therefore appears that in an appropriate case a Jamaican Court is prepared to
find a Choice of Law or Jurisdiction stipulation as void ab initio based on public policy
considerations.
However as was emphasized in the instant case, there is a very strong
commitment to the notion of the sanctity of contractee to the extent that “ where the parties
to a contract have expressed an intention that a particular legal system shall govern their
rights and obligations that intention almost invariably must prevail”.
One is therefore prompted to contemplate what are the possible considerations
that might of ought to move a Jamaican Court to treat as void ab initio or otherwise,
91Ibid.,p 471
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circumvent a Jurisdiction or Choice of Law clause in the present context whether on the
basis of such clause being deemed to be contrary to public policy or otherwise.
Jurisdiction and Choice of Law clauses, appear to find their strongest buttress in
the argument that persons should be held to their agreement: the principle of the sanctity
of contract.
However, this principle was itself founded on certain premises which have been
eroded by the present adhesion93 character of Bills of Lading.
In the Bills of Lading, the Jamaican shipper is faced with a standard form fme
print document whose terms he has had no opportunity of negotiating and practically is
hardly in a position to negotiate.
He is very much the weaker party in the relationship and has practically not
much of a bargaining power.
At times, he may fmd himself being subject to terms which he can have no real
opportunity of knowing their details.
This usually takes place by use of the device of clause incorporating charterparty
93An adhesion contract is based on standard form, used to supply mass demands for goods and/or
services, drafted for an indefinite number of persons, rather than a single individual and whose use
entails the superior bargaining power of the stipulator vis-a-vis the individual customer/consumer
whoihad no bargining power, must either adhere to the contract ar refuse to contract altogther See eg.
Burgess, Andrew: Adhesion Contracts and Unfair Terms.., Faculty if Law, U.W.I., at p7 citing
Lenhoff, Contracts of Adhesion and Freedom of Contract (1962) 36 Tul. L.R.48
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terms. Such terms may include Jurisdiction and Choice of Law Stipulations.
In addition, it may well be that a jurisdiction and Choice of Law clause may, if
given effect in Jamaica, may lead to an avoidance of the Hague Rules stipulations to
which Jamaica is subject.
This will happen where the designated jurisdiction and applicable law is that of a
country which does not apply the Rules.
In the case, The Morviken, 1983, Lloyd’s Rep.1., the House of Lords in
England, decided that a jurisdiction clause is null and void pursuant to Article 3(8) of the
Hague Rules when the court to which the dispute would be submitted would apply
provisions less favorable to the cargo owner than those of the Rules.
Article 3(8) provides, inter alia, that any clause in a contract of carriage which
lessens the liability, otherwise than as provided for the Rules are null and void and of no
effect.
Clearly therefore, Jurisdiction Clauses when they have this effect ought to be
treated as null and void.
However, this may be said to be a particular situation. There is the question as
to whether these clauses are amenable to some sort of general approach particular
presumptions as to their enforceability. Here the varying approaches of different
countries may be noted.
American Courts, in the past, held consistently that jurisdiction clauses were not
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valid perse as purporting to “oust the courts of their jurisdiction”94
Braekhus has cited the practice of American Courts in the period preceding The
Hatter Act, 1893 (U.S.) as an example of the vindication of national mandatory law
through the rejection of both Jurisdiction and Choice of Law clauses.95
He observes that then:
the English shipping companies, who dominated the traffic between Europe
and the United States of America, employed broad exemption of liability clauses in their
bills of lading. These exemptions were respected by the English Courts, but to a large
degree declared to be against public policy and invalid by the American courts, thereby
protecting American cargo interests engaged in import and export, to and from the United
States of America. The English shipowners attempted to avoid the stringent liability
imposed by the United States law first by including a clause in bifis of lading that they be
subject to English law, and then via a clause providing that the suits arising due to a loss
of or damage to cargo only could be brought before English Courts. The American cargo
interests were forced to accept such bills of lading. Nevertheless, both the choice of law
and jurisdiction clauses were rejected by the American Courts”Y
94See: Wiid & Salik Inc. v. Companie Generale Transatlantique, 43 F. 2d. 941, 942. (2d Cir. 1930)
950p cit., p. 304
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The protectionist attitude in the U.S.A. was subsequently more overtly maintained by
way of legislation through the Harter Act of 1893 and later the Carriage of Goods by
Sea Act, 1936 (U.S.) 97
Since 1949, American courts have respected clauses granting exclusive
jurisdiction to foreign courts if they were “reasonable”98.It is for the Plaintiff to prove
that the clause was unreasonable.
Here, it is noted that “mere inconvenience or additional expense is not the test of
unreasonableness’.
In Belgium, foreign jurisdiction clauses are in principle, deemed not valid as
they may relieve the carrier from liability he would normally have incurred under Belgian
Law.
However, it appears, Belgian Courts tend to recognize foreign jurisdiction
clauses if they are satisfied that the foreign courts will apply the Hague Rules in the Same
way as Belgian Courts.
Australia has by way of legislation, made such clauses invalid.
97thid.
98See: Manbabady, Samir (ed): Comments on the Hamburg Rules, The Hamburg Rules on the
Carriage of goods by sea, 1978, p. 101 citing Kranger v Pennsylvania Rail Co., 2 Cir. 1949, 174F.
2d. 2556.
99See: Bills of Lading, Report by the Secretariat of UNCTAD: TD/BC.4JILS/6/ Rev. 1; U.N., N.Y.,
1971, at p. 50; See also: Oland, A. Barry: Forum Non Coveniens in Canada: The Common Law
Position, The Federal Court of Canada, Suggested Reform, 1986 Meredith Memorial Lectures, Mcgill
University, Richard de Boo, Ontario, at pp. 323, 334.
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Thus its Carriage of Goods by Sea Act provides:
“Any stipulation or agreement, whether made in the Commonwealth or
elsewhere, purporting to oust or lessen the jurisdiction of the courts of the
Commonwealth or of a state in respect of any bill of lading or document relating to the
carriage of goods from any place outside Australia to any place in Australia shall be
illegal, null and void and of no effect. The basic English Common law position has
already been summarily indicated above.
In the Eleftheria (1969= 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 237, Justice Brandon elaborated on the
position thus:
“(1) Where plaintiffs sue in England in breach of an
agreement to refer disputes to a foreign court, and the defenthnts apply for a stay, the
English Court, assuming the claim to be otherwise within the jurisdiction, is not bound to
grant a stay but has discretion whether to do so or not.
(2) The discretion should be exercised by granting a stay
unless strong cause for not doing so is shown.
(3) The burden of proving such strong cause is on the
plaintiffs.
(4) In exercising its discretion the Court should take into
account all the circumstances of the particular case.
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(5) In particular, but without prejudice to (4), the following
matters, where they arise may be properly regarded:
(a) In what country the evidence on the issues of
fact is situated, or more readily available, and the effect of that on the relative convenience
and expense of trial as between the English and foreign courts;
(b) Whether the law of the foreign court applies
and, if so, whether it differs from English law in any material respects;
(d) Whether the defendants genuinely desire trial in
the foreign country, or are only seeking procedural advantages, whether there would be
very great delay relative to English proceedings and whether remedies available in
England would not be available in the foreign forum.
(e) Whether the plaintiff would be prejudiced by
having to sue in the foreign court because they would: (i) be deprived of security for that
claim; (ii) be unable to enforce any judgment obtained; (iii) be faced with a time bar not
applicable in England; or (iv) for political, racial, religious or other reasons be unlikely to
get afair trial.” 100
It is to be noted that Justice Brandon’s first three principles place very strong
emphasis on the sanctity of contract notion.
1Thud., p. 242
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They refer to the plaintiff bringing an action in breach of an agreement to refer
disputes to a foreign court and the strong onus on the plaintiff to defeat a jurisdiction
clause.
Oland,101 writing about the situation in Canada where the Eleftheria’s principles
are applied, has noted in this context that:
“...the sanctity of contract issue...is paraded before the courts in biblical terms
by P&I Council. This issue fails to recognize the realities of commercial life, that Bills of
Lading in unreadable form are prepared by contractual craftsmen employed by vessel
owners and P&I Clubs. Except for the Hague Rules, the terms of a bill of lading are
those of a contract of adhesion. There is no free discussion or negotiation about a
jurisdiction clause...”02
Oland goes on to lament in this context the adoption of a contractual
interpretation in Canada “...that effectively sends litigants away from the courts to other
jurisdictions” 103
He argues for an approach which “...if not actually welcoming a claimant, at
least does not discourage him from using the court’s services” 104
It seems to the writer, that just such ab approach is highly advisable in the case
of Jamaica.
101 Op.cic, F:N:101
102bjd., p. 318
103bjd., p. 319
104bid.
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If the Jamaican Admiralty Court and Jamaican maritime jurisprudence is to
develop fully, then an approach ought to be adopted which is strongly inclined towards
hearing a case whenever the aid of the court is sought, provided the court’s jurisdiction
had been properly invoked.
In short, the court should be strongly inclined to exercise whatever jurisdiction it
has in matters where, say, a Jamaican shipper or consignee holds a Bill of Lading with a
foreign jurisdiction clause and wishes to make a claim against a foreign shipowner in
Jamaica.
Such an approach would not only in the normal case protect Jamaicas cargo
interests, but also generally serve to expand the judicial and legal services provided in
Jamaica in the maritime sphere iocally as well as in due course to persons from overseas
who may be attracted to the jurisdiction.
Here it is acknowledged that, inter alia, various charges are needed to improve
the efficacy of Jamaican Admiralty Law and practice before the suggested approach can
have any significant result in the direction contemplated.105
However, one thing is clear, a judicial approach that discourage use of the court
is one which can only result in such a prospect receding further and further away from
ever coming to fruition.
The Eleftheril approach in England to Jurisdiction clauses is quite compatible
105See g. Chapter 2.
231
with that country’s position as the leading centre in the world for adjudication of maritime
cases.
In jamaica, an approach ought to be taken which takes into account Jamaicas
national interests based on considerations of public policy.
The particular position of the Jamaican cargo-owner vis-a-vis the adhesion type
contract he is confronted with, should be taken into account.
inconvenience and extra expenses to the cargoowner in having his matter heard
overseas, should weigh very heavily in favor of Jamaica assuming jurisdiction.
The Hamburg Rules, Article 21 is clearly against the carrier dictating to the
shipper and national courts where the shipper must go to have his claim adjudicated.
The Hamburg Rules provisions are thus instructive in this regard.
Overall, it appears that these provisions merit special attention.
They attempt to establish a better balance between the competing interests of
shipper and carrier.
They were developed after much discussion and compromise between the
competing interests of shipowner, shipper and their respective insurers.
In contrast their predecessor Hague Rules reflect basically the interests of
shipowners, These Rules had their genesis in the era when almost all of the present
developing countries were colonies and had no opportunity to present their points of view
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as they had a regards the Hamburg Rules.
As is to be expected, the result of this was that the Hague Rules largely reflected
the interests of the club of shipowning countries who enacted them in accordance with
their vested maritime interests.
No provision as regards Jurisdiction or Jurisdiction clauses effectively meant
that carriers who in reality unilaterally draw up the terms of the Bill of Lading, have
sought to take advantage of the opening in the Hague Rules by way of self serving
Jurisdiction and Choice of Law Stipulations.
The Hamburg Rules Article 21 and 22 provisions after a solution to the
problems which flow from this situation.
Jamaica,as a “shippers” country, ought to bear this in mind and have the reality
of this fact reflected in its laws.
Indeed, Oland has strongly argued for the immediate enactment into Canadian
legislation of the provision of Articles 21 and 22 of the Hamburg Rules.106
Canada is hardly to be compared with Jamaica as a “shippers country”.
Hence, it seems that a fortiori, the enactment of the Hamburg Jurisdiction
provisions is also highly advisable in Jamaicas case where it is saddled with the aging
Hague Rules and a common law approach to Jurisdiction and Choice of Law clauses
which, if not creatively applied, stand to exacerbate an inequitable situation and generally
106 Ibid., p. 321
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operate contrary to Jarnaicas best interest in the present context.
Articles 21 and 22 may be given local legislative effect, with or without Jamaica
becoming a party to the Hamburg Rules.
Indeed, there are already instances in Jamaican law where International Maritime
Convention provisions are given legislative effect without Jamaica being a party to the
particular convention.
Thus such enactment as suggested need not await appraisal of the Rules in toto
and their ratification.
Until such enactment (if any) due cognizance may also be paid to the
considerations embodied in The Eleftheria’s fifth principle. However these should be
done from the perspective indicated. The Australian approach in statutorily outlawing
such clauses recommends itself as a secondary option.
Finally, it should be emphasized that no blanket judicial insularity or
chauvinistic legislation promulgation is being promoted.
However, it appears to the writer that in a world where perceived “national
interests” often provide the ratio d’étre whether overtly or covertly for legislative or
judicial activity, it would be less than prudent not to have regard for one’s own national
interests in attempting to shape an indigenous and relevant maritime jurisprudence.
United Nations Convention
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on International Multimodal Transport of Goods, 1980
(Articles 26 and 27)
The Jurisdiction stipulations of this Convention broadly parallel those of its
UNCTAD counterpart, the Hamburg Rules.
Article 26 provides that in judicial proceedings relating to international
multimodal transport under the Convention, the Plaintiff at his option may institute an
action in a court which, according to the law of the state where the court is situated, it is
competent and within the jurisdiction of which is situated one of the following places:
(a) the principle place of business, or in the absence
thereof, the habitual residence of the defendant; or
(b) the place where the multimoclal contract was made,
provided that the defendant has there a place of business, branch of agency through which
the contract was made; or
(c) the place os taking the goods in charge for international
multimodal transport or the place of delivery; or
(d) any other place designated for that purpose in the
multimodal transport document.
Likewise, where provided for, arbitration proceedings may be instituted in any
of the said places. Agreements between the Parties after the claim has arisen as regards
235
the place of jurisdiction are valid.
C: CONCLUDING REMARKS
The various Convention provisions examined may be considered as falling into
3 broad categories.
Firstly, there is a category of provisions which embraces the issue of the
geographical ambit of a state court’s jurisdiction.
Here, the precise location of the place where say, a maritime tort was
committed, or a particular person or vessel vis-a-vis the various maritime zones is crucial
in determining whether a court had or may exercise its jurisdiction in a particular case.
Also such provisions in the case of maritime torts provide the public
international law framework for the application of choice of law rules.
The provisions in this first category are to be found in the provisions of the law
of the sea conventions and influence the local law as described.
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Secondily, there is the category in which the majority of provisions examined
fall.
This category deals with the question as to which country’s tribunals are
competent to adjudicate a particular maritime claim.
This question falls more directly in the realm of private international law. The
relevant provisions have more potential for direct and immediate impact on national law
once the relevant convention is ratified or acceded to and subsequently given the force of
law in the state concerned.
As already intimated, Jamaica is not a party to any of these Conventions.
However, should Jamaica become a party to such Conventions, then it will be
obliged to make special provisions for the jurisdictional rules in its procedural and private
international law.
The net result would be that Jamaican courts would then have no jurisdiction to
entertain an action falling under such enabling enactments unless the particular
Convention jurisdictional requirements are met.
Examples of such Conventions are The Hamburg Rules, the Civil Liabity for Oil
Pollution Convention and the Athens Passengers and Luggage Convention.
A feature of this second category is therefore that becoming a party to the
particular Convention, of necessity, ultimately has direct consequences for the local
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maritime procedural and private international law rules, where these are different from
those stipulated in the connection. In effect, the Convention Jurisdiction stipulations and
ramifications are of a mandatory character.
In contrast, ratification of say the Montigo Bay Convention, places no obligation
on a state to declare an EEZ and to concomitantly enact appropriate jurisdiction and choice
of law rules.
The relevant Law of the Sea provisions in the fmal analysis merely sets outer
limits as regards the possible exercise of civil jurisdiction by ascribing varying degrees of
competence to the littoral state depending on which maritime zone is involved.
The rest of the Convention provisions looked at may broadly be considered as
falling into a third category embracing a variety of public and private international law
issues.
For the most part, they relate to the matter of Choice of Law, whether directly or
indirectly.
The effect of these provisions on national law are not as direct as those of the
second category.
thus, for instance, the ship nationality provisions of the Law of the Sea, are
amenable to interpretations permitting the use of flags of Convenience.
These in turn have consequences for choice of law.
Hence, the provisions affect the local law rather indirectly whenever the
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question of the law of the flag state is brought into issue.
Similar considerations obtain in respect of the Choice of Law provisions in the
seamen’s Articles of Agreement Convention.
Overall, it had been shown that as regards the Conventions to which Jamaica is
a party, the provisions relating to the considered preliminary issues may ultimately have
consequences for Jamaican maritime procedural and private international law.
This will be even more so the case when Jamaica fully exercises its rights under
such Conventions. An important case in point, is the establishment of an EEZ as
provided for by the Montigo Bay Convention.
In the case of the 1952 Collision Convention, where Jamaica has given
legislative effect to its provisions without becoming a party to the convention, the relevant
legislation contemplates the enactment of certain Rules of Court.
These are yet to be promulgated. There is thus a gap in the local law which has
its roots in the provisions of an international convention to which Jamaica is not even a
party.
This situation ought to be rectified along the lines already suggested.
As Jamaica is not a party to the Conventions whose considered provisions fall
within the second category their stipulations have not up to now had any direct
consequences for Jamaican law.
However, indirectly they may affect Jamaican Jurisprudence to the extent that
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they offer guidelines as to international thinking on jurisdictional questions which may
well inform legislative and judical activity.
This, it is suggested, is particularly the case as regards the Hamburg Rules
jurisdictional stipulations and its ramifications for Jurisdiction clauses in Bills of Lading.
Here, much guidance can be obtained from these provisions for judicial and
legislative activity.
Indeed, immediate enactment of their stipulations is being strongly urged.
Another matter which the analysis reveals is particularly deserving of immediate
attention is the maritime procedural and private international law relating to marine
pollution.
Here, urgent changes are necessary in the law as an integral part of any national
or regional marine pollution disaster preparedness effort.
In the fmal analysis, it is essential that the local jurisdictional and related rules as
they exist now, and develop in the future, within international legal parameters advance,
or at least do not frustrate vested national interests.
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Chapter 7
The Limitation of Maritime Actions
Part A
— General Background
1. Introduction
In practice it is of the most importance that a maritime claimant does not go to sleep on his
claim. He is required to commence and pursue his claim with reasonable dispatch. As Jackson
notes, “Delay is relevant to every stage of enforcement proceedings and can have the
consequence of penalty in costs, destruction of the remedy or destruction of the claim.”
Various devices and sanctions are available and used at different stages of the litigation
process to discourage and penalize a tardy claimant.
At the pre-litigation stage a claimant is in the first place required to commence court
proceedings within a stipulated time period. After he has started his action, he is required to
IbidJackson, D.C., Enforcement of Maritime Claims, 1985, p. 86.
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promptly proceed with his claim or be liable to have his action dismissed by the court for “want
of prosecution”.
In this regard Lord Justice Diplock noted:
‘Courts do not like to deprive a plaintiff of the right to his day in Court or
of having his action tried but, at the same time, delays cannot be permitted
to the prejudice of defendants who are entitled to have the issues disposed
of promptly and in accordance with the rules.”
In keeping with the focus of this thesis, this chapter is essentially concerned with time
stipulations in respect of commencing legal proceedings by the maritime claimant as distinct
from those relating to continuation of such proceedings. Here, time is of the essence not only
for the claimant but also for the claimant’s lawyer who may, if properly and timely briefed, be
exposed to liability for negligence where he fails to start proceedings within the time allowed.
Thus, Pineus observes:
“An Attorney will not always win his case. How could he? He is not
Diplock, U. (as he then was) in Allen v Sir Alfred McAlpine and Sons Ltd. et al (1968), 2QB 229 at
p. 254.
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expected to. It will not be held against him unless it happens because he
had missed a time bar.”
Danielson and Smith notes (in respect of cargo claims):
“Upon receipt of the file from underwriters, the first thing to be
determined by the Attorney is how much time remains before suit must be
filed.”
In Jamaica, following the English practice, the expression “Limitation of Action” is used in
reference to the situation where a Claimant is liable to lose or forfeit his right of action or
remedy as a result of lapse of a stipulated period of time before he commences court
proceedings. For the claimant, the limitation period is accordingly “... the period during which
the law permits him to delay, without losing his right . .
Various statutory provisions prescribe limitation periods affecting maritime claims in
Jamaica. The principal Jamaican Statute of Limitation is The Limitations of Actions Act, 1881,
Pineus, Kaj International Maritime Law, Time-Barred Actions, 1984 at p.v. (Introduction).
Danielson, David and Smith, Craig: The presentation of the claimant’s cargo case, 1981.
Archbold v Scully (1861) 9 H.L. Case 360 per Lord Wensleydale at p. 383 cited also in Weld v Peire (1929)
1 Ch. 33 (C.A.).
Roughly analogous terms used in Continental European civil law jurisdictions are “prescription” and
“Verjahrung”.
Mozley and Whitely’s Law Dictionary 10th edition, E.R. Butterworths (E.R. Hardy Ivany (editor)) stated that
“A statute of limitation is one which provides that no court shall entertain proceedings for the enforcement of
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(itself dated) which is general in its scope.
There is as such one other Statute of Limitation in Jamaica: The Public Authorities Protection
Act, 1942. This Act deals exclusively with actions instituted against Public Authorities.
Neither statute makes any specific reference to maritime claims although these claims
generally fall Within their purview. The exceptions are the few instances where there are in other
statutes particular provisions specifying limitation periods for certain maritime claims. In these
cases it is the particular stipulations which apply and take precedence over any general
stipulations which would otherwise apply. Thus as Jackson states ‘Any inquiry about time
limits must, therefore, stan with a search for a particular statute relevant to the claim.” If such a
search is not fruitful, then one looks to the more general and all embracing limitation statutory
provisions.
2. Policy Considerations
Various policy reasons supporting the need for statutes of limitation have been put forward
certam rights if such proceedings were set on foot after the lapse of a definite period of time, reckoned as a
rule from the date of the violation of the right”.
Ibid., p. 90.
247
by the courts. These include:
1. that long dormant claims have more cruelty than justice in them
(RB Policies at Lloyds v Butter 2 ALL E.R. 226 at 229, 230 per
Streatfield J.);
2. that a defendant might have lost the evidence to disprove a stale claim
(Jones v Beligrove Properties Ltd. (1949) 2 K.B. 700 at 704, C.A.
per Lord Goddars C.J.); and
3. that persons with good causes of actions should pursue them with
reasonable diligence (Board of Trade v Cayzer, Irvine and Co (1927)
AC 610 at 628, HL, per Lord Atkinson).
The Ontario Law Reform Commission of Canada in its Report on Limitation of
Actions succinctly sets out the raison detre of limitation periods as follows:
“Lawsuits should be brought within a reasonable time. This is the policy
behind limitation statutes. These laws are designed to prevent persons
from beginning actions once that reasonable time has passed. Underlying
See Haisbury’s Laws (4th edition) Vol 28, para 605.
Ontario Law Reform Commission, Report on Limitation of Actions, 1969.
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the policy is a recognition that it is not fair that an individual should be a
subject indefinitely to the threat of being sued over a particular matter. Nor
is it in the interest of the community that disputes should be capable of
dragging on interminably. Furthermore, evidentiary problems are likely to
arise as time passes. Witnesses become forgetful or die: documents may
be lost or destroyed. Certainly, it is desirable that, at some point, there
should be an end to the possibility of litigation in any dispute.”
From the commercial perspective, as Gertner notes, “Limitation periods also inject a much
needed element of certainty or finality into commercial dealings and the commercial world,
where certainty is the handmaid of efficiency and progress.”
From the standpoint of the Legislator setting the cut off point is a balancing exercise
involving the differing interests of the Plaintiff and the Defendant. Thus Stone notes that a
“sensible legislator” should in drawing the line, inter alia, “... give Plaintiffs a reasonable
opportunity of enforcing their rights”, taking into account “... disabilities to which the plaintiff
may be subject and to difficulties which he may have in discovering the facts from which the
claim arises”. Conversely, the legislator should endeavor not to “disappoint reasonable
Ibid.., at p. 9.
Gertner, Eric: Dismissal for want of prosecution: A Decade after Sir Alfred McAlpine and SOns Ltd.,
at p. 48.
Stone, P.A.: Time limitation in the English Conflict of Laws, 1985 L.M.C.L.Q., 497 at p. 501.
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Fexpectations of the defendant that a matter is closed”.
3. Limitation Periods — the General Principles
a. When time starts to run
In general, the period of limitation begins to run when the cause of action accrues. Apart
from any special provision, a cause of action normally accrues when there is in existence a
person who can sue and another who can be sued, and when there are present all the facts
which are material to be proved to entitle the plaintiff to succeed. The general rule in contract is
that the cause of action accrues when the breach takes place and in tort when the damage is
suffered.
b. Preventing time from running out
i. By commencing court proceedings
Ibid..
See generally: Haisbury’s Laws (4th edition) Vol 28, para 601 et seq.
“The fact or combination of facts which give rise to a cause of action” (per Osbom’s Concise Law
Dictionary, 7th Edition, at p. 66.
Cooke v Gill (1873) LR 8CP 107 at 116 per Brett J; Read v Brown (1888) 22 Q.B.D. 128, C.A.
Pineus, Kaj (ed.), op. cit., at p. 71; Halisbury’s Laws. op. cit., para 622 et seq.
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This is done in Jamaica by filing or having issued a written of originating
summons in the Supreme Court or a Plaint in the Resident Magistrate’s Court.
ii. ‘Where there is an Agreement not to sue
“If creditors enter into a binding agreement not to sue a debtor for a certain time,
the agreement can be pleaded as a defence to an action by the creditors and no
statute of limitation will run while the agreement is in force.”
iii. Where there is a promise not to plead the statutory provisions
Such a promise accompanied by acknowledgement of debt may set time running
afresh. Even, without such an express promise, it appears, a defendant may be
stopped from pleading the statutory limitation provisions where he represents to
the Plaintiff that he wishes him to delay proceedings without prejudice to the
Plaintiff who in good faith does so based on this representation. In general, an
express or implied agreement not to plead a time-bar is valid if supported by
consideration and will be given effect to by the court.
c. Extension or Postponement of Limitation Period
In general, limitation periods may be extended in case of disability (e.g. where an infant
Halisbury’s Laws, op. cit., para 643-
Ibid., para 644; Pineus, Kaj (ed), op. cit., at p. 72; The doctrine of promissory estoppel is started in Central
London Property Trust Ltd v High Trees House Ltd (1947) K.B. 130.
Pineus, Kaj (ed), OP. cit., at p. 72.
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or person of unsound mind is involved). They may be postponed where there has been certain
written acknowledgement of obligation or part payment appropriate to the right of action, or in
cases of fraudulent concealment or mistake.
Haisbury’s Laws, op. cit., para 864 et seq.
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d. The effect of time having run
The general rule, in Jamaica (following the traditional English view) is that the effect of a
time-bar is to take away the claimant’s remedies (by action or by set-off) It leaves the right to the
claim otherwise intact. Thus, claimant, may by means other than action or set-off on the time-
barred claim still recover his due.
Part B
— Limitation ofMaritime Actions in Jamaica
1. General Stipulations
In Jamaica, the general period of limitation is six years from the accrual of the cause of
action where it is founded on simple contract or on tort. For actions against Public Authorities,
the limitation period is one year. In cases of fatal accident, the relevant time period is three
years. Thus, where there are no special provisions relating to a particular maritime claim, these
Ibid.., paras 645, 646.
See generally: The Limitation of Actions Act, 1881.
The Public Authorities Protection Act, 1942, section 2.
The Fatal Accidents Act, section 3.
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time periods would, in general, apply to the claim.
2. Particular stipulations
a. Carriage of Goods by Sea Claims
Article HI, paragraph 6 of the SCHEDULE to the Jamaican Carriage of Goods Act,
1889, (enacting the Hague Rules) provides that:
“Unless notice of loss or damage and the general nature of such loss or
damage be given in writing to the carrier or his agent at the port of discharge
before or at the time of the removal of the goods into custody of the person
entitled to delivery therest under the contract of carriage, or if the loss or
damage be not apparent within three days, such removal shall be prima facie
evidence of the delivery by the carrier of the goods as described in the bill of
loading.
The notice in writing need not be given if the state of the goods has at the
time of their receipt been the subject of joint surrey or inspection.
The International Convention for the unification of certain rules of law relating to bills of lading, 1924.
Note: This section of the thesis focuses on carriage of goods claims covered by the Hague Rules. For other
carriage of goods claims, other considerations will apply, vide:infra.
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In any event the carrier and the ship shall be discharged from all liability
in respect of loss or damage unless suit is brought within one year after
delivery of the goods or the date when the goods should have been
delivered.
Notice by certain time
From this it follows that the consignee or person taking delivery on his behalf is normally
required to upon taking custody of the goods to indicate then, at the latest, that they are not in
the same order and condition described in the Bill of Loading, if that is the case. Except that
where the loss or damage is not apparent such written notice has to be given within three days.
The penalty for failing to give notice within the time stipulated is to provide the carrier with
prima facie evidence of delivery of the goods in the same order and condition as described in the
bill of loading.
Thus, it appears that essentially the legal implication is that a tardy consignee in such a case
would (by failing to give timely written notice) have the onus of proving loss of or damage to
the goods definitely thrust upon him.
However, in Scrutton on charterparties it is asserted in reference to the relevant sub
Except where the goods were subject to a joint survey or inspection.
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paragraph of paragraph 6 dealing with notice, that it “... appears to have no legal effect.
Whether notice is given or not, the onus of proving loss or damage will lie upon the person
asserting it”.
However, with respect, it appears to the writer, that this assertion fails to distinguish “legal”
from “practical” consequences. Mankabady, for instance states that the sanction for not giving
timely notice in accordance with the provisions under discussion, “... is that the burden if proof
shifts from the carrier to the shipper.” This surely is a legal consequence and follows logically
from the evidential presumption against the consignee where he fails to give notice.
It is true that in practice it is likely that in the final analysis a claimant, despite any initial
presumption in his favour will ultimately have to discharge the burden of proving his claim.
Hence, it may be said that the first sub-paragraph of paragraph 6 is of limited practical
significance. Nevertheless, the view that it is of no legal effect seems unsupportable in strict
legal terms, since the mere shifting of the burden of proof however short lived that might be is
of definite legal consequence. Moreover, such shift need not be temporary nor does it appear
that the first sub-paragraph is devoid of practical significance.
For instance, where a consignee can furnish a qualified receipt, this will automatically
18th edition.
Ibid.., at p. 428.
Mankabady, Samir: Comments on the Hamburg Rules, the Hamburg Rules on the Carriage of Goods by
Sea, Samir Mankabady, Editor, A.W. Sitho 88 - Leyden/Boston 1978, at p. 93.
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provide prima facie evidence against the carrier of the existence of loss or damage at the time of
delivery. This then places the onus of furnishing rebuttal evidence on the carrier. In a situation
where a prima facie case has been made out and there is difficulty on procuring rebuttal evidence
then this may well be decisive in favour of the consignee.
Conversely, the giving of a clean receipt to the carrier upon taking delivery of the goods or
otherwise failing to give timely written notice of loss or damage to the goods will, as Astle
notes, place upon the consignee “the onus of retuting the prima facie evidence of the clean
receipt...
Two final observations may be made regarding the Notice stipulations. Firstly, as is noted in
Scrutton on Chapter parties:
‘if by the time the goods have been removed into the custody of the person
entitled to delivery the ship has sailed and has no agent at the port of
discharge, it is a little difficult to see how this provision will be complied
with.”
Serutton suggests that possibly the agent employed for the ship will be held to continue to be
agent for the purpose of receiving notice. Thankfully, the problem does not seem to present
Vide: Astle, W.E.: Shipping and the Law, at p. 53.
Ibid.
Ibid.
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itself in practice as conceivably, difficult problems would arise concerning any ungratified
assumed authority of such a former agent of the carrier.
Moreover, in the first place, the person who was employed as agent for the ship may be held
to be within his rights not to accept any such notice after the ship has left and his agency
contract with the ca-trier has ended on the basis that he has no actual or implied authority to do
so.
The second observation concerns the words: “... before or at the time of the removal of the
goods into the custody of the person entitled to delivery thereof. .“ Normally, the consignee
does not receive the goods directly from the ship. Typically, cargo after discharge in Jamaica,
will at least pass through the hands of the reminal Operator and Customs Authorities before it
reaches the consignee. These “intermediaries” ought therefore to take care of timely quality in
writing their receipt of the goods as appropriate.
“Suit” to be brought within one year
An initial question to be determined is the meaning and scope of the term “suit” in this
context. Importantly, does it include arbitration proceedings?
Ibid.
Astle, Ibid..
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Normally the term “suit” means civil court proceedings. The English Osborn’s concise Law
Dictionary states that suit is “any legal proceeding of a civil kind brought by one person against
another.” The American Black’s Law Dictionary in its definition unequivocally indicates that
suit necessarily means court proceedings.
It states that “suit” is “A generic term, of comprehensive signification, referring to any
proceeding by one person or persons against another or others in a court of justice in which the
plaintiff pursues, in such court, the remedy which the law affords him for the redress of an
injury or the enforcement of a right... “Kohl v U.S., 91 U.S. 367,375, 23 L. Ed. 449;
Weston v Charleston, 27 U.S. (2Pet.) 449, 464, 7 L. ED 481; Syracruse Plaster Co v Agostini
Bros, Bldg Corporation, 169 Misc. 564, 7 N.Y.S. 2d 897.
Black’s Dictionary goes on to point out that the term “is, however, seldom applied to a
criminal prosecution” and has, “generally been replaced by the term ‘action’...”
Section 2 of the Jamaican Civil Procedure Code which deals with the interpretation to be
given to various terms used in the code, tersely states that “suit” “shall include action”. This
“definition” by itself hardly takes us any further. However the code then states that “action”
“shall mean a civil proceeding commenced by writ, and shall not include a criminal proceeding
aLp. 315.
Black’s Law Dictionary, 5th Edit, 1979, at p. 1286.
Ibid.
The Consolidated Judicature (Civil Procedure Code) Law, Chapter 177, 1889.
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by the crown. ..“
It therefore appear that at the very least, as a matter of legal semantics, the term “suit”
implies civil court proceedings. The question therefore arises as to whether “suit to be brought
within one year under Article 3(6) should be confmed to civil court proceedings
The issue of whether commencement of arbitration proceedings was “suit brought” within
the meaning of Article 3(6), came up for decision in the English case of The Merak.
In that case, cargo owned by the plaintiffs was discharged on 21st November 1961, in a
damaged condition. The bill of lading contained a clause requiring any dispute to be referred to
arbitration within 12 months of final discharge. The plaintiffs issued a writ on 15th November
1962, and the case came on trail on 28th July 1964, when the trail Judge stayed the action on
the ground that the parties had agreed to refer the dispute to arbitration. By then, the time limit
under the arbitration clause had long since passed. The plaintiffs appealed and claimed that the
arbitration clause was void in that it conflicted with Article 3, paragraph 6 and 8, of the Hague
Rules, and that they were still entitled to bring an action within one year of final discharge as
they had done in fact.
The English Court of Appeal held that the action must be stayed. The arbitration clause was
(1965) p 223 (1965) I All E.R. 230, CA; It appears American Courts have taken an opposite view to that in
the Merak, vide: Murray D.E.: The Hamburg Rules: A comparative analysis. Lawyer of the Americas; at p.
80. Vide: Shipping Marine Insurance and the Law
— Background plots (34). Time Limitation — Place of
Settlement. Definition of Suit, Fairplay, May 1967.
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effective, and since the matter had not been referred to arbitration within 12 month, the plaintiffs
were without a remedy. The word “suit’t in Article 3(6) was held to include Arbitration
proceedings.
The ultimate consequences for the consignee were clearly severe. Prima facie, it seems to be
a case where the right thing was not done at the right time by the plaintiff. However, further
exploration of the facts reveals that the Arbitration Clause and its time stipulation was not
apparent on the face of the Bill of Lading. Rather, these stipulations were incorporated into the
Bill of Lading by reference.
It is respectfully submitted that whenever the bill of lading is issued under a charterparty
containing an arbitration clause a different approach ought to be taken by the courts. Here, the
consignee will typically be ignorant of the details of the charterparty provisions, and often
cannot without much inconvenience and costs to himself procure such information.
Otherwise, it seems in principle desirable to construe “suit” as including arbitration. Thus
where for instance, a Bill of Lading clearly on the face of it requires disputes to be settled by
arbitration, them arbitration proceedings timely commenced should be sufficient to satisfy the
provisions of Article 3(6). However, if an arbitration clause stipulates a time limit shorter than
that in Article 3(6) it should be held to be at least void to this extent.
Vide infra.
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This is do since this would clearly violate Article 3(8) of the schedule of the Jamaican
carriage of Goods Act (which enacts the same provision of the Hague Rules) and provides as
follows:
“Any clause, covenant or agreement in a contract of carriage relieving the
carrier or the ship from liability for loss or damage to or in connection with
goods arising from negligence, fault or failure in the duties and obligations
provided in this Article or lessening such liability otherwise than as provided
in these Rules, shall be null and void and of no effect...”
When time starts to run
Firstly, time starts to run from the date of delivery of the goods. Secondly, it starts to run
from when the goods should have been delivered. Thus it is important to consider what
constitutes “delivery” and whether, for instance, it has the dame meaning as “discharge”.
Different courts in different countries have attributed differing interpretations to “delivery”
vis-avis “discharge” in their interpretation of Article 3(6) of the Hague Rules.
The Supreme Court of Australia has held that “delivery” was made for the purpose of
In Automatic Tube Co Pty Ltd. and Email Ltd. - Balfour Buzacott Division v Adelaide SS (Operations) Ltd.,
Adelaide SS Co Ltd. and Adelaide SS Co Pty Ltd., The Belirane (1967) i Lloyd’s Rep 531.
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Article 3(6), either when the goods were landed on the wharf and freed from the ship’s tackle,
or at the latest, when they were placed in a warehouse and immediately became available to the
consignee.
In an American Case, it was held that the time-bar period started running after discharge
plus notice to the consignee plus a reasonable opportunity to receive the goods. In another
American case it was held that “delivery” was not synonymous with discharge and denoted a
two-party transaction in which the consignee would have an opportunity to observe defects.
There appears to be no Jamaican or other West Indian or English cases directly on point.
However, it appears, to the writer that mere discharge of the goods should not be sufficient to
start time running against the consignee. At least he needs to have been notified and given a
reasonable opportunity of receiving and inspecting the goods to at least ascertain apparent
defects before time should start running against him.
Enactment of the Hague Rules
Article 3(6) of the Schedule to the Jamaican Carriage of Goods Act in its enactment of the
corresponding provision of the Hague Rules omitted the second sub-paragraph of the latter’s
National Packaging Corp. v Nippon Yusen Kaiska (NYK Line) 1973 I Lloyd’s Rep 46.
American Hoesch Inc. and Riblet Products Inc. v SS Aubade and Maritime Commercial Corp. Inc. (1971) 2
Lloyds Rep 423.
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provisiOnS.
This sub-paragraph provides that:
“If the loss or damage is not apparent, the notice must be given within three
days of the delivery of the goods”.
This extra wording which was perhaps put in the Hague Rules to aid its translation into
other languages was apparently omitted from the Jamaican Act by the draughtsmen to avoid
tautology.
This appears to be so as the requirements of the deleted sub-paragraph are contained in the
first sub-paragraph of paragraph 6.
Nevertheless, it appears to the writer that its inclusion, although seemingly repetitions would
have enhanced the clarity of paragraph’s 6 stipulations,
This submission is based on the fact that the first sub-paragraph is cumbrously drafted. It
requires rather careful reading to extract the meaning readily conveyed by the deleted sub
paragraph.
The Jamaican Carriage of Goods Act is actually divided into two parts. Part 1 deals with the
carriage of goods by land. Part 2 deals with the carriage of goods by sea and incorporates the
Hague Rules.
It seems to the writer that it would have been better to have had a separate Act dealing
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exclusively with the carriage of goods by sea rather than have those provisions in effect,
attached to a largely unrelated and dated 1889 Act dealing with carriage of goods by land.
Part 2 of the Act is essentially a duplication of the 1924 United Kingdom Carriage of Goods
by Sea Act, which enacted the Hague Rules into English Law. Part 2 was enacted by Act 10 of
1927.
The Hague Rules Amendments
The provisions of Article 3(6) of the Hague Rules have been amended by Article 1,
paragraph 2 of the Brussels Protocol, 1968.
The amendment is firstly by way of deleting sub-paragraph 4 of paragraph 6, which
provides that:
“In any event the carrier and the ship shall be discharged from all liability in
respect of loss or damage unless suit is brought within one year after
delivery of the goods or the date when the goods should have been
delivered.”
This deleted sub-paragraph is replaced by the following in the Hague—Visby Rules:
Like its Jamaican counterpart does now, it applied only to “outward” Bills of Lading.
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“Subject to paragraph 6bis the carrier and the ship shall in any event be
discharged from all liability whatsoever in respect of the goods unless suit is
brought within one year of their delivery or of the date when they should
have been delivered. This period may however be extended if the parties so
agree after the cause of action has arisen.”
The effect of this amendment, it appears, is to now apply the one year time limit to all claims
in respect of loss or damage, inclusive of claims such as those for wrongful delivery.
In addition the amendment makes it clear that the parties may by agreement extend the
limitation period after the cause of action has accrued. This, in any event, can normally be done
under the general law pertaining to limitation of actions.
By virtue of Article, paragraph 3 of the Brussels Protocol, an additional paragraph b bis has
been added. It immediately follows the now amended paragraph 6 of Article 3 of the Hague
Rules and provides as follows:
“An action for indemnity against a third person may be brought even after
the expiration of the year provided for in the preceding paragraph if brought
within the time allowed by the law of the Court seized of the case. However,
the time allowed shall not be less than three months commencing from the
Astle, op. cit., p. 52.
Vide supra.
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day when the person bringing such action for indemnity has settled the claim
or has been served with process in the action himself’.
By virtue of this amendment, the carrier is not discharged from liability within the one year
time limit provided by Article 3(6), in the case of claims for indemnity by, for instance, another
carrier who had to pay a claim for loss or damage to cargo which occurred while the cargo was
in the custody of the carrier against whom the right of indemnity exists.
The carrier who has paid the claim has at least three months from the time of (1) the
settlement of the claim or (2) when proceedings were instituted against him, to Commence
proceedings against the other carrier for an indemnity.
The Hamburg Rules Amendments
These have effected very significant changes in both substance and form to the Hague Rules
Article 3(6) provisions. Under the Hamburg Rules, only its Article 20 is captioned “Limitation
of Actions”. However, the matter of limitation of actions and intimately related issues are dealt
with by 4 articles: 19—22, comprising part 5 of those rules under the caption: “Claims and
Astie, Ibid..
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FActionS”.
The subject matter of Article 19 is “Notice of loss, damage or delay”. Accordingly, Article
19 deals with those matters within the purview of the first three and fifth sub-paragraphs of
Article 3, paragraph 6 of the Hague Rules. Here, significant amendments have been made.
However, it appears that, by far the most significant amendments have been made in respect
of sub-paragraph 4 of Article 3, paragraph 6 which requires “suite to be “... brought within one
year...”. These amendments have largely been instituted by the cumulative effect of Articles
20—22.
Articles 21 and 22, which deal with “Jurisdiction” and “Arbitration”, respectively, have no
counterparts in neither the Hague nor Hague-Visby Rules. They were introduced in the
Hamburg Rules to deal with particular deficiencies arising from certain lancunae in both the
Hague and Hague-Visby Rules.
Article 19 provides as follows:
“1 Unless notice of loss or damage, specifying the general nature of such
loss or damage, is given in writing by the consignee to the carrier not later
than the working day after when the goods were handed over to the
consignee, such handing over is prima facie evidence of the delivery by
268
the carrier of the goods as described in the document of transport or, if no
such document has been issued, in good condition.
2 Where the loss or damage is not apparent, the provisions of paragraph 1
of this article apply correspondingly if notice in writing is not given
within 15 consecutive days after the day when the goods were handed
over to the consignee.
3 If the state of the goods at the time they were handed over to the
consignee has been the subject of a point surrey or inspection by the
parties, notice in writing need not be given of loss or damage ascertained
during such survey or inspection.
4 In the case of any actual or apprehended loss or damage the carrier and
the consignee must give all reasonable facilities to each other for
inspecting and tallying the goods.
5 No compensation shall be payable for loss resulting from delay in
delivery unless a notice has been given in writing to the carrier within 60
consecutive days after the day when the goods were handed over to the
consignee.
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6 If the goods have been delivered by an actual carrier, any notice given
under this article to him shall have the same effect as if it had been given
to the carrier, and any notice given to the carrier shall have effect as if
given to such actual carrier.
7 Unless notice of loss or damage, specifying the general nature of the loss
or damage is given in writing by the carrier or actual carrier to the shipper
not later than 90 consecutive days after the occurrence of such loss or
damage or after the delivery of the goods in accordance with paragraph 2
of Article 4, whichever is later, the failure to give such notice is prima
facie evidence that the carrier or actual carrier has sustained no loss or
damage due to the fault or neglect of the shipper, his servants or agents.
8 For the purpose of this Article, notice given to a person acting on the
carrier’s or the actual carrier’s behalf, including the master or the officer
in charge of the ship, or to a person acting on the shipper’s behalf is
deemed to have been given to the carrier, to the actual carrier or the
“any person by whom or in whose name a contract of carriage of goods by sea has been concluded with a
shipper” (per Article 1)
“any person to whom the performance of the carriage of the goods, or of part of the carriage has been
entrusted by the carrier; and includes any other person to whom such performance has been entrusted.’ (per
Article 1)
Article 4(2) provides that the carrier is deemed to be in charge (and accordingly responsible, per Article 4(1))
for the goods from the time he has taken them over until when he has delivered them.
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shipper, respectively.”
The main amendments effected by Article 19 therefore appears to be the following:
1 Time starts to run against the consignee for giving notice from when the
goods are handed over to the consignee.
2 In the case of apparent loss or damage to the goods, the consignee now
has until the working day after the goods were handed to him to give
notice. Under the Hague Rules he is required to give notice immediately.
3 Where the loss or damage is not apparent, the time allowed is now 25
days as compared to only 3 days under the Hague Rules.
4 Whereas under the Hague Rules, a joint inspection or survey of the
goods eliminates the need to give written notice by the consignee, under
the Hamburg Rules such notice requirement is only precluded in respect
of “... loss or damage ascertained during such survey of inspection.”
Thus if the consignee discovers damage after say, a joint inspection, he
will be required to give timely written notice.
5 Losses arising from delay in delivery are treated separately. Claims in
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respect of such losses must now be given within 60 days of the goods
handing over to the consignee. Otherwise no compensation is payable.
This severe consequence contrasts markedly with the “evidentiary”
sanctions for untimely notice in respect of loss or damage to goods under
the Hague, Hague-Visby and Hamburg Rules themselves.
6 The consignee may give the relevant notice to either the actual carrier or
the carrier in whose name the contract of affreightment was entered.
7 A limitation period of 90 days is introduced for the “carrier” or “actual
carrier” to give written notice to the shipper of any loss of damage due to
the fault of the shipper. Failure to give timely notice is prima facie
evidence that no such loss or damage was sustained.
8 Notice for the actual carrier, carrier or shipper may respectively be given
to anyone acting on each behalf.
Article 20 of the Hamburg Rules provide that:
“1 Any action relating to carriage of goods under this Convention is time
barred if judicial or arbitral proceedings have not been instituted within a
period of two years.
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2 The limitation period commences on the day on which the carrier has
delivered the goods or part thereof or, in cases where no goods have been
delivered, on the last day on which the goods should have been delivered.
3 The day on which the limitation period commences is not included in the
period.
4 The person against whom a claim is made may at any time during the
running of the limitation period extend that period by a declaration in
writing to the claimant. This period may be further extended by another
declaration or declarations.
5 An action for indemnity by a person held liable may be instituted even
after the expiration of the limitation period provided for in the preceding
paragraphs if instituted within the time allowed by the law of the State
where proceedings are instituted. However, the time allowed shall not be
less than 90 days commencing from the day when the person instituting
such action for the indemnity has settled the claim or has been served
with process in the action against himself.”
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a
1
This Article along with Articles 21 and 22 have virtually effected a transmutation of the
provisions of sub-paragraph 4 of Article 3, Paragraph 6 of the Hague Rules. These latter
provisions with their requirements for “suite to be be “brought within one year” with time
revealed a number of deficiencies and have been subject to a variety of judical interpretations.
Often, it seemed that this provision in conjunction with others was weighted against cargo
interests.
This served to exacerbate the unease with which a number of developing countries viewed
the Hague Rules and its amendments. Most of these countries were colonies when the Hague
Rules were promulgated under the yoke of the dominant ship owning perspectives of a number
of developed countries.
The unease and agitation of the developing countries culminated in UNCTAD, in 1970
mandating UNCITRAL to review in detail the Hague Rules and their amendments. Among the
areas singled out for special attention were those pertaining to limitation periods and related
issues of jurisdiction.
The UNCTAD committee in its review of Article 3, paragraph 6 was particularly concerned
with sub-paragraph 4.
The Committee sought to have clarified the following five questions:
See generally: Bills of Lading, Report by the Secretariat TD/B/C.4/ISL/6/rev. 1 United Nations,
New York, 1971; Astle W.E.: The Hamburg Rules. Fairplay, 1981; Mankabady, Samir (Ed): The Hamburg
Rules on the Carriage of Goods by Sea, 1978.
As noted in Astle, W.E.: The Hamburg Rules, pp. 48—5 1, 137—138.
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V(a) what constitutes “delivery’ in order to start the one year period running? Here, the
view was taken that “delivery” would normally mean the moment when the consignee
receives the goods from the person competent to deliver them. Accordingly, it was
proposed by the Committee that the Article 3, paragraph 6 provisions be changed to
indicate that the moment from which time begins to run is from when the consignee
received the goods or on the 1st day when he should have received them. This
proposal is reflected in Article 20 (2) (as well as Article 19 (2) and (3).
(b) Does “brought within one year” mean brought anywhere within one year, or
brought before a particular court within that time?
In the English case, Compania Colombia de Seguros v Pacific Steam Navigation Co (1932)
2 Lloyds Rep 479, it was held that a suit was time-barred because it was not brought in England
within one year, although they were previously brought within one year in another country — the
United States.
The decision in this case was very much criticized. The UNCTAD Committee opined that “if
the object of the time limit is to make cargo owners give prompt notice of claims to carriers, this
could be accomplished suitable by permitting commencement of an action in any jurisdiction
having a reasonable close connection with the contract of carriage”
Thid., p. 50.
275
The Committee felt that there should be amendments stating that it would be sufficient for
suit to be brought in any jurisdiction having reasonable close connection with the contract of
carriage, and as the country of shipment or destination, and that the cargo claimant would not be
restricted to bringing suit in a particular jurisdiction.
Accordingly, Article 21 gives a claimant a wide choice of jurisdiction. Further, even where
the contract of carriage stipulates jurisdiction in a particular country or courts, the claimant is
not, by the Hamburg Rules precluded from seeking alternative jurisdiction.
(c) Does the word “suit” include arbitration?
As afready noted, the English case, The Mearak, held that “suit” includes arbitration. The
UNCTAD Committee was concerned that where ‘suit” is held to include arbitration, the
consequences could be very prejudicial to consignees when the Bill of Lading has been issued
under a charterparty containing an arbitration clause.
Here, the charterparty is usually incorporated into the Bill of Lading by reference and the
consignee does not know of its contents. The result is that the consignee might start court
proceedings within one year. Belatedly, he discovers that his legal suit will not be entertained
because he did not in the first place arbitrate. His application for arbitration then fails because he
(1965) p. 223, (1965) 1 All E.R. 230, C.A.
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did not appoint an arbitrator within the one year period. The end result is that he is without a
remedy.
However, if ttsuit” is taken to exclude arbitration and the parties in fact submit to arbitration,
there is the question of whether this means that they have thereby waived the requirement that
suit must be brought within one year.
In the final analysis the word “suit” was abandoned and Article 20 (1) expressly indicates
that either judicial and arbitral proceedings may be commenced to satisfy the time limitation
requirement.
Nevertheless, it appears, a claimant is still required to ensure that he starts the right
proceedings at the right time. This is so as the Rules expressly provides for the settlement of
disputes by arbitration per Article 22 (1).
Further, Article 22 (2) provides that:
“When a charter-party contains a provision that disputes arising thereunder shall be
referred to arbitration and a bill of lading issued pursuant to the charter-party does not contain a
special annotation providing that such provision shall be binding upon the holder of the bill of
lading, the carrier may not invoke such provision as against a holder having acquired the will of
lading in good faith”.
Hence the problem of due notice to the bill of lading holder as to what proceedings to
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commence should not normally arise.
(d) What is the significance of the phrase “in any event”?
Here, Astle notes that “Thee was also a conflict among the Common Law Countries as to the
effect of the words ‘in any event’.” Under English Law an unjustifiable deviation could
conceivably (via the fundamental breach doctrine) result in the six year common law limitation
period being applied instead of that of the Hague Rules.
In the United States the one year time limit continues to apply even in cases of unjustifiable
deviation, because of the words “in any event”.
UNCTAD sought to have this potential conflict in interpretation clarified by appropriate
amendment. However, it appears that in the final analysis the Rules have not by express
provision resolved this problem.
Although, inductive reasoning would seem to suggest that under the Hamburg Rules, the
latter American view regarding the Hague Rules “in any event” stipulation is the one adopted.
To begin with, Mankabady notes in reference to the time limit under section 20 of the Hamburg
Astle, Ibid., p. 50.
See e.g. 1-lain Steamship Co Ltd v Late & Lyle, (1936) 2 All ER 597, in which Lord Atkin stated that: “...
the departure from the voyage contracted to be made is a breach by the ship owner of his contract, a breach of
such a serious character that, however slight the deviation, the other party to the contract is entitled to treat it
as going to the root of the contract, and to declare himself as no longer bound by any of the contract
terms...”
Astle, Ibid..
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Rules that “the time limit will still be applicable in case the loss damage of delay resulted from
an intentional or a reckless act. It is clear from Article 8 that the only sanction is that the carrier
loses benefit of the limitation of liability.”
This inference appears to be based on reasoning which may be analogised with that
underlying the law maxim: “what is not prohibited is permitted”.
Thus, it is noted that sanctions are stipulated for when the carrier or actual carrier does or
fails to do certain things. This is the case, for example, under Article 8, where the right to limit
liability is lost upon certain happenings.
No such stipulations are made with respect to the carrier losing the benefit of the limitation
period stipulations. Hence, one can infer that none was intended.
It therefore appears that, prima facie, the limitation period stipulations under the Hamburg
Rules will always apply regardless of what the carrier or actual carrier does or fails to do.
(e) May the parties extend the time limit by agreement?
While extension by the parties is permitted in Jamaica and in most countries, it was not
allowed in certain Eastern European countries. Such extension accords with the provisions of
Article 5 of the Hague Rules which permits the carrier to surrender wholly or partly his rights
Op. cit., p. 96
Mankabady, op. cit., p. 97
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and immunities or to increase any of his responsibilities and liabilities under the Rules.
Whatever existing doubts that persisted should be put to rest by paragraph 4 of Article 20
which expressly permits such extension by a declaration in writing to the claimant. As alluded
to, this does not affect the position in Jamaica where, in any event, such extension is permitted
under the general principles relating to limitation of actions.
Finally, as regards Article 20, it has quite importantly, increased the one year period of
limitation to two years. Also, this Hamburg Rules provision unlike its Hague Rules counterpart
is formulated as a time-bar rather than as a discharge from liability. It therefore seems open to be
construed as only barring the claimants remedy and not his right to claim. For recourse actions
for indemnity claims, the relevant limitation period is not less than 90 days instead of (not less
than) 30 days (under paragraph 6bis of Article 3, Hague-Visby Rules).
(b) Claims for Collision Damage and Salvage Remuneration
The Maritime Conventions Act, 1911 (U.K.) applies to Jamaica by virtue of its section 9(1)
which provides that:
“This Act shall extend throughout His Majesty’s Dominions and to any territories under
This accords with certain established practice. For instance, under the existing “Gold Clause Agreement”,
British ship owners agree to, in effect, allow up to two years for cargo interests to start action against them
provided specified timely notice is given of the claim.
Vide: supra
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his protection.. .
Section 8 of the said Act is captioned ‘Limitation of Actions” and provides as follows:
“No action shall be maintable to enforce any claim or lien against a vessel or her owners
in respect of any damage or loss to another vessel, her cargo or freight, or any property on
board her, or damages for loss of life or personal injuries suffered by any person on board her,
caused by the fault of the former vessel, whether such vessel be wholly or partly in fault, or in
respect of any salvage services unless proceedings therein are commenced within two years
from the date when the damage or loss or injury was caused or the salvage services were
rendered, and an action shall not be maintainable under this Act to enforce any contribution on
respect of an overpaid proportion of any damage for loss of life or personal injuries unless
proceedings therein are commenced within one year from the date of payment:
Provided that any Court having jurisdiction to deal with an action to which
this section relates may, in accordance with the rules of court, extend any
such period, to such extent and on such conditions as it thinks fit, and shall
if satisfied that there has not during such period been any reasonable
opportunity of arresting the defendant vessel in the territorial waters of the
country to which the plaintiffs ship belongs or in which the plaintiff resides
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or have his principal place of business extend any such period to an extent
sufficient to give such reasonable opportunity.”
The Maritime Conventions Act, 1911 (U.K.) was enacted to give legislative effect to two
Brussels COnventions on Collision and Salvage to which the United Kingdom and with her
Jamaica acceded on February 1, 1913.
The two conventions are The International Convention for The Unification of Certain Rules
of Law with respect to Collision between vessels, 1910 and The Convention for the Unification
of Certain Rules of Law relating to assistance and salvage at sea, 1910.
Section 8 of The Maritime Conventions Act, 1911 (U.K.), was enacted to cumulatively give
legislative effect to Article 7 of the Collision Convention and Article 10 of the Salvage
Convention. These Articles respectively prescribe a limitation period of two years for collision /
and salvage claims.
Both Articles permit State Parties to the Conventions to provide in their legislation for the
extension of the limitation periods where it has not been possible to arrest the defendant vessel
in the territorial waters of the state in which the plaintiff has his domicile or principal place of
business.
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Article 7 also stipulates a one year period of limitation for enforcement of rights to obtain
contribution for excess damages paid to third parties in respect of death or personal injuries.
As under English law claims for salvage and for damage done by a ship in collision with
another ship or vessel are among the claims recognised as giving rise to maritime liens, section
8 of the Act specifies that the enforcement in each case of both the claim and the lien to which it
gives rise to will be barred after two years. This provision thus provides one of the exceptions
to the general rule that liens are only extinguished in accordance with the doctrine of laches.
“Temperley’s Merchant Shipping Acts, emphasises that section 8 by its wording, only
applies “... to claims in respect of damage or loss to cargo or property or loss of life or
personal injury which lie against the other vessel.”
It states further that “claims of this nature which lie against the vessel carrying the persons,
cargo or property in question are not affected by this period of limitation: cf. The Nice to de
Larrinaga (1966) P. 80; The Ainwick (1965) 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 69 (reversed ibid. 320 on another
point). Jackson notes that they “are subject only to the general pattern of time-bar rules.”
As an action in rem commences when the writ is issued, the lack of reasonable opportunity
to arrest does not prevent a prospective plaintiff fro ensuring that the time limit is complied with
Vide: Thomas, P.R.: Maritime Liens, 1980, para 504; Mankabady, S. The Law of collision at sea, 1987, p.
544.
Ibid., para
Temperly, R.: The Merchant Shipping Acts, Britgish Shipping Laws, Vol. II, London, 1976.
Ibid., para 844
Ibid.
Op.cit. p. 93; Vide: The Niceto de Larrinaga (1966) p. 80
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in the first place.
However, having had the writ issued, he might not have an opportunity to serve it before the
writ expires.
Here, section 30 of the Jamaica Civil Procedure Code provides that:
“No original writ of summons shall be in force for more than twelve months from the
day of the date thereof, including the day of such date; but if any defendant therein
named shall not have been served therewith, the plaintiff may, before the expiration of
the twelve months, apply to the court or Judge for leave to renew the writ; and the Court
or Judge if satisfied that reasonable efforts have been made to serve such defendant, or
for other good reason, may order that the original or concurrent writ of summons be
renewed for six months from the date of such removal inclusive, and so from time to
time during the currency of the renewed writ.”
Even if application is not made within the prescribed time, the court can extend the time for
renewing the writ, despite the general rule of practice that the court will not by the renewal of
the writ revive a statue-barred debt: Doyle v Kaufman (1878) 3Q.B.Q. 1, 340; Hewett v Barr
(1891) 1 Q.B. 98.
In the case of The Espanoleto, 36 T.L.R. 554; (1920) p. 223. the facts were that a collision
Vide: F.N. 40
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having taken place in February 1917, a writ in rem was issued in December 1918. By that time
the defendant vessel had left the jurisdiction. Application for renewal of the writ was made in
March 1920. Then, the vessel was arrested upon her first return to a port within jurisdiction.
Upon a motion to set aside the writ and the renewal and the warrant of arrest, and to
discharge the undertaking to put in bail, Hill I. held that in as much as the period of limitation
provided by section 8 was not absolute, the court should consider the applicant on its merits and
inquire whether the circumstances were such that the court would have given leave to issue the
writ notwithstanding that the time had expired, on the ground that the plaintiff exercised due
diligence in prosecuting his claim. If leave to issue the writ would have been granted, a fortiori,
a renewal of a writ taken out within the prescribed time should be granted.
Section 8, refers to the court extending the time period in accordance with rules of court”.
Although no rules of court have yet been made under the section, the court may exercise its
discretion as to extending time: H.M.S. Archer (1919) p. 1.
The principles upon which the court will grant such extension under section 8 are the same
applicable for renewing the writ.
The 1965 Annual Practice states that:
“In considering whether to grant a renewal or further renewal of a writ, the court will
Temperly, op.cit. para 845, Jackson, op.cit., p. 93; The Owenbawn (1973) I Lloyds Rep. 56
The Annual Practice 1965, Vols. I, London, Sweet & Maxwell, 1965, p. 68
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have regard to all the circumstances of the case.”
In the Owenbaum, (1973) 1 Lloyds Rep. 56, Brandon J. envisaged three situations in
which it was just to renew the writ:
(1) where there is an express agreement deferring service
(2) where there is an implied agreement to the same effect; and
(3) where there has been conduct leading the plaintiff to suppose that it would be all right
to defer service.
This list is not exhaustive. It appears that once the court is convinced that there is “good
reason” to renew the writ or likewise extend the two years limitation, it will normally do so.
However, mere negotiation between the parties do not constitute “good reason” to renew.
Thus, Lord Denning M.R. in Easy v Universal Anchorage Co Ltd (1974) 1 W.L.R. 899 at p.
902 states that: “Negotiations for a settlement do not afford any excuse for failing to serve a writ
in time or to renew it.”
Finally, as regards section 8, it should be noted that despite the reference to arrest in its
proviso, the discretion to extend time applies to actions in personal as well as to action in rem:
The Arraiz (1924) Ll.L Rep 235.
“The only principle is that a writ is not to be renewed except for good reason...” per Lord Denning. M.R. in
Easy v. Universal Anchorage Co. Ltd. (1974) 1 W.L.R. 899 at p. 902; Vide: Odgers’ Principles of Pleading
and Practice in Civil Actions in the High Court of Justice (22nd Edn.), London, Stevens & Sons, 1981.
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New Salvage Convention
There is now a new Salvage Convention: The International Convention on Salvage, 1989.
Its Article 23 under the caption‘tLimitation of Actions provides as follows:
1 Any action relating to payment under this Convention shall be time-barred if judicial
or arbitral proceedings have not been instituted within a period of two years. The
limitation period commences on the day on which the salvage operations are
terminated.
2 The person against whom a claim is made may at any time during the running of the
limitation period extend that period by a declaration to the claimant. This period may
in the like manner be further extended.
3 An action for indemnity by a person liable may be instituted even after the expiration
of the limitation period provided for in the preceding paragraphs, if brought within the
time allowed by the law of the State where proceedings are instituted.”
Thus, the limitation period remains at two years, before it runs fro the day on which the
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1salvage services terminate.
It is now expressly provided that the person against whom a claim is made can during the
limitation period allow more time to the claimant for commencing his action against him. This,
as already noted, would in any event be normally allowed under Jamaican Law.
Article 23 expressly indicates that commencing arbitration proceedings will be sufficient to
stop time from running against the claimant. No reference was made to arbitration under the
1910 convention.
The new stipulation parallels the Hamburg Rules Article 20 (1) provisions and appears to be
indicative of a new trend in International Maritime Convention provisions.
Under the new provisions, a court would no longer, at least, by virtue of the Convention,
have any power to extend the time for bringing action except in respect of recourse actions for
indemnity.
For indemnity actions, no maximum period is stipulated. This is left to the law of the state
where proceedings are instimtecl.
(c) Maritime Claims in Jamaica — without claim specific limitation periods (and International
Convention provisions)
Supra.
Discussed, supra
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i General
In Jamaica, these are, in general, governed by the broadly applicable 6 year period of
limitation. On exception is in respect of maritime fatal accident claims, involving for example
ship passengers or crew. Here, as noted, the relevant period under The Fatal Accidents Act is
three years. Also, where the Government or other Public Authority is being sued the applicable
limitation period for commencing suit is one year (Public Authorities Protection Act, section 2).
ii Claims against carrier by sea in respect of Passengers Death, Personal Injury, Loss
of or Damage to Luggage.
Article 16 of the 1974 Athens Convention Relating to The Carriage of Passengers and Their
Luggage by Sea, which is captioned “Time-bar for actions” provides that:
“1 Any action for damages arising out of the death or personal injury to a passenger or
for the loss of or damage to luggage shall be time-barred after a period of two years.
2 The limitation period shall be calculated as follows:
(a) in the case of personal injury, from the date of disembarkation of the passenger,
(b) in the case of death occurring during carriage, from the date when the
passenger after disembarkation, from the date of death, provided that this period
Supra
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shall not exceed three year from the date of disembarkation;
(c) in the case of loss or damage to luggage, from the date of disembarkation or
from the date when disembarkation should have taken place which ever is later.
3 The law of the court seized of the case shall govern the grounds of suspension and
interruption of limitation periods, but in no case shall an action be brought after the
expiration of three years from the date of disembarkation of the passenger or from the
date when disembarkation should have taken place, whichever is later.
4 Notwithstanding paragraph 1,2 and 3 of this Article, the period of limitation may be
extended by a declaration of the carrier or by agreement of the parties after the cause
of action has arisen. The declaration or agreement shall be in writing.”
In determining when time begins to rum paragraph (b) makes a distinction between when
death occurs during carriage and when it occurs after carriage of the passenger. Under the
Jamaican Fatal Accident Act, the primary concern is the date of death.
Jamaica os not a party to the Athens Convention. However, in an appropriate case, a
Jamaican court could pay cognizance to the distinction.
The distinction seems well advised as whoever is bringing suit might mot be made aware of
the death of the deceased until after the time he should have disembarked.
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Clearly, if the distinction is followed the result wifi be to increase the period of limitation that
would be available to the claimant for death occurring during the voyage.
The absolute ceiling of three years for fatal accident claims, except for the distinction noted,
generally accords with present Jamaican law. However as regards personal injury and damage
to luggage claims, the 6 year period of limitation is available to the claimant.
Article 17 of the convention which deals with “competent jurisdiction “permits a claimant to
choose from a variety of courts to bring his action. If he chooses a Jamaican Court, one benefit
he will clearly have vis-a-vis the controls of State Parities to the Convention is a longer time
within which to bring his action in respect of personal injury and loss or damage to luggage.
On the other hand, if it is a fatal accident claim arising from the death of the passenger
during the voyage he may well find himself with less time to commence proceedings in the
Jamaican court as against that permitted by the courts of the State parties to the Convention.
It appears anyway that a “limitation period” Forum Shipping claimant might be very much
constrained in exercising his Article 17 options by the relatively few number of State Parties to
the Convention. At June 1, 1989, this amount stood at a mer 12 countries.
(iii) Claims for Oil Pollution Damage
Vide: IMO News, No. 2, 1989, p. 2.
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Article 8 of the International Convention on Civil Liability For Oil Pollution Damage (1969)
provides that:
‘Rights of compensation under this convention shall be extinguished unless
an action is brought thereunder within three years from the date when the
damage occurred. However, in no case shall an action be brought after six
years from the date of the incident which caused the damage. Where this
incident consists of a series of occurrences, the six years’ period shall run
from the date of the first such occurrence.”
Similarly, Article 6 of the International Convention on the Establishment of An International
Fund For Compensation For Oil Pollution Damage provides as follows:
“1. Rights to compensation under Article 4 or indemnification under Article 5 shall be
extinguished unless an action is brought thereunder or a notification has been made pursuant to
Article 7, paragraph 6 within three years from the date when the damage occurred. However, in
no case shall an action be brought after six years from the date of the incident which caused the
damage.
2. Notwithstanding paragraph 1, the right of the owner or his guarantor to seek
indemnification from the Fund pursuant to Article 5, paragraph 1 shall in no case be
extinguished before the expiry of a period of six month as from the date on which the owner or
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his guarantor acquired knowledge of the bringing of an action against him under the Liability
Convention.”
In considering these provisions, it is worth bearing in mind that the main aim of the
“Liability Convention” is to facilitate the recovery of compensation for oil pollution damage
against the responsible vessel.
The “Fund” Convention broadly aims to provide additional compensation in appropriate
cases where damage claims are not covered by the Liability Convention. Article 4 of this
convention provides for the obtaining of such compensation. Article 5 facilitates indemnification
of the owner and his guarantor in certain circumstances. Article 7 (6) requires notice to be given
to the Fund in respect of any proceedings for oil pollution damage brought in a contracting
state’s court under the Liability Convention.
For both Conventions, the basic limitation period is three year from the date when damage
occurred. Claimant in respect of latent or deterred oil pollution damage stand to benefit from the
longer but absolute 6 years ceiling for bringing claims. Although, this need not always be so as
in this case time runs from the incident and not the damage. Often, the full effects of oil
pollution damage take a long time to manifest themselves. The potential claimant may thus be
Vide: Gold, Edgar: Handbook on Marine Pollution, Gard, 1985, p. 114 - 115; Bates, John H.: United
Kingdom Pollution Law, 1985, chap. 4; Abecassis, D.W., Tarashow, R.L.: Oil Pollution from Ships, (2nd
Edn), 1985, Chap. 10.
Ibid.
293
prejudiced accordingly.
Jamaica is a party to neither the Liability nor the Fund Convention. The general six year
limitation period thus applies to oil pollution damage claims. However, Jamaica may wish to
benefit from certain Voluntary Compensation Schemes provided by the Oil Tndustry. For both
TAVOLOP and CRISTAL, a claimant is required to give notification within two years of the
incident.
(iv) Other Maritime Claims - applying six year limitation period.
These broadly include all other claims such as those for demurrage, freight under a
charterparty, loss or damage under a marine insurance policy and contribution to general
average. For these claims, there appears to be no International Convention provisions
specifying particular limitation periods.
3. Maritime Liens - their extinction by lapse of time
i. General consideration
Maritime liens, with limited exceptions, are not subject to any specific time for enforcement
Vide: Gold, op.cit., pp 47 - 48, 115 - 118.
Tanker Owners Voluntary Agreement Concerning Liability For Oil Pollution.
Contract Regarding A Supplement To Tanker Liability For Oil Pollution.
Vide: TOVALOP & CRISTAL: A guide to oil Spill Compensation, pp. 4, 8.
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under Jamaican Law. However, they may be lost through lack of reasonable diligence in
enforcing them.
Thomas notes that “with regard to the operation of the doctrine of laches in the Admiralty
Court, it would appear that a claim will rarely founder on the ground of mere delay. “Thus in
the Chieftan (1863) B&L. 212, a lapse of 10 months before a master instituted a suit for wages
was held to be no bar. In The Europa (1863) B& L 80, a delay of over three years ion
prosecuting a damage lien arising out of collision did not bar enforcement.
The case of The Wing Magnus, 1891 p. 223 affords a remarkable example. In that English
case a delay of eleven days before instituting proceedings in rem was held insufficient to
extinguish the claim, although during that period the offending ship had made frequent visits to
port in the United Kingdom.
The applicable principle appears to be that where there is undue delay in presenting a claim
the Court looks not only to the period of time which has elapsed, but to the total circumstances
as they touch upon the interests of justice or of the parties involved, the ultimate consideration
being “... the balance of justice or injustice in affording or refusing relief.”
Relevant circumstances include the loss of witnesses or evidence and the rights of third
parties. Thus in the Europa, it is noted that “A maritime lien follows the ship into whosoever
Thomas, Maritime Liens, op.cit., para 502; Pineus, op.cit. p. 70.
Thomas, op.cit., para 502.
thid, para 502
Re Sharpe (1892) I Ch. 154, per Lindley 3. at p. 168.
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hands she may pass, and may be enforced after a considerable lapse of time; but to effect the
rights of third persons, reasonable diligence in its enforcement must be used, otherwise the lien
may be lost.”
In the same case it is stated that “Reasonable diligence means not the doing of everything
possible but that which, having regard to all the circumstances, including consideration of
expense and difficulty, can be reasonably required.”
The doctrine of laches prevail except in cases where there are specified limitation periods as
in respect of salvage and collision damage liens. Thomas opines that where there exists a
statutory time limitation, there can be no successful challenge for delay within the specified
period, for the statutory period of time represents “... the period during which the law permits
him to delay, without losing his right.”
If this is so then it seems to the writer that this rules out the possibility of a situation
occurring where a claim secured by a maritime lien survives the loss of that lien. However, such
a possibility, although considered “unlikely” has been put forward in Pineus: Time-Barred
Actions.
The example given is where a lien has been lost through lach of reasonable diligence ‘as
(1863)B &L89.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
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may be the case if the vessel is allowed to change ownership to the plaintiffs knowledge
without the plaintiff attempting to exercise the lien, the plaintiff would still have his claim until
the expiry of the limitation period.
It is respectfully submitted that this latter view ought to be preferred to that of Thomas. The
fact is that maritime claims can and do exist without accompanying maritime liens.
A maritime lien is a privilege against particular maritime property. Its retention is subject to
certain rules. These rules are quite distinguishable from those relating to preservation of the
right of action on the claim by instituting proceedings within a specified limitation period.
While application of one set of rules may bring into consideration the other set, each set is
not inextricably bound up with the other. Thus, it seems to the writer, that if a court in applying
the rules relating to the extinction of maritime liens resulting from lapse of time to a particular
case, fmd that it is an appropriate case for extinction of the lien, then it may well determine that
the “other rules” are only part of the matrix of factors relevant to arriving at such a finding.
Hence, it is the writers respectful submission that it seems possible for an underlying
maritime lien to be extinguished within the limitation period leaving the claim it accompanied
otherwise intact.
Op. cit., at p. 72.
Vide: Tetley, William: Maritime Liens and Claims, International Shipping Publications, Montreal, 1985, at
p. 40 where he defines a maritime lien as “a privilege against property (a ship) which attaches and gains
priority without any court action or any deed or any registration “, cited in IMO and UNCTAD consultations:
vide; LEG 55/4/1, IMO, consideration of work in respect of Maritime Liens and Mortages and Related
Subjects; Also vide supra.
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ii International Convention Provisions
Both existing conventions on Maritime Liens and Mortgages have failed to gain broad
international acceptance. Preparatory work on a new convention on the subject under the
auspices of IMO and UNCTAD is now at a very advanced stage.
Both of the existing Conventions contain provisions relating to the extinction of Maritime
Liens. Article 9 of the 1926 Convention has very detailed stipulations but like its much briefer,
1967 Counterpart, per Article 8, it prescribes a period of one year for the extinction of specified
liens subject to certain qualifications.
Article 8 of the new draft Convention on Maritime Liens and Mortgages also generally
prescribes a one year period for the extinction of the lien.
Section 74 of the Jamaica Shipping Bill, 1989 is based on and worded similar to that of
Article 8 of the draft Convention in its present form.
Section 74 provides (with the marginal note: ‘Limitation Period”), as follows:
1 The maritime liens relating to a ship set out in section 68 shall be
extinguished after a period of one year from the time when the claims
The International Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules of Law Relating to Maritime Liens and
Mortgages 1926. The International Convetion for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to Maritime
Liens and Mortgages, 1967.
The Joint Intergovernmental Group of Experts on Maritime Liens and Mortgages ad Related Subjects had its
fifth session 11-20, December 1988 and are finalizing work on Draft Articles for a new Convention on
Maritime Liens and Mortgages, vide: LEG/MLM/19 (IMO Report).
Vide LEGIMLMJ19 (IMO Report).
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secured thereby arose unless, prior to the expiry of such period, the ship has
been arrested and the arrest has led to a forced sale pursuant to the
provisions of the rules of court or any other law for the time being in force
relating to the sale of property in admiralty proceedings.
2 The one year period referred to in subsection (1) shall not be subject to
interruption or suspension except that time shall not run during the period the
lien holder is legally prevented from arresting the vessel.”
This provision was apparently put into the Jamaican Bill in anticipation of Jamaican
eventually becoming a party to the fmalized convention.
However at the present time there are a number of doubts and misgivings surrounding the
present draft Article 8.
Chief among these is the concern about the period of one year was too short and that it
should be extended to two years. Alternatively, a compromise proposal between the latter and
the present draft proposal could be to allow maritime liens recorded at the end of one year to
continue their validity for another year.
These various positions have been canvassed at the Sessional Group meetings of the Joint
Inter Governmental Group of Experts on Maritime Liens on December 20, 1988. Jamaica was
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not represented at this meeting.
The majority view is that “... the one-year period was sufficient since maritime liens were
hidden charges and should not remain valid for a period longer than one year”
However special problems may arise in respect of crew wages. Here the International
Confederation of Free Trade Unions have proposed that special consideration be given to
extending the period of validity of maritime liens to two years, at least, in case of crew wages
since the crew members often stayed on board ship for a period longer that one year during
which time they were not paid.”
Similarly, the International Labour Organization, supporting the proposal has noted that in
the case of social insurance contributions, the problem was even more serious, as “. . .often the
crew members discovered much later that social insurance contributions had not been paid.”
It seems that the best solution could be to have a generally applicable period of one year but
with exceptions for crew claims in which case the period would be two years. Such a
compromise solution would be in Jamaica’s best interest where more and more seafarers are
being produced. While ignorance of the law is no excuse, seafarers are likely to be quite
susceptible to the harsher consequences of this maxim as regards limitation periods.
Ibid., p 24.
Ibid.
Ibid., p 25.
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Thus, bearing in mind this fact as it relates to Jamaica and the observations of the
International Labour Representatives, special consideration should be given to giving seafarers
ample opportunity to pursue their legal claims. Except for this qualification, the present majority
view should be supported. As regards the drafting of Section 74 itself, it seems the marginal
note: “limitation of Action “is inappropriate. The note should be “extinction of maritime liens by
lapse of time”. Such a note would not only be identical to the present caption of the relevant
Article 8 of the draft convention, but would more accurately indicate the intent and contents of
that Article as contained in Section 74. Moreover, as discussed above, the issue of extinction of
maritime liens by lapse of time although related is quite distinguishable from considerations
relating to limitation factions, stricto senso.
Maritime Arbitration Proceedings and Time-Bars
Maritime Arbitrations are founded on agreement between the parties as to how disputes
between them are to be resolved. Accordingly <jamaican law does not ipso facto prescribe any
specific time period for commencing arbitration proceedings. Any such requirement is provided
by the arbitration agreement.
Thomas notes that it is not open to the court to “...dismiss a claim in arbitration or grant an
Thomas, D. Rhiclian: The legal remedies for dilatoriness in the pre-hearing arbitral procedure, 1983,
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injunction to restrain an arbitral proceeding that had it been an action at law the court would have
dismissed the claim for want of prosecution.”
He notes further that “...a respondent in an arbitration enjoys no right as against the claimant
expeditiously advanced or that prejudicial delay would be avoided. ..“
The arbitrator himself has at common law no inherent power to dismiss a claim for want of
prosecution (Crawford v. A.E.A. Prowting Ltd.,1973, 1Q.B.1; Bremer Vulkan Schiffinban
und Machine fabriko v. South India Shipping Corp, 1981 A.C. 909).
It thus appears that a very advisable stipulation in any Agreement to submit to Arbitration is
one specifying the time within which Arbitration proceedings are to be brought and the attendant
consequences for failure to do so.
hence, Arbitration Agreements often specify that a particular step must be started within a
prescribed period of time with failure to do so operating as a bar to subsequent prosecution of
the claim concerned.
The Centrocon arbitration clause provides a typical example.It states in part:
“Any claim must be made in writing and claimant’s Arbitrator appointed within twelve
months of final discharge and where this provision is not complied with, the claim shall be
L.M.C.Q. 315.
Ibid., at p 321.
Ibid.
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deemed to be waived and absolutely barred.”
Such “time and bar’ arbitration agreements operate independently of statutory time limits.
Thomas notes that “In effect, by substituting an alternative period of time to that specified by
statute, such agreements operate as a contractual displacement of the otherwise operative time
limits.”
These “time and bar” clauses are valid and not deemed to be contrary to public policy.
(Atlantic v. Drefus, 1922, 2A.C. 250). However they can give rise to harshly inequitable
consequences for a potential claimant particularly where the time period stipulated is rather
short. A default extinguishes the claim (in respect of both right and remedy), leaving nothing
capable of being pursued either in arbitration or a court of law.
Maritime Arbitrations in Jamaica are governed by The Arbitration Act, 1900. This Act does
not contain any special provision empowering the court to take ameliorative action when faced
with an unconscionable but valid “time and bar” clause. It is probable that the court may well
consider itself unhappily fettered by the manacles of the position at common law. This
permissive common law approach is itself clearly buttressed by the sanctity of contract
principle.
Thomas, D. Rhidian: Commercial Arbitration: Power of court to extend time for commencing arbitration
proceedings, 1981, L.M.C.L.Q.529.
Ibid.
Term used by Thomas, Ibid. to indicate that default bars the claim absolutuley, as compared with a “time
stipulation simpliciter” which ‘leaves open the possibility of legal proceedings subject to the court’s
discretion to stay”: Ibid., p 530.
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It therefore appears that appropriate amendment to the Jamaican Arbitration Act to remove
these shackles. Here, it is worth noting the provision of Section 27 of the United Kingdom’s
Arbitration Act 1950, of which there is no equivalent in Jamaican Arbitration Legislation.
Section 27 provides that:
“Where the terms of an agreement to refer future disputes to arbitration provide that any
claims to which the agreement applies shall be barred unless notice to appoint an arbitrator is
given or an arbitrator is appointed or some other step to commence arbitration proceedings is
taken within a time fixed by the agreement, and a dispute arises to which the agreement applies
the High Court, if it is of opinion that in the circumstances of the case undue hardship would
otherwise be caused, and notwithstanding that the time so fixed has expired, may, on such term
if any, as the justice of the case may require, but without prejudice to the provisions of any
enactment limiting the time for commencement of arbitration proceedings extend the time for
such period as it thinks proper.
By this provision the English Court is given a discretionary jurisdiction to extend the time
for commencing an arbitration proceeding in circumstances where the applicant would otherwise
suffer undue hardship and injustice. A similar provision in Jamaican Arbitration legislation
would go a far way in correcting the pregnant potential for injustice and hardship provided by
the existing position at common law.
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Salmon L.J., in the case Liberian Shipping Corp. v. A. King & Sons, Ltd: the Pegasus
(1967) 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 302,309, commented on the state of English law as regard “time and
bar” clauses, prior to the enactment of Section 27. These comments which point appositely to
the present state of Jamaican law were as follows:
“Prior to this enactment.. .the commercial community.. .and. . .those who practiced and
administered commercial law.. .were shackled by. . .this type of arbitration clause. It put it out of
the power of the Court to grant any relief to a claimant who had allowed perhaps a day or two to
run beyond the period. . . specified in the clause, even although the delay could have caused no
conceivable harm to the other side.. . .The other party, who had not been guilty of a deliberate
breach of contract, was relieved from liability to pay compensation for the heavy loss which he
had caused... .It was no doubt to remedy this hardship and injustice that the legislature
intervened to alter the law.”
It seems all the more desirable to legislatively empower the courts to intervene when it is
remembered as noted in the United Kingdom’s 1927 Machinnon Report on the Law of
ARbitration that ...“ the vast majority of submissions to arbitration are contained in the printed
arbitration clause in printed form of contract, which cannot be carefully examined in the
transaction of business, and alteration of which it would be difficult for most people to
Cmd. 2817, quoted in Thomas, op. cit., p 532.
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secure. .
In introducing an amendment to the Jamaican Act, it would be helpful to enact guidelines as
to how the court’s discretion to extend time or not should be exercised. Such guidelines are
absent from the United Kingdom’s 1950 Act. However, English Case Law provide some
pointers.
In the Jocelyne, (1977) 2 Lloyds Rep. Ri at p. 129, Brandon, J. (as he then was)
sunimarised some of the relevant criteria to be applied in relation to Section 27 of the United
Kingdom Act. He stated as follows:
“In deciding whether to extend time or not the Court should look at all the relevant
circumstances of the particular case. In particular the following matters should be considered:
(a) the length of the delay;”
(b) the amount at stake;
(c) whether the delay was due to the fault of the claimant or to circumstances outside his
control;
(d) if it was due to the fault of the claimant, the degree of such fault;
(e) whether the claimant was misled by the other party;
(f) whether the other party has been prejudiced by the delay, and if so, the degree of
Paragrafip 33 of The Report, as quoted, Ibid.
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such prejudice.’
Other criteria have been identified in other English cases. These include the following
considerations:
(g) the strength of the claim of the applicant. (Sanko Steamship Co., Ltd v. Tradax
Export S.A. (1979) 2 Lloyds Rep. 273)
(h) whether apart from Section 27, there is a criteria structured into the arbitration
process by which the time stipulation may be extended: (Ets Soules & Cie v.
International Trade Development Co. Lt.(1979), 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 122, Timmerman’s
Graan - En Maalhandel En Maalderij B.V. v. Sachs (1980) 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 194.)
(i) would the applicant suffer personal liability if and so far as the claim is not allowed to
proceed: (Timmerman’s Graan - En Maalhandel En Maalderij B.V. v. Sachs (1980) 1
Lloyd’s Re. 194)
(j) was the time stipulation part of an international code for promoting uniformity: (Nea
Agrex S.A. v. Baltic Shippin Co. Ltd. and Intershipping Charter Co. The Agios
Lazaras (1976) 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 47 (CA.) ; and
(k) considerations emanating from and prevailing within the particular trade in which the
Noted in Thomas, Ibid, p 539.
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dispute arises: (Timmerman’s Coraan - En Maalhandel En Maalderij B.V. v. Sachs
(1980) 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 194).
It is submitted that Jamaica should make the necessary amendments paying cognizance to
these guidelines.
While in general a Jamaican Court may feel powerless to deal effectively with a seemingly
too short time period stipulation in a time and bar arbitration clause, this ought not to be the case
where it is dealing with a case within the ambit of the Carriage of Goods Act, 1889 which
enacted the Hague Rules.
The problem may arise if the time limit in the charter-party arbitration clause is shorter than
the one year limit provided for in the Hague Rules where they govern the contract between the
parties.
Application of a shorter time limit would violate Article 3 (8) of the Hague Rules because it
would lessen the carrier’s liability. Hence such a time and bar clause ought properly to be
treated as void and repugnant to the Hague Rules provisions contained in the Carriage of Goods
Act.
The Limitation in Jamaican Conflict Laws
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Under Jamaican Law, following the traditional English position, statutory rules on limitation
of action are classified as procedural rather than substantive, on the ground that they only bar
the remedy and do not extinguish the right.
Accordingly for purposes of Jamaican private international law, time limitation is governed
by the lex fori. No foreign time bat will therefore be recognized even if that is labelled as
substantive by the foreign law.
As a consequence, if an action is brought in a Jamaican Court to enforce an obligation
arising from a contract governed by foreign la, a Jamaican Court following the English common
law position, is obliged to apply the Jamaican Statute of Limitation and not that of the proper
law of the contract.
Thus, if the Jamaican Limitation period has expired, it may be obliged to dismiss the action,
even if the foreign period had not expired. Conversely the court would be obliged to permit the
action if brought within the Jamaican period but after expiry of the foreign period.
This approach stands in sharp contrast to that taken by continental European, which
characterize time bars as substantive. Further, the traditional English approach has now been
abrogated with the enactment in England of The Foreign Limitation Periods Act, 1984 (U.K.),
Vide: Stone, P.A.: Time Limitation in the English Conflict of Laws, 1980 L.M.C.L.Q., 497.
The internal law of the country where the court is situated.
Jackson, op. cit., p 101.
Stone, op. cit., p 497.
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which came into force on October 1, 1985.
Thus in England, the basic rule now is that time limitation is treated as a substantive question
and thus governed by the law which governs other aspects of the parties substantive rights.
The result is that a claim will be dismissed in England, if it is time barred by the lex causae,
although not by English internal law, and will be upheld if it is timely under the lex causae, even
if it id time barred under English internal law.
Stone notes that “the rule that procedure is governed by the lex fori has the legitimate
purpose of simplifying the conduct of the proceedings and enabling them to be conducted in a
manner with which the court is familiar and comfortable. It is not designed to enable the forum
to give effect to its views, as to the appropriate outcome of the dispute.
He notes further that “... time limitation cannot justifiable be characterized as a matter of
procedure: the relevant limitation rule will often be decisive as to the outcome of the case; there
will seldom be any particular difficulty in applying a foreign limitation rule; and the question
does not relate to the manner of conducting the proceedings.”
Added to these very cogent reasons for departure from the traditional English position is the
crucial question is the reasonable expectation of the parties.
Dicey and Morris observe that “The main justification for the conflict of laws is that it
The law applicable to the case.
Thid., p 500.
Ibid.
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implements of reasonable and legitimate expectations to a transaction or an occurrence.”
Thus where for instance, parties enter into a maritime contract for which the proper law is
that of country X which provides for a limitation period of say three years, then it is reasonable
to expect that if no action is commenced in accordance with the three year stipulation, that is the
end of matter or at least no subsequentation will be entertained.
However, if the matter ends up in a Jamaican Court where the applicable limitation period is,
say six years, then the Jamaican Court, following the traditional English position, would be
obliged to entertain the suit. It would then go on to apply the “substantive” law of country X to
the case.
Such a scenario manifestly wreaks injustice. Consideration should therefore be given to
reforming the law along the lines long taken in Continental European law and now belatedly
followed by England.
Dicey and Morris on The Conflict of Laws, 10th Ed., 1980.
Ibid., p 5.
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CONCLUDING COMMENTS
Undoubtedly, a crucial preliminary consideration for any maritime claimant (and indeed for
all concerned, whether in negotiations or otherwise about a claim) is how much time the
claimant has left to initiate court or arbitration proceedings.
Exploration of the relevant Jamaican Law reveals an absence of Jamaican or West Indian
cases or limitation of Maritime Actions. It is therefore likely that Jamaican Courts will resort to
English case authorities.
However, these authorities are not without their problems. Indeed, some have been much
criticized by UNCTAD, an organization in which Jamaica is represented. Such criticisms should
not escape the attention of Jamaican Courts.
Here, it is worth bearing in mind that the perspectives of analysis adopted by UNCTAD are
likely to more favourable to “cargo interests” countries like Jamaica, than those which gave rise
to conventions such as the Hague Rules adopted when Jamaica was a British colony by a few
mainly ship owning countries who naturally sought to legislate in accordance with their rested
interests.
Overall, in the development of Jamaican jurisprudence and legislation in this area of the law,
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due regard should thus be had to the deliberations of international organizations such as
UNCTAD and IMO on subjects such as the Carriage of Goods by Sea and Maritime Liens.
This should be done not only to gain a different and wider perspective than that of the
English but to be exposed to the direction of international thinking, an appreciation of which is
vital in the international maritime law sphere. These deliberations offer readily accessible,
inexpensive and comprehensive information in a relative non-voluminous form by an array of
international experts.
Similarly, cases from other common law jurisdictions reveal different approaches which
should aid judical analysis.
Also, the approaches of civil law counties in this area can be very instructive. For instance,
the treatment of Continental European law of limitation of actions as a “substantive” rather than
“procedural” matter commends itself.
Here it has been shown that the United Kingdom itself has now albeit belatedly taken steps
to rid itself of what, in the writer’s humble view, was a blot on its jurisprudence.
Sadly, Jamaican law is left with this legacy. A new approach is therefore strongly urged.
A new Limitation of Actions Act is required to break new ground and consolidate certain
existing laws. There should be clear enumeration of maritime and other claims, specifying their
limitation periods as well as the overall applicable principles. Provision should be made in this
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regards for Jamaican courts to deal with unconscionable time stipulations in Arbitration “time
and bar” clauses.
The present incorporation of the draft Article on extinction of maritime lien by lapse of time
points to an attempt to keep Jamaica’s law abreast of the latest developments. While this is
commendable, steps should be taken to ensure, as far as possible, Jamaica’s participation in the
decision making process as regards the draft Article itself and others. Otherwise, Jamaica might
be “modernizing” but not in line with its best interests. For instance, as shown, our seafarers
may be unduly prejudiced by a blanket one year period for the extinction of maritime liens.
As Jamaica is only a party to the Hague Rules which it has enacted, its limitation of action
provisions in this area, suffer from a number of the deficiencies of these Rules. It is unable to
benefit from the improvements afforded by the Hague-Visby amendments.
The Limitation of Actions and related provisions of the Hamburg Rules, which although not
yet in force, are very instructive as they arguably point in the direction in which the international
maritime community is moving. They provide a useful part jurisprudential policy framework for
judicial analysis and legislative activity. Further, to the extent that in some respects they purport
to only clarify certain ambiguous provisions of the Hague Rules they are to some extent
indicative of agreement on preferred interpretations existing Hague Rules provisions.
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IThese Hamburg Rules Limitation of Actions and related provisions appear to offer a more
just and equitable balancing of the risks between cargo and carrier interests as compared to the
Hague or Hague-Visby Rules. Cargo Interests are provided with more reasonable time to
negotiate with carriers before commencing proceedings to protect their claim. This itself accords
with certain established commercial shipping practice.
As regards collision claims, it appears that Jamaica should consider establishing Rules of
Court as required by the existing convention, along the lines of its established principles for writ
renewal.
The Maritime Conventions Act (U.K.) 1911, does not appear in the Volumes of Laws of
Jamaica. This means that resort has to be had to English literature to locate the Act. Jamaica is a
party to the existing Collision and Salvage Conventions, in its own right. It should reenact these
conventions into Jamaican law so that the relevant legislation appears in our statute books.
In the case of salvage claims, the new Salvage Convention has done away with the need for
special Rules of Court as regards extension of time. This convention with its emphasis on
encouraging operations to stem oil pollution, should prima facie, be favourably viewed by
Jamaica.
Overall, there is a need to carefully look at International Conventions, en toto, to determine
their desirability. However even if there is a decision not to become a party to a convention, it is
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apparent that guidance for judicial and legislative purposes can be obtained from an examination
of its limitation of action and related provisions. Moreover, uniformity as regards such
provision are very desirable.
The modernization of Jamaican law relating to the limitation of maritime actions in
accordance with widely accepted international provisions would enhance not only the contents
of its law provisions but also Jamaica’s appeal as a forum.
No analysis has been attempted of provisions of conventions other than those impinging on
the subject of this chapter, hence no inferences are offered about these Conventions on a whole.
Nevertheless, it is clear that in the case of the Carriage of Goods by Sea, the limitation of
actions provisions of the Hague Rules especially as they have been interpreted by the English
Courts to be revised.
Here, one caveat worth emphasising is that time limitation provisions of maritime
conventions constitute a relatively small albeit very important component of these conventions.
Hence, consideration of a Convention, especially if seen as a package of compromises require
meticulous cost-benefit analysis.
It has been shown that analysis of these convention provisions additionally serve the useful
purpose of seeing where Jamaican law stands as regards certain internationally agreed time
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1limitation stipulations.
Further, even where there are no International Conventions as is the case with TOVALOP
and CRISTAL, it is important to know the time constraints within which a Jamaican maritime
claimant operates. It therefore seems safe to conclude, that in any event from the perspective of
practice, time will ultimately be of the essence.
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Chapter 7
CONCLUSION
A Variety of subject matters falling under the broad umbrella of preliminary legal issues
have been examined. In each of the preceding chapters dealing with the various preliminary
legal issues an attempt has been made in each case to indicate the main inferences to be drawn
from the analysis. It is not the writer’s intention to simply regurgitate them here.
Certain conclusions may be advanced from the study as a whole. The primary
conclusion is that preliminary legal issues pertaining to maritime claims enforcement in Jamaica
definitely have an international dimension worth considering when such issues are being dealt
with.
Examination of all of the major sub-areas spanned by the thesis support such an
inference.
This is manifestly the case as regards issues pertaining to ship arrest and the scope of the
Jamaican Admiralty Jurisdiction where essential local rules clearly have their roots in
international Convention stipulations.
The study supports the basic inference that muncipal maritime Jurisdiction and Choice of
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Law issues ultimately operate within international legal parameters and its useful to see them in
this light, in the case of Time Limitation of Maritime Actions, where, prime facie, it seems less
probable that international rules may have an influence, the study shows that as regards a
number of particular Maritime claims the influence is direct and very significant.
The basic reason for this recurring international and local legal nexus, appears to be
simply the international character of maritime matters. As a consequence, there is increasingly
the striving for international uniformity, certainty and justice in maritime matters generally.
Thus, more and more, international maritime rules are extending their frontiers into the
domain of what was traditionally perceived as the preserve of municipal law rules.
For instance, IMO has traditionally been preoccupied with safety and anti-marine
pollution substantive safety regulations. However, in recent years, it has been increasingly
concerned with civil liability and related jurisdictional issues as these pertain to, for example,
oil pollution.
UNCTA1) which has been traditionally preoccupied in the legal sphere with broad issues
of economic regulation of shipping, is now with IMO jointly focusing on issues of maritime
liens and ship arrest.
Also UNCTAD by way of its more recent conventions on the carriage of goods by sea
320
and multimodal transport has been paying special attention in these Conventions to preliminary
legal issues. This, the study shows reflects a growing trend in international maritime
stipulatuions. Indeed, this development has been prompted by the failure of many of the past
conventions to include peovisions on these preliminary legal issues and to make them
mandatory for the municipal law of Contracting State parties. Such a failure it has been shown
has at times to frustrated the objectives of the substantive Rules of the relevant Conventions.
The net result of this new trend is more direct consequences for state partiest domestic
procedural and private international law rules.
In the case of Jamaica, this is exemplified by the incorporation of provisions of the Draft
Articles for a new Convention on Maritime Liens and Mortgages in its new Shipping Bill.
Whenever both sets of previsions move beyond the draft stage into being respectively,
international and Jamaican law, then the nexus will entail clearer consequences for law practice
in Jamaica. The international dimension, to such issues will then be more readily discernible.
However, on the whole, the trend is yet to have full impact on Jamaican law.
More directly responsible for the link between the preliminary issues and international
stipulations in the Jamaican Context is the mechanism of extended U.K. legislation.
This is what has been largely responsible for the appearance in Jamaica of international
stipulations seemingly clothed only in local procedural garb.
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The process of extended legislation has brought with it international convention
stipulations which have helped to keep Jamaican maritime procedural and private international
law rules in keeping with existing international stipulations. However, they have also brought
with them particular problems of statutory interpretation and various deficiencies. Where they
have required or contemplated further enactment, these have not been promnigated.
Overall, it is safe to conclude that the area of the law examined by this study has been
ignored by the legislators. The reasons for this include the apparent low priority accorded the
development of rules embracing these preliminary issues and a lack of expertise for both
identifying and effecting needed changes.
Many areas of Jamaican law have been identified as needing changes or particular
approaches in seeking solutions to problems. At times, important national interests are
hampered by the local maritime and private international law rules. Thus, a basic conclusion is
that significant changes are needed to improve the efficacy and efficiency of the relevant local
laws.
The manifest international dimension to these preliminary issues have highlighted the
need for Jamaica to strive to participate fully in the shaping of the narrower circumscribed
maritime conventions dealing with such issues.
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The study supports the inference that International Maritime Convention provisions
provide valuable aids to judicial and legislative activity.
Attempts to ascertain what the law is on particular issues is at times made more difficult
by the very limited amount of Jamaican cases impinging on the subject area. Also compounding
this difficulty is the process of extended legislation, and various colonial legacies.
On the whole however, the legal position in Jamaica on the various issues can generally
be stated with a significant degree of certainty.
Also, it may well be that the study, mainly, by its express incorporation of the
International dimension as well as its emphasis on the protection of national interests will
provide at least an additional lens with which to view the preliminary issues discussed.
The importance of the preliminary legal issues can hardly be doubted. Part of the future
challenge is to ensure that the relevant rules are updated and improved to make certain their
relevance to national interests as well as their overall efficacy and efficiency. A further and vital
challenge is to simultaneously pay due cognizance to the international dimension involved.
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TABLE OF INTERNATIONAL CONVENTIONS
(A) Brussels International Maritime Law Conventions
1 International Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules of Law Relating
to Collision Between Vessels.
2 International Convention for the Unification of certain Rules of Law
Relating to Assistance and Salvage at Sea.
3 International Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules of Law
Relating to Bills
of Lading.
4 Protocol to amend the International Convention for the Unification of
Certain Rules
of Law Relating to Bills of Lading.
.5 International Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules If Law
Relating to Maritime Liens and Mortgages.
6 International Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules of Law
Relating to Immunity of State-owned Ships.
7 International Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules of Law
Relating to Arrest of Sea-going Ships.
8 International Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules of Law
Relation to Civil Jurisdiction in Matters of Collision.
9 International Convention Relatiing to the Limitation of the Liability of
Owners of Sea-going Ships.
10 International Convention Relation to the Liability lf Operators of Necular
Ships.
11 International Conventin for the Unification of Certain Rules of Law
Relating to Maritime Liens and Mortgages.
(B) ILO Maritime Conventions
12 Convention fixing the Minimum Age for Admission of Children to
Employment at
Sea (Convention 7 of 1920)
13 Convention concerning Unemployment Indemnity in case of Loss or
Foundering of
the Ship (Convention 8 of 1920)
14 Comvention for Establishing Facilities for Finding Employment for
Seaman (Convention 9 of 1920)
15 Comvention fixing the Minimum Age for the Admission of Young Persons
to Employmeent as Trimmers or Stokers (Convention 15 of 1921)
16 Convention concerning the Compulsory Medical Examination fof Children
and Young Persons Emplooyed at Sea (Convention 6of 1921)
17 Convention concerning Seamen’s Articles of Agreement (Convention 22 of
1926)
18 Convention fixing the Minimum Age for the Admission of Children to
Employment
at Sea (Convention 58 of 1936)
(C) IMO Conventions
1 International Convention on Civil Liability for Pollution Damage, 1969
2 Protocol on the International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution
Damage, 1969.
3 Protocol of 1984 to amend the International Convention on Civil Liability
for Oil Pollution Damage, 1969
4 International Convention on the Establishment of an International Fund for
Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage 1971
5 1976 Protocol to the International Convention of the Establishment of an
International Fund for Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage 1971
6 Protocol of 1984 to amend the International Convention on the
Establishment of an
International Fund for Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage, 1971
7 Athens Convention Relating to the Carriage of Passengers and their
Luggage by Sea
1
1974
8 Protocol to the Athens Convention Relating to the Carriage of Passengers
and their Luggage by Sea 1974
9 Convention on Limitations of Liability for Maritime Claims 1976
(D) UNCTAD Conventions related to Maritime Matters
1 Convention on a Code of Conduct for Liner Conferences, 1974
2 United Nations Convention in the carriage of Goods by Sea, Hamburg,
1978
3 United Nations Convention on International Multimodal Transport of
Goods, 1980
4 United Notions Convention on Conditions for the Registration of Ships,
1986
(E) U.N. Conventions on the Law of the Sea.
Geneva Convention on Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone, 1958
Geneva Convention on the High Seas, 1958
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 1982
APPENDIX 1
JAMAICA - A skeletal profile
Part A: General
Name etymon: XAYMACA (gland of wood and water)
Caribbean Sea 18’ N, 77 W
(See appendix)
Population: 2.4 million
*Jea. 4,243.6 . mIs (10,990.98 sq km)
Language: English
Government: Civil-parliamentary democracy
Climate: Tropical
Capital: Kingston
Recorded History : Original Inhabitants - Arawaks (650-1492),
Columbus/Spanish arrival: 1492; English Colony: 1655-1962
Independance: August 6, 1962
*Economy: Tourism, Bauxite (main foreign exchange earners). Also,
Agriculture, Light Manufacturing, Unemployment Rate
(1986) :22.3%; Inflation Rate (1986) :14.7%; Growth Rate
(1986) : 2.1% ; G.D.P. (1986) : U.S. 2.5 Billion.
Organization
Membership: Caribbean Common Market (CARICOM), Organization of
American States (O.A.S.), African, Caribbean and Pacific
Group (A.C.P.); The Common wealth: The United Nations
(U.N.).
*Source: Statistical Yearbook ofJamaica. 1987, Statistical Institute of
Jamaica.
Part B: Maritime Supplementary Data
1. Jamaica. Coastal, Shelf and EEZ Characteristics:
(a) Coastal length: 280 nautical miles
(b) shelf area to 200 meters depth: 11,700 square nautical miles
(c) EEZ area to 200 nautical miles: 86,800 square nautical miles
Source: Attard, David: The Exclusive Economic Zone in International Law,
Clarendon Press, thford, 1987, p. xxxii.
(Attard indicates that this data is itself based on “information supplied by the U.S.
Geographer, see eg., Limits no.36 (4th Rev.). The EEZ figures are generally based on
the equidistant boundary and a normal baseline”.
He also notes in reference to the data that limitations may prevent states from
claiming a full 200 mile EEZ. Overall, it appears that the figure given in respect of the
EEZ indicated the area the zone would have if Jamaica was able to claim all areas
adjacent to it to a distance of 200 miles from the relevant baselines. However, as
Jamaica is a Carib-locked country, the figure stated for the EEZ is larger than it will be
eventually when Jamaica actuaily declares an EEZ.
2. Registered
Tonnage: 7,473 GRT (as at July 1, 1985 per Annex 3, U.N. C
Convention on Conditions for Registration
of Ships)
3. Maritime
Training: Jamaica Maritime Training Institute (Facility for
training Caribbean Master Mariners, Chief Engineers
and other sea going personnel, established, 1980)
4. Maritime
Administration: centered in work of Marine Division of
Ministry of Public Utilities but involving
a number of other Government Ministries
and Departments. (see Appendix 2)
5. Maritime Sector
APPENDIX 3
JAMAICAN MARITIME LEGISLATION (By subject matter)*
Carriage of Goods By Sea
Carriage of Goods Act, 1889
Bills of Lading Act, 1872
Economic Regulations
Cargo Preferences Act, 1979
Shipping (Incentives) Act 1979
West Indies Shipping Corporation Act
HARBOUR / PORTS
Harbour Fees Act 1927
Harbour Lights and Lighthouse Act
Harbours Act, 1874
Leyland Wharf Pier Law
Montigo Bay Pier (Enabling) Law
Pilotage Act, 1975
Port Authority Act, 1972
Port -authority Declaration of Ports (Validation) Act
Port Authority (Superannuation Scheme)(Validation) Act
Port Workers (Superannuation Fund) Act
Shipping Master’s Fee’s Law
Wharfage Act, 1895
MARINE RESOURCES
Beach Control Act, 1956
Fishing Industry Act, 1976
Rio Cobre Canal Law
River Rafting Act, 1970
MARITIME ADMINISTRATION
Marine Board Act, 1903
MARITIME COMMUNICATIONS
Merchant Shipping (Wireless Telegraphy) Act, 1926
International Ocean Telegraph Company’s Law
MARThE INSURANCE
Marine Insurance Act, 1973
PRIZE GOODS
Prize Goods Law
SEAFARERS
Seafarers (Certification) Act, 1986
Seamen (Repatriation) Act
Seamen’s Wages (Recovery of) Law
TERRITORIAL JURISDICTION
Morant and Pedro Cays Act, 1907
Territorial Sea Act, 1971
WRECK AND SALVAGE
Wrack and Salvage Law, 1875
*Opy Jamaican enactments dealing essentially or at least substantially with maritime
related matters are included.
IAPPENDIX 4
List of International Maritime Conventions to which Jamaica is a Party.
A:IMO CONVENTIONS
1. Convention on the International Maritime Organization
2. International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, 1974
3. Convention on the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea, 1972
4. International Convention on Loadlines, 1966 (as amended in 1971, 1975 and 1979)
5. International Convention for Safe Containers, 1972
6. International Convention on Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping
for Seafarers, 1978
7. International Convention on Maritime Search and Rescue, 1979
B: 1LO CONVENTIONS
8. Convention fixing the minimum age for admission of Children to employment at
sea, 1920 (1LO Convention #7)
9. Convention fixing the minimum age for the admission of young persons to
employment as trimmers or stokers, 1920 (ILO CONVENTION #15)
10. Convention fixing the minimum age for the admission of children to employment at
sea (revised 1936) (ILO Convention #58)
11. Convention concerning unemployment indemnity in case of loss or foundering of
the ship, 1920 (1LO Convention #8)
12. Convention concerning the compulsory medical examination of children and young
persons at sea, 1921 (ILO Convention #16)
UN CONVENTIONS
13. Geneva Convention on Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone, 1958
14. Geneva Convention on the High Seas, 1958
15. Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources of the High
Seas, 1958
16. Convention on the Continental Shelf, 1958
17. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 1982
18. Convention on a Code of Conduct for Liner Conferences,
C: CMI-BRUSSELS CONVENTIONS
19. International Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules of Law Relating to
Collision between Vessels, 1910
20. International Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules of Law Relating to
Assistance and Salvage at Sea, 1910 21.
21. International Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules of Law Relation to
Bills of Lading, 1924.
APPENDIX 5
Regional Maritime Convention to which Jamaica is a party.
1. Convention for the Protection and Development of the Marine Environment of the
Wider Caribbean Region, 1983.
APPENDIX 6
Bilateral Maritime Agreements to which Jamaica is party:
1. Jamaica I Colombia Fishing Agreement 1982
2. Jamaica / Colombia Fishing Agreement 1984
3. Jamaica I Colombia Fishing Agreement to initiate negotiations for delimitation of all
marine and submarine areas, corresponding to regions mentioned in the Jamaica /
Colombia Fishing Agreement, 1984.
4. Jamaica / Guyana Fishing Agreement, 1984
5. Jamaica / Mexico Maritime Transportation Agreement, 1975
6. Jamaica / Norway Protocol on Maritime Cooperation, 1980
7. Jamaica / USSR Agreement on merchant navigation, 1978
